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Abstract 
 The incidence of completed and attempted suicide among those with first episode 
psychosis (FEP) is high. Studies have shown that history of self-harming behaviour remains 
as the strongest predictor of both attempted and completed suicide in psychosis. Due to the 
lack of understanding about the suicidal thinking mechanism in psychosis, the development of 
effective treatment interventions continues to be a major gap for clinicians and patients. More 
importantly, the rate of suicidal relapse remains tragically frequent. In view of the fact that 
hopelessness is one of the most significant cognitive risk factors for suicidal behaviour in 
psychosis, the Differential Activation Hypothesis (DAH) of suicidal relapse may serve as a 
potential framework for understanding suicidality in psychosis. According to the DAH model, 
low mood triggers the recurrence of hopeless/suicidal thoughts in individuals who have 
previously felt suicidal during their early episodes of depression. This thesis sets out to 
investigate the suicidal thinking process in FEP, by comparing those with a history of suicidal 
attempt or deliberate self-harm vs. those without using the DAH of suicidal relapse as the 
main theoretical framework. 
 First, the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) was employed in order to examine the 
relationship between hopelessness and mood in the day to day life of people with psychosis. 
The ESM is a diary keeping procedure that systematically samples real-life data over a 6-day 
period. The ESM data showed that attenuated hopelessness was found to be more 
differentially active in response to negative affectivity in the suicidal history group (N = 35) 
than the non-suicidal group (N = 40).  
 Second, borrowing from the DAH methodology, the sad mood induction procedure 
(MIP) was employed. The purpose of the sad MIP was to induce feelings of sadness necessary 
to create a context that was suitable for reactivating hopeless thoughts. In conjunction with the 
sad MIP, the Means-Ends Problem Solving (MEPS) task was employed in order to measure 
the individual’s problem solving skills. It has been previously established that lack of problem 
solving skills is an important characteristic of hopelessness. In order to test if the dampening 
of mood will impair the individual’s problem solving ability, the MEPS task was performed 
before and after the sad MIP. The results were as predicted by the DAH: the reduction in 
problem solving ability following the mood challenge was significantly greater in the suicidal 
history group (N = 48) than the non-suicidal group (N = 49). 
 The Future Thinking (FT) task was also employed conjunction with the sad MIP. 
Similar to the MEPS task, the purpose of the mood challenge was to test if fluency for 
considering positive events, another important characteristic of hopelessness, will also 
respond to the changes in mood. The results indicated that the observed reduction in fluency 
for positive events following the mood challenge was more evident in the suicidal history 
group (N = 49) than the non-suicidal group (N = 50).  
 Together, these studies support the validity of the DAH of suicidal relapse as a 
framework for understanding the suicidal thinking mechanism in psychosis. More 
importantly, the consistent pattern of results shared between the ecological (ESM) and 
experimental (sad MIP) studies validates the application of the DAH in the real-life, day to 
day experiences of those at risk of suicidal relapse. The evidence suggesting the applicability 
of the DAH in FEP will help establish the importance of the interaction between distal and 
proximal risk factors for suicidality, which will be of great clinical value in improving the 
existing risk assessment procedures. 
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CHAPTER 1 
SUICIDALITY IN PSYCHOSIS 
 
1.0. Introduction  
The main goal of this thesis is to investigate the suicidal thinking process of 
individuals who recently suffered an initial episode of psychosis. Suicide is a major health 
issue worldwide with significant economic implications. According to the World Health 
Organisation (2012), the worldwide prevalence rate of suicide is about a million a year, 
which is approximately one complete suicide every 32 seconds. In the UK alone, the Office 
of National Statistics (2012) reported an incidence of 6,045 completed suicide in 2011, of 
which 4,552 are men and 1,493 women. Contrary to the popular belief, not everyone who 
attempts suicide is mentally ill.  Whereas many previous studies have indicated a strong link 
between suicidal behaviour and mental illness, a previous study suggests that only 1 out of 4 
suicide attempters have been in contact with the mental health services a year prior to their 
death (Pirkis & Burgess, 1998).  
 Understanding suicide and suicidal attempts remains difficult for clinicians and 
researchers alike. Suicidal behaviour is a complex phenomenon to predict given the 
enormous amount of potential risk factors, which can be intertwined in a number of ways.  
The purpose of this chapter is to review the scientific literature on hopelessness as a 
significant risk factor for suicidal behaviour in early psychosis. Preceding the review is a 
brief discussion of the general aspects of psychosis, its definition, diagnosis, and associated 
features. Following this is an overview of the prevalence and risk factors of suicidal 
behaviour in psychosis, with a particular emphasis on the role of hopelessness as an 
associated feature of suicidal vulnerability. The concluding discussion will point at the 
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application of the Differential Activation Hypothesis as a potential model for understanding 
hopelessness and managing suicidal vulnerabilities in early psychosis.  
 
1.1. The Diagnosis and Prevalence of Psychosis 
 According to the definition of the APA's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM IV; 2000), psychosis is a symptom of a distortion in rational thinking that is 
often characterised by the person’s inability to recognise reality from that of the imaginary. 
Also commonly described in the literature as a “loss of contact with reality”, psychosis 
typically manifests itself in the form of imaginary experiences (e.g. hallucinations) or 
fictitious beliefs (e.g. delusions or paranoia). Other forms of psychosis also include 
incoherent speech (e.g. word salad) and muddled thoughts (e.g. flight of ideas) along with a 
lack of awareness of the psychotic experience (APA, 2000). Whereas psychosis occurs as a 
symptom of other mental health conditions, the experience of psychosis alone does not 
warrant a diagnosis of mental illness. The initial episode of psychosis is often referred to as 
“early psychosis” or “first-episode psychosis” (Kirch, Lieberman, & Matthews, 1992). In 
general, psychotic episodes can range from briefly losing touch with reality due to the effects 
of sensory-altering drugs, to perpetually experiencing lapses from reality due to the presence 
of a long-term and severe psychiatric condition. Both the length and the causal factor of the 
psychotic experience will help determine the diagnosis of a psychotic illness. A diagnosis is 
particularly difficult to make during the initial psychotic episode due to the lack of 
information on the causal factors that triggered the symptom on the first place. In order to 
formulate a diagnosis, a clinician carries out a mental health examination in the form of a 
clinical interview. A diagnosis of Schizophrenia is usually given when a psychotic episode 
lasts for 6 months or more. A diagnosis of Bipolar is typically given when the psychotic 
symptoms are accompanied by cycles of polar opposite mood swings, from extreme highs 
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(mania) to lows (depression; APA, 2000). Other types of diagnostic labels for psychosis are: 
drug-induced psychosis, organic psychosis (psychotic episode due to a particular physical 
condition), brief reactive psychosis (a brief psychotic experience due to a traumatic life 
event), psychotic depression (depression with psychotic features), schizophreniform disorder 
(psychotic episode of less than 6 months), and schizoaffective disorder (psychotic symptoms 
are neither that of schizophrenia nor a mood disorder; APA, 2000).  
 According to the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (2009), the prevalence rate 
of psychotic illness in the UK across age is about 7 per 1000 of the population. Mangalore 
and Knapp (2006) indicated that about 37 – 40% of the incidence of psychotic episodes in the 
country satisfy the diagnostic criteria for Schizophrenia. In a survey conducted by the Office 
of National Statistics (2000), schizophrenia alone has a yearly prevalence rate of 5 per 1000 
of the population in the UK.  Although schizophrenia affects men and women equally, the 
onset of schizophrenia in men occurs at an earlier point in their lives (15 – 24 years of age) 
compared to the onset in women (24 – 35 year of age; Hafner, Maurer, Loffler, & Riecher-
Rossler, 1993; Hafner, Riecher-Rossler, Maurer, et al., 1992). The incidence of schizophrenia 
has also been reported to be particularly higher in the black and minority ethnic or BMI 
groups (Bresnahan et al., 2007; Sharpley, Hutchinson, McKenzie, & Murray, 2001).  
 
1.2. Phases of Psychosis 
 There are three stages to a psychotic episode (APA, 2000). The length of each stage, 
however, varies greatly from person to person. Stage 1 is known as the prodromal phase and 
is characterised by changes in the person’s behaviour and perception of things, along with 
his/her feelings and thoughts. These changes may be too subtle for some people to and to 
some extent, completely undetectable (Jackson, McGorry, & McKenzie, 1994; Heinrichs, & 
Carpenter, 1985; Malla & Norman, 1994). The length of this phase varies but may last up to 
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several months in some people. Stage 2 is known as the acute phase and is characterised by 
severe, observable psychotic symptoms. This is typically the phase when the person gets 
referred for diagnosis and treatment. Finally, stage 3 is known as the recovery phase.  This is 
the point when the person’s psychotic symptoms start to recede with the help of an 
appropriate treatment. Although recovery has been strongly linked with the delays in 
treatment (Marshall, Lewis, Lockwood, Drake, Jones, & Croudace, 2005; Wunderink, 
Sytema, Nienhuis, & Wiersma, 2009), recovery is also linked with a number of individual 
and social factors. Despite the subjective nature of recovery, the prognosis of psychosis 
following its first episode is generally good with approximately between a quarter and a third 
of the people never re-experiencing any form of psychosis again after the initial episode 
(Wunderink et al., 2009; Verma, Subramaniam, Abdin et al., 2012 ).    
 When a person loses touch with reality, that person also loses touch with people who 
are important to them (e.g. family & friends) and his/her surrounding environment (e.g. 
school or work). The prodromal phase can be complicated for both the sufferers and their 
family, as the subtle, peculiar changes in the sufferers’ behaviour can sometimes cause 
misunderstanding, or even a break down in relationships.  The acute phase, on the other hand, 
can be a very frightening and traumatic experience not just for the sufferers but also for the 
people closest to them (Jackson, Knott, Skeate, et al., 2004; Barton & Jackson, 2008). A lack 
of awareness on the part of a family who is caring for an acutely psychotic individual can 
make a difficult situation distressing for both parties. Unfortunately, identification of 
psychosis can also be problematic for some general practitioners and many non-mental health 
nurses (Lamph, 2010). The formation of a specialist service such as the Early Intervention 
Teams meant that specialist intervention is now available at the earliest sign of psychosis. 
Intervening at the earliest possible stage not only reduces the trauma associated with the acute 
psychotic phase, but also ensures a much better prognosis and recovery (Birchwood & 
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McMillan, 1993a; Birchwood, McGorry, & Jackson, 1997; Birchwood, Fowler & Jackson, 
2001; Craig, Garety, & Power, 2004; McGorry & Jackson, 1999; NICE, 2009).  
 Given that psychosis typically occurs between late adolescence and the early years of 
adulthood (18 – 25), a particularly crucial period for identity formation and psycho-social 
development, its disruptive effect often prompts secondary problems such as lack of self-
confidence or self-esteem (Birchwood, Fowler, & Jackson, 2001; Gumley, O'Grady, Power, 
& Schwannauer, 2004; Gumley, Karatzias, Power, et al., 2006). A number of studies 
conducted by Birchwood and his colleagues indicated that individuals experiencing an FEP 
were also more prone to depression and suicidal ideation (Birchwood, Smith, McMillan et 
al., 1989; Birchwood, Mason, McMillan, & Healy, 1993b; Rooke & Birchwood, 1998; Iqbal, 
Birchwood, Chadwick, & Trower, 2000).      
 
1.3. The Prevalence of Suicide in First Episode Psychosis 
 The reported prevalence rate of suicidal attempt from the moment psychosis starts 
until the onset of treatment (also known as the duration of untreated psychosis) is between 
6.5 and 9.6% (Clarke, Whitty, Browne et al., 2006; Foley, Jackson, McWilliams et al., 2008). 
In studies whose samples were recruited from the initial presentation to psychiatric service, 
rather than the actual psychosis onset, the rate of suicidal attempt prior to starting the initial 
treatment is between 14% and 28% (Bertelsen, Jeppesen, & Petersen, 2007; Robinson, 
Harris, Harrigan et al., 2009; Barret, Sundet, Faerden et al., 2010). Despite the timing 
discrepancy upon which the rates of suicidal attempts were measured, the incidence of 
suicidal attempts following treatment remains high across the FEP spectrum. Short-term and 
long-term follow-up studies indicated a variety of results. One-year follow up studies 
reported a prevalence rate of attempted suicide between 2.9 and 25.4% (Addington, Williams, 
Young, & Addington, 2004; Bakst, Rabinowitz, & Bromet, 2010; Nordentoft, Jeppesen, 
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Kassow et al., 2002; Robinson et al., 2009), while 2 to 7-year follow-up studies reported a 
prevalence rate of attempted suicide between 6 and 29.4% (Bakst et al., 2010; Foley et al., 
2008; Levine, Bakst, & Rabinowitz, 2010; Melle, Johannesen, Friis, et al., 2006; Robinson et 
al., 2010; Walsh, Harvey, White et al., 2001). In schizophrenia alone, the lifetime prevalence 
rate of completed suicide is about 5% (Palmer, Pankratz, & Botswick, 2005; Hor & Taylor, 
2010), with the highest suicide risk during the early stages of the illness (Brown, 1997; Harris 
& Barraclough, 1997; Palmer et al., 2005). Studies on the FEP spectrum over a 4 to 5-year 
follow-up period, on the other hand, have estimated the rate of completed suicide in early 
psychosis between 1 and 3% (Bertelsen et al., 2007; Clarke et al., 2006; Crumlish, Whitty, 
Kamali et al., 2005) 
 The variability in the prevalence rates of both completed and attempted suicide within 
the FEP spectrum is probably due to two things. One, the “diagnostic instability” during the 
early phase of psychosis (Haahr, Friis, Larsen et al., 2008) makes the identification of eligible 
research volunteers complicated for many researchers. Two, the timing discrepancy due to 
the psychosis being inconsistently detectable during its prodromal phase also contributes to 
the variability of the study time scales. So far, only a few studies have looked into the 
incidence of suicidal attempts and deliberate self-harm within the duration of untreated 
psychosis, or that time between the psychosis onset and start of treatment (Harvey, Dean, 
Morgan et al., 2008; Upthegrove, Birchwood, Brunnet, McCollum, & Jones, 2010). The 
majority of studies have focused only on the time between the initial presentation and 
treatment onset, or the treatment onset and follow up period.    
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1.4. Risk Factors of Suicide in FEP 
 In a systematic review conducted by Hawton and his colleagues in 2005, it was found 
that a number of risk factors for suicide in schizophrenia were comparable to that of the non-
psychiatric population (e.g. previous suicidal attempts, depression, recent loss, & drug 
misuse). Similar risk factors were found when Hor and Taylor (2010) conducted a systematic 
review on the studies published after June 2004, the cut- off date for the studies included in 
the previous review. Hor and Taylor (2010) have also found that in addition to those factors 
that were shared by the non-psychiatric population, being young, male, and well educated 
emerged to be the strongest risk factors. Just like Hawton et al. (2005), Hor and Taylor 
(2010) found other risk factors that were illness-specific. Previous studies have shown that 
individuals suffering from psychotic illnesses are not only at high risks of attempted suicide 
(Harris & Barraclough, 1998; Harkavy-Friedman, 2006), but also completed suicide (Brown, 
1997; Saha, Chant, & McGrath, 2007). According to Limosin et al. (2007), the risk of 
completed suicide for individuals with psychosis is about 16 times greater than that of the 
non-psychiatric population. It is for this reason why a more precise identification of the risk 
factors in this particular clinical group is of great clinical importance. The risk factors 
identified below were extracted from studies that investigated suicidal behaviour within the 
FEP spectrum. 
 
1.4.1. Demographic Risk Factors 
 The most commonly cited demographic risk factors that were found to be 
significantly associated with completed suicides are young age (Ceskova et al., 2011; Walsh 
et al., 2001) and male gender (Ceskova, Prikryl, & Kasparek, 2011; De Hert, McKenzie, & 
Peuskens, 2001). Alternatively, the risk factors associated with attempted suicide are female 
gender (Cotton, Lambert, Schimmelmman et al., 2009; Hawton, 1997; Melle et al., 2006; 
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Nordentoft et al., 2002; Zahl & Hawton, 2004) and younger age at illness onset (Barret et al., 
2010). Substance abuse issues, non-compliance to treatment, and more impaired cognitive 
functioning are some of the key reasons why the incidence of completed suicide is higher in 
males than females (Cotton et al., 2009).  
 
1.4.2. Clinical and Psychosocial Risk Factors 
 The most common clinical symptoms that predicted suicidal attempts in both short-
term and long-term follow-up studies were depression (Barret et al., 2010; Bertelsen et al., 
2007; Cohen, Lavelle, Rich, & Bromet, 1994; Cotton et al., 2009; Crumlish et al., 2005; 
Flanagan & Compton, 2012; Fialko et al., 2006; Hawton et al., 2005; Melle et al., 2006; 
Robinson et al., 2010) and hopelessness (Cohen et al., 1994; Klonksy, Kotov, Bakst, 
Rabinowitz, & Bromet, 2012; Nordentoft et al., 2002; Robinson et al., 2009), along with 
greater insight (Barret et al., 2010; Crumlish et al., 2005; Flanagan & Compton; 2012; Foley 
et al., 2008). Illness-specific risk factors that were found to be associated with subsequent 
suicidal attempts include the early stages of the illness (Brown, 1997; Harris & Barraclough, 
1997; Palmer et al., 2005), less positive symptoms (Verdoux, Liraud, Gonzales et al., 2001), 
hallucination (Bertelsen et al., 2007; Fialko, Freeman, Bebbington et al., 2006; Nordentoft et 
al., 2002), negative beliefs (Barret et al., 2010; Fialko et al., 2006), and anxiety (Fialko et al., 
2006). Other illness-related factors that were also linked to the recurrence of suicidal 
behaviour are duration of untreated psychosis (Clarke et al., 2006; Melle et al., 2006), higher 
premorbid functioning (De Hert et al., 2001), and prolonged initial admission (Verdoux et al., 
2001).  
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1.4.3. Behavioural Risk Factors 
 Overall, the most prevalent risk factor for suicidal behaviour across the FEP spectrum 
is the history of self-harm and/or suicidal attempt (De Hert et al., 2001; Hawton et al., 2005; 
Flanagan & Compton, 2012; Nordentoft et al., 2002; Robinson et al., 2010; Verdoux et al., 
2001). A number of studies have indicated that problems with alcohol also increased the risk 
of attempted suicide in early psychosis (Fialko et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2010). According 
to Verdoux (2001), the risk of engaging in suicidal behaviour over a 2-year follow-up was 
seven-fold in substance abusers. According to the systematic review conducted by Hawton 
and colleagues (2005), drug misuse was also found to significantly increase the suicidal risks 
in FEP patients. On the other hand, Tiihonen, Wahlbeck, and Lonnqvist (2006) have 
indicated that recently discharged first-episode schizophrenia patients were about 37 times 
more likely to die by suicide than those who are at a later stage of the psychotic illness. This 
was especially true for those who have an irregular compliance to their anti-psychotic 
medication. 
 
1.5. Hopelessness as a risk factor in FEP 
 There is an enormous amount of literature on the role of hopelessness as a risk factor 
of attempted and completed suicide in both non-psychiatric and psychiatric populations. 
However, to date, there are only three prospective studies that looked into the relationship 
between hopelessness and subsequent suicide attempts within the FEP spectrum (Klonksy, 
Kotov, Bakst, Rabinowitz, & Bromet, 2012; Nordentoft et al., 2002; Robinson et al., 2009). 
The other published studies were either retrospective or cross-sectional, with samples that 
were not exclusive to FEP (Borgeois, Swendsen, Young et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 1994; 
Kim, Jayathilake, & Meltzer, 2002; Montross, Kasckow, Golshan et al., 2008).     
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1.5.1. Hopelessness: Studies that Link Suicidality in FEP and Hopelessness 
 Of the three prospective studies that examined the link between hopelessness and 
suicidal risks in FEP, only two studies were able to demonstrate the predictive value of 
hopelessness in determining the recurrence of suicidal behaviour in this particular sample. In 
a randomised controlled trial of first-episode schizophrenia-spectrum patients, Nordentoft and 
colleagues (2002) found that baseline hopelessness was significantly associated with the 
attempted suicides during the 1-year follow-up. However, hopelessness did not emerge as a 
predictor of subsequent suicidal attempts after controlling for the effects of the other clinical 
variables in the multivariate analysis (e.g. positive & negative symptoms, depression, etc.). 
On the contrary, Robinson et al.’s (2010) 7.4 year follow-up study on the prevalence and risk 
factors of suicide in FEP indicated that along with self-harm, suicidal tendencies, and 
depression, hopelessness emerged as one of the key predictors of subsequent suicidal 
attempts during the follow-up period. More importantly, Robinson and colleagues (2010) 
confirmed that the predictive value of hopelessness holds true after covarying out the effects 
of age at psychosis onset, gender, DUP and previous self-harm. A similar pattern of results 
were found in Klonsky et al.’s (2012) 10 year cohort study of first admission patients with 
psychosis. To this point, this is the only study that specifically set out to examine 
hopelessness as a predictor of future suicidal behaviour exclusively within the FEP spectrum. 
Results from this authoritative study revealed that baseline hopelessness significantly 
predicted subsequent suicidal attempts within the 10-year follow-up period, and this holds 
true after controlling for depression. Intriguingly, further analyses indicated that the 
predictive power of hopelessness was strongest over short-term intervals (2 years or less). 
Klonsky and colleagues (2010) indicated the predictive power of hopelessness as a risk factor 
of a suicide attempt remained strong only until the subsequent 2 years. Following the 2-year 
period after the hopelessness was assessed, the predictive power of hopelessness declines to 
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the minimum level. For example, results showed that baseline hopelessness predicted suicide 
attempts up until the 24-month follow-up period, but not the later follow-ups (i.e. 48 month – 
10 years). A similar pattern of results was found when hopelessness was measured at 24
th
 
month and predicted suicide attempts over the subsequent 2 years (i.e. between 24 and 48
th
 
month follow up), but not the follow-ups after that.  
 Despite the congruence of outcome of Robinson et al.’s (2010) and Klonsky’s et al.’s 
(2012) studies, the overall findings about the predictive role of hopelessness on future 
suicidal attempts in FEP are subject to a number of limitations, thus, making it hard to 
interpret. First, the studies used different scales to measure the construct of hopelessness. 
Klonsky et al. (2012) employed the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, Weissman, Lester, 
& Trexler ,1974). The BHS is a tool that is renowned for being the “gold-standard” measure 
of hopelessness. On the other hand, Robinson et al., (2010) employed The Royal Park 
Multidiagnostic Instrument for Psychosis or the RPMIP (McGorry, Singh, Copolov et al., 
1990). Although the RPMIP has a respectable reliability (mean kappa for all items = .70) and 
validity (RPMIP vs. DSM-III-R: kappa = .65, 74% agreement) overall, to date, there is no 
published information about the validity and reliability of the hopelessness items in this 
measure. Second, due to the fact that Robinson et al.’s study (2010) was only on a part of an 
overarching research programme, the study was not originally designed to examine the risk 
factors of suicidal behaviour. Due to this, hopelessness was only measured at baseline and 
unlike Klonsky et al. (2012), Robinson and colleagues (2010) was not able to demonstrate the 
trajectory of hopelessness as a predictor of attempted suicide across the different follow-up 
periods. Third, although both studies were able to demonstrate the relationship between 
hopelessness and recurrence of suicidal behaviour in early psychosis, both studies were not 
able to capture the social contexts (e.g. social support) and other clinical or behavioural 
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factors (e.g. depression, problem-solving skills, & others)  that might have facilitated 
hopelessness, and more importantly the recurrence of suicidal behaviour.  
 
1.5.2. Hopelessness: The Need for a Theoretical Model in Psychosis 
 While there is an increasing amount of information on the risk factors of suicidal 
behaviour in early psychosis, to date, there is no model that explains the mechanism of 
suicidal thinking in either the FEP spectrum or general psychotic disorders. With the 
mortality rate by suicide in schizophrenia alone being 10 times greater than the non-
psychiatric population (Nordentoft, Laursen, Agerbo et al., 2004) and the first-episode 
patients being at higher risks of killing themselves than those who are at a later stage of the 
illness (Bertelsen et al., 2007), it is crucial to have a model of suicidality that takes into 
account the experience of psychosis. Although previous studies have shown that the risks of 
attempted suicide in FEP are strongly linked with depression (Barret et al., 2010; Bertelsen et 
al., 2007; Cohen et al., 1994; Cotton et al., 2009; Crumlish et al., 2005; Flanagan & 
Compton, 2012; Fialko et al., 2006; Hawton et al., 2005; Melle et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 
2010) and hopelessness (Cohen et al., 1994; Klonksy et al., 2012; Nordentoft et al., 2002; 
Robinson et al., 2009), along with higher insight (Barret et al., 2010; Crumlish et al., 2005; 
Flanagan & Compton; 2012; Foley et al., 2008), there are risk factors that are specific to the 
experience of the illness itself. For example, the early stage of the illness (Brown, 1997; 
Harris & Barraclough, 1997; Palmer et al., 2005) has been linked to subsequent suicidal 
attempts. At this point in time, it is a fact that the presence of a psychotic disorder (Cohen et 
al., 1994; Nordentoft et al., 2004; Verdoux et al., 2001), especially those with significant 
depressive symptoms (Barret et al., 2010; Bertelsen et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 1994; Cotton et 
al., 2009; Crumlish et al., 2005; Flanagan & Compton, 2012; Fialko et al., 2006; Hawton et 
al., 2005; Melle et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2010), are at particular high risks for both 
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attempted and completed suicide. However, it is not exactly clear if the experience of 
psychosis per se, more specifically the early phase of the illness, has any impact on the 
relationship between hopelessness and risks for suicidal behaviour.      
 So far, the literature on suicidal behaviour more broadly is predominantly limited by 
two things: First, theoretical models of suicidality were narrowly grounded on either 
biosocial [i.e. Schotte & Clum’s stress-diathesis model (1987)] or the cognitive [i.e. 
Baumeister’s Escape theory (1999) & Carver & Scheier’s Self-regulation or Goal-
Disengagement model (1998)] aspects of suicidal behaviour. And although the stress-
diathesis model (Schotte & Clum, 1987) paved the way to the conception of two of the most 
promising theoretical models of suicidal behaviour to date [i.e. Williams & Pollock’s Cry of 
Pain Model (2001), which led to the formation of the Differential Activation Hypothesis of 
suicidal relapse (Lau, Segal, & Williams, 2004)], the earlier stress-diathesis model (Schotte 
& Clum, 1987) was simply restricted to the importance of certain risk factors and the 
relationship between them (Mann, Waternaux, Haas, & Malone, 1999). Second, samples used 
to test these models were limited to either the non-psychiatric, healthy population, or 
currently and previously recovered depressed individuals. In view of these two current 
limitations in the literature, the present study looks into the application of the DAH of 
suicidal relapse (Lau, Segal, & Williams, 2004) as a potential model for understanding 
suicidality in psychosis. With the assumptions of the DAH framework focusing on the 
underlying mechanism of suicidal thinking, the applicability of this model in psychosis will 
help clinicians manage and prevent suicidal relapse better. This is especially crucial in FEP as 
the suicidal thinking process often happens too quickly and the incidence of completed 
suicide often happens unexpectedly.   
 
  
14 
 
1.6. The Differential Activation Hypothesis of Suicidal Relapse 
 The DAH of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004) was an extension of Teasdale’s DAH 
of depressive relapse (1988), which in brief suggests that due to the formation of a link 
between the depressed mood and certain negative thinking patterns during the early 
depressive episodes, reoccurrences of low mood will trigger these patterns of negative 
thinking (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). The ease and the extent to which these negative 
thinking patterns are triggered by the depressed mood is what Teasdale referred to as the 
“cognitive reactivity” to depression (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Lau and colleagues (2004) 
extend Teasdale’s DAH of depressive relapse (1988) by employing the assumptions of his 
model to explain the mechanism of suicidal thinking. By adopting the assumptions of the 
original DAH, the differential activation model of suicidal relapse suggests that during the 
early episodes of depression, a link is formed between a depressed mood and a pattern of 
negative and maladaptive thoughts. Hopelessness, as a form of an intensely negative, self-
referential thinking, occurs as part of these negative and maladaptive thinking patterns that 
becomes associated with the depressed mood. The link that is formed between the depressed 
mood and hopelessness is then reinforced through repeated episodes of depression. The 
stronger the link between the depressed mood and hopelessness, the more easy and likely 
hopeless thoughts will get reactivated in the event that low mood reoccurs. In keeping with 
Teasdale’s idea of “cognitive reactivity”, the ease and extent to which the depressed mood 
can trigger hopelessness is what characterises the individual’s cognitive reactivity to 
hopelessness (Lau et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2008). In other words, the greater the 
reactivity to hopelessness is, the more vulnerable the individual is to a suicidal relapse. An 
elevated CR to hopelessness would simply mean that even minor negative shifts in mood will 
easily reactivate hopeless/suicidal cognition.  
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1.6.1. Generalised hopelessness vs. Cognitive reactivity to hopelessness  
 Historically, the word hopeless originate from the 16
th
 century and was a combination 
of the old English words “hopa”, which means “to place trust in, or to rely in”, and “leas”, 
which means “without” (dictionary.com unabridged). By literally combining the meaning of 
these two old English words together, the definition of hopelessness then becomes without 
having anyone or anything to put your trust in. Linehan and colleagues (1983) described 
hopelessness as the lack of reasons for living, while Beck and colleagues (1999) characterised 
it as a negative outlook for the future. In 1975, Beck, Kovac, and Weissman first linked 
hopelessness with suicidality and since then, numerous attempts have been made to uncover 
the role of this multifaceted construct in suicidal behaviour.  
 To date, the literature on suicidal behaviour in early psychosis has only looked into 
hopelessness as a generalised pessimistic view of the future, which is typically measured by 
using the Beck Hopelessness Scale (Beck et al., 1974). In 2004, Lau and colleagues 
introduced the concept of “cognitive reactivity to hopelessness” as the core idea of their DAH 
of suicidal relapse. The term “cognitive reactivity” to hopelessness literally translates as the 
vulnerability to hopeless thoughts. Unlike the concept of generalised hopelessness which 
characterises how negative the individual perceives the future on the whole, cognitive 
reactivity to hopelessness characterises the individual’s tendency to pessimistic thinking 
given a negative situation. In summary, generalised hopelessness describes the overall 
response of the individual to a difficult situation, while CR to hopelessness describes the 
more immediate response should the individual encounter a difficult situation.  
 
1.6.2. Studies on cognitive reactivity to hopelessness  
 As the DAH of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004) is still in its early stages, there is 
only a limited number of studies that currently supports its assumptions. So far, the 
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application of the DAH of suicidal relapse has only been tested on a sample or previously 
depressed individuals, and that was largely due to the fact that suicidal ideation is a one of the 
most crucial symptoms of depression. In 2005, Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, and Beck 
conducted a study to test the hypothesis. The main objective of the study was to investigate 
the effects of mood on the individual’s problem-solving ability. Previous studies have 
identified problem-solving deficit as a behavioural marker of hopelessness (Schotte & Clum, 
1982; Orbach, Bar-Joseph, & Dror, 1990; Sadowsky & Kelly, 1993). The sample consisted of 
3 groups: (1) 15 previously depressed individuals without the history of suicidal ideation, (2) 
19 previously depressed individuals with a history of suicidal ideation, and (3) 22 never 
depressed individuals. According to Williams and colleagues (2005), the lack of coping 
options is exacerbated by impaired problem solving ability, which then facilitates the 
escalation of the depressed mood into suicidal thoughts. A mood priming technique was 
employed in order to test if a downward shift in mood will significantly impair the problem 
solving ability of the previously depressed group with a history of suicidal ideation. 
Consistent with the authors’ assumption, results showed that only the previously depressed 
group with a history of suicidal ideation exhibited impaired problem solving performance 
following a sad mood induction. However, the impairment was only evident in the 
effectiveness, but not in the number of problem solving means. In other words, although there 
was a significant decrease in the effectiveness of the problem solving means following the 
mood challenge, quantity of the problem solving means generated did not differ between 
groups. As cited by authors themselves, this study has a number of limitations. First, the 
sample size is relatively small. Second, the autobiographical memory data are in conflict with 
previous studies. The autobiographical memory task was also employed in this study as the 
authors also speculated that impaired performance is associated with the lack of specificity in 
autobiographical memory. Unexpectedly, scores of individuals with & without histories of 
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depression did not differ in autobiographical memory tests. Finally, the absence of a neutral 
mood induction control group that could have helped identify the effects of any undesirable 
variables on the problem solving performance. 
 Following this, Hepburn, Barnhofer, and Williams (2006) investigated the effects of 
mood on future thinking on a sample of 52 non-depressed individuals. A number of studies 
have evidenced that the lack of fluency in positive future thinking is a significant feature of 
hopelessness (MacLeod, Rose, & Williams, 1993; MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, & Mitchell, 
1997; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). The sample was randomly allocated to the two mood 
priming conditions (positive vs. negative). The results were in agreement with the authors’ 
hypothesis as the negative mood induction reduced the fluency for good events while the 
positive mood induction reduced the fluency for bad events. Intriguingly, however, the 
negative mood induction did not increase the fluency for bad events just as the positive mood 
induction did not increase the fluency for good events. The authors suggested that such a 
pattern of results may be due to the possibility that future fluency was more sensitive to 
diminution than increase when subjected to subtle mood changes. In addition to investigating 
the effect of mood on future thinking, it was also predicted that future fluency is due to 
mood-related changes in the evaluation process (i.e. positive vs. negative categorisation of 
events). Although evidence showed that mood influenced the perceived valence of events 
(e.g. good events were rated as more negative in a sad than recovered mood), the change in 
pre- to post-induction future fluency did not correlate with the change in pre- to post-
induction valence ratings. However, the authors suggested the lack of association between 
perceived valence and future fluency might be due to the small sample size and should 
therefore not be ruled out on this occasion. In addition to the sample size, there are further 
limitations to this study. The sample consisted of non-depressed students whose 
characteristics are different to that of a clinical sample, who are at higher risks of suicidal 
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behaviours. Although the mood challenge in general altered future fluency as predicted, the 
lack of neutral mood induction made it slightly difficult to isolate the effects of the positive 
and negative mood induction on future fluency. However, overall, this study was an 
important step in the literature of the DAH of suicidality. The confirmation that even subtle 
shifts in mood altered future fluency was a novel and important finding, which served as a 
platform for studies that aim to explore the mechanism of hopeless or suicidal cognition.  
 Williams, Crane, Barnhofer, Van der Does, and Segal (2006) also published a study, 
which prospectively examined the recurrence of suicidal ideation across depressive episodes. 
The aim of this study was twofold: (1) to examine the extent of association between suicidal 
ideation and other symptoms of major depression across depressive episodes, and (2) to 
investigate the nature of inconsistencies in suicidality across episodes, and when they arise. A 
total of 69 individuals with a history of Major Depression (MDD) were allocated to treatment 
as usual and prospectively studied over a 12-month period. Follow-up data revealed that a 
total of 38 individuals (56%) had a recurrence of depression. Results suggest that suicidal 
ideation is the only symptom that appears consistent across depressive episodes. The authors, 
however, have pointed out that there was a decrease in severity of suicidality from previous 
episode to recurrence. One of the reasons is the possibility that patients might have 
underreported current suicidal ideation in fear of intervention. Overall, this study provided 
initial evidence on the recurrence of suicidal behaviour across depressive episodes in line 
with the assumptions of DAH of suicidal relapse. According to the DAH, once suicidal 
ideation has occurred during a depressive episode, it is more likely to reoccur along with the 
re-emergence of another depressive episode. The two main limitations of this study include 
the small sample size, and that the reoccurrence of suicidal ideation was measured in the 
absence of suicidal attempts.  
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 Enthused by the results of the previous study, the same authors (Williams, Van der 
Does, Barnhofer, Crane, & Segal, 2008) conducted a study to investigate if the reoccurrence 
of suicidal or hopeless thoughts over time can be illustrated using the DAH of suicidality. 
There were 3 parts to this study. The aim of studies 1 and 2 was to examine if cognitive 
reactivity as measured by the hopelessness/suicidality subscale of the Leiden Index of 
Depression Scale – revised version (Van der Does & Williams, 2003) will be associated with 
previous suicidal ideation. On the other hand, the aim of study 3 was to examine if higher CR 
as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale will be associated with impairment in 
future fluency when in a sad mood state. Participants in the study 1 consisted of 36 
previously depressed and 80 never depressed first year undergraduate psychology students, 
while participants in study 2 consisted of 63 previously depressed and 57 never depressed 
middle-aged adults. Participants who have been identified as previously depressed met the 
criteria for the previous Major Depression using Major Depression Questionnaire (Van der 
Does, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2003). As predicted, results of studies 1 and 2 indicated that 
individuals who had higher scores on LEIDS’ hopelessness/suicidal ideation subscale also 
admitted to having suicidal ideations in the past when feeling depressed. Such pattern of data 
was consistent with the previous study (Williams et al., 2006), which illustrated that suicidal 
ideation was the only symptom that was consistent across depressive episodes. On the other 
hand, participants in study 3 were a subgroup of individuals who took part in study 2. Of the 
32 individuals who met the inclusion criteria, 13 had been previously depressed without 
suicidal ideation, 5 had been previously depressed with suicidal ideation, and 14 had never 
been depressed at all. Results for study 3 also confirmed the assumption that CR, as measured 
by the LEIDS’ hopelessness/suicidality subscale, was predictive of the changes in positive 
future fluency (as measured using the Future Fluency Task) following the sad mood 
induction. Similar results were found in an earlier study conducted by Hepburn and 
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colleagues (2006), which indicated a decrease in positive future fluency following a sad 
mood induction. Despite the promising results, careful considerations must be observed when 
drawing conclusions from this study. The authors have identified a number of limitations. 
Firstly, the sample size is relatively small and the rate of depression in both genders did not 
differ. Secondly, the specificity of the relationship between history of suicidal ideation and 
CR to hopelessness was based on two things: (1) with the exception of guilt, all other 
depressive symptoms did not predict CR to hopelessness, and (2) history of suicidal ideation 
did not predict the other subscale of LEIDS. Despite the association between history of 
suicidal ideation and CR to hopelessness holding true after controlling for current depression 
and severity of past depression, the authors suggested that the sample size might be lacking in 
power to detect the differences between the other subscales of LEIDS. More importantly, the 
lack of distinction between the magnitude of group differences in the hopelessness subscale, 
and the other LEIDS’ subscales across the two groups (with suicidal ideation vs. without 
suicidal ideation) seemed to suggest that history of suicidal ideation may not only be specific 
to higher CR to hopelessness. Further analyses showed that both the ruminative and avoidant 
tendency were significant covariates to CR to hopelessness. Finally, the authors pointed out 
that the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale was devised to measure CR to hopelessness or 
suicidal ideations and not to suicidal attempts. As the majority of the participants in this study 
only had histories of ideation, the interpretation of results with regards to the use of this 
subscale is therefore limited only within this type of sample. The authors recognised that this 
measure needs to be validated in a clinical sample with higher rates of suicidal attempts.   
 In summary, the results of the previous studies support the assumptions of the DAH 
of suicidal relapse by demonstrating that a subtle downward shift in mood impairs problem 
solving (Williams et al., 2005) and fluency for positive events (Hepburn et al., 2006), two of 
the most widely recognised characteristics of hopelessness. The observed recurrence of 
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suicidal behaviour across depressive episodes also renders support to the DAH of suicidal 
relapse, which suggest that once suicidal ideation occurs as a feature of an early depressive 
episode, it is more likely to reoccur in another depressive episode (Williams et al., 2006 & 
2007). Together, these results illustrate that vulnerability to suicidal thinking can be measured 
via quantifiable behavioural features of hopelessness (e.g. problem solving & future fluency). 
Identification of the most relevant risk factors for suicide is crucial for a successful 
prevention and treatment of suicidal behaviour. While the DAH framework is only in its 
infancy, evidence that supports its concept on cognitive reactivity represents a good starting 
point for further investigation of the suicidal thinking mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHOD 
 
2.0. Introduction 
 One of the major difficulties in investigating suicidal thinking is the lack of context 
that is relevant to the occurrence of this pernicious thinking process. To date, the suicidal 
thinking process has only been studied within the confines of the laboratory. The purpose of 
this chapter is to review the scientific literature on the Experience Sampling Method 
(Delespaul, 1995; de Vries, 1992) in order to assess its potential as a research tool for 
investigating the suicidal thinking process in early psychosis. Preceding the review is a brief 
discussion of the general aspects of the ESM, its definition and use in psychosis research, 
limitations and strengths, and validity and reliability as a research method. Following this is a 
review of the previous ESM studies in psychosis. The concluding discussion will point at the 
application of the ESM as a potential tool for investigating the suicidal thinking mechanism 
in psychosis using the DAH framework. 
 
2.1. The Experience Sampling Method (ESM): An Overview 
 The ESM was originally defined as a process of collecting data about a person’s daily 
life experiences (Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihayli, 2007).  The use of ESM was first 
initiated by Hektner, Schmidt, and Csikszentmihayli during the early 1970’s to study the 
‘flow’ (Hektner et al., 2007) of daily life experiences. It all started with the use of pagers 
activated at random times from a central radio station, prompting people to write in their 
diaries about the things they have done and enjoyable moments of their day. The last 4 
decades of research has transformed the ESM into using a more structured diary method, 
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making it a widely popular tool in investigating an extensive range of human behaviour and 
activities, in a variety of disciplines (e.g. psychology, sociology, & anthropology). 
 Researchers of contemporary ESM studies characterise the ESM as a systematic diary 
keeping technique, which requires individuals to fill in a self-report questionnaire at 
predetermined times of the day within his/her real life environment (Delespaul, 1995; de 
Vries, 1992). The term “diary keeping” was central to the description of the ESM for two 
reasons: (1) the questionnaires are compiled in a form of a small diary or booklet, and (2) just 
like the traditional diary; the ESM booklet keeps a record of daily events and activities over a 
specific period of time. The self-report questionnaires in an ESM diary usually consists of 
open- and close-ended, Likert formatted questions, which were formulated to assess for 
topics that are of key interest in the study. Depending on the study, each questionnaire will 
take about 1 to 1.5 minutes to complete and each ESM diary consists of at least 3 to 10 
identical questionnaires that are to filled in one questionnaire at a time, as and when 
prompted by a programmable device (e.g. a digital wristwatch, mobile phone, personal digital 
assistant/PDA, or beeper), at predetermined times of the day. Sampling time schedules are 
always semi-randomised in order to avoid clustering of the sampling time points (Delespaul, 
1995; de Vries, 1992). The duration of ESM studies vary from a day to several years 
(Csikszentmihayli & Schneider, 2001).   
 
2.2. The Use of ESM in Psychosis Research 
 In clinical research, the ESM is also referred to as the “Ecological Momentary 
Assessment” (Stone & Shiffman, 1994). However, for the purpose of this review, only the 
term ESM will be used. The use of ESM as a research tool in psychosis has come a long way 
since it was initially used in 1987 (Hurlburt & Melancon) when a patient with schizophrenia 
was asked to write a narrative description of her daily hallucinatory experiences. Over the last 
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25 years, this purely qualitative, freestyle-written diary method has evolved into what is now 
the present-day ESM, a diary keeping technique that is more systematic and structured. The 
advancement of ESM as a research tool in psychopathology is largely due to a group of 
clinicians and researchers from the University of Maastricht in The Netherlands (e.g. 
Delespaul, de Vries, Myin-Germeys, Van Os, & others). At the same time Hurlburt and 
Melancon (1987) first used ESM on a single case study, Delespaul and de Vries (1987) 
devised an ESM diary with open- and close-ended questions. The reformulated diary 
questionnaire was used to capture the daily life experiences of 11 non-psychiatric volunteers 
and 11 patients with chronic mental illness. Through the use of both open- and close-ended 
questions, Delespaul and de Vries (1987) were able to qualitatively and quantitatively 
measure the day to day activities of both groups, and more importantly, the illness-related 
experiences of the patient group. Since then, the use of ESM has been dramatically 
transformed from being a mere qualitative measure to a dual-function research tool that is 
capable of sampling qualitative and quantitative data all together. 
 
2.2.1. The Contemporary ESM in Psychosis Research 
 Nowadays, the ESM questionnaire or the experience sampling form (ESF; Delespaul, 
1995; Delespaul & de Vries, 1987) in psychosis research generally consist of questions about 
the individual’s thoughts, mood, somatic and psychotic symptoms, context (e.g. place & 
people), activities, and events. Questions on thoughts, context, activities, and events are a 
combination of open-ended (e.g. “What are you thinking?” or “Who are you with?”) and 
close-ended, follow-up questions (e.g. “My thoughts are pleasant.” or “My thoughts are 
clear.”) with a Likert-type response scale (1 = not at all and 7 = almost always). On the other 
hand, questions on mood, somatic, and psychotic symptoms are entirely close-ended (e.g. “I 
feel tired.” or “I feel secure.”) with the identical 7-point Likert-type response scale. The 
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questions on the ESF are based on the standard mental health examination procedure in 
psychiatry while the coding of the open-ended questions is based on the ESM instruction 
manual formulated by Delespaul and de Vries (1987). Although many researchers still use 
some of the components of the original Delespaul and de Vries’ ESF (1987), the entire 
content of the ESF can be tailored according to the purpose of the study provided that: (a) 
newly formulated questions must be piloted to establish its reliability and validity, (b) 
completion time of the entire ESF must be between 2 to 3 minutes to retain good compliance 
(Delespaul, 1995; Delespaul & deVries, 1994).    
 Until recently, the use of ESM in psychosis research has always been conducted using 
a paper and watch procedure. Paper based diaries (typically A6 in size) along with a 
signalling device (e.g. digital wristwatch) were considered to be the most economical, 
convenient, easy, and efficient way of conducting ESM studies (Palmier-Claus, Taylor, 
Gooding, Dunn, & Lewis, 2011). With the recent advances in handheld computing 
technology, two studies were able to demonstrate the use of electronic devices (i.e. PDA’s) to 
conduct the ESM in a sample of patients with psychotic disorders (Kimhy, Delespaul, 
Corcoran et al., 2006; Granholm, Loh, & Swendsen, 2008). Findings from both studies 
indicated a high compliance rate (87% - Granholm et al., 2008 & 80% - Kimhy et al., 2006), 
that did not significantly differ from that of the non-psychiatric control group (81% - Kimhy 
et al., 2006). Whereas the participants in Granholm and colleagues’ study (2008) reported 
positive feedback for their overall electronic diary keeping experience, participants in Kimhy 
et al.’s (2006) study found the use of electronic devices quite challenging.  
 
2.2.2. Feasibility and Compliance 
 The feasibility of employing the ESM in a sample of individuals, with a spectrum of 
psychotic disorders has already been demonstrated in previous studies (Delespaul, de Vries, 
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& Van Os, 2002; Delespaul & de Vries, 1987; Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987; Myin-Germeys, 
Delespaul, & de Vries, 2000; Myin-Germeys, Nicolson, & Delespaul, 2001; Myin-Germeys, 
Krabbendam, Jolles, Delespaul, & Van Os; 2002; Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, Delespaul, & 
Van Os, 2003; Lardinois, Myin-Germeys, Bak, Mengelers, Van Os, & Delespaul, 2003, & 
many others). Despite the relatively high drop-out rates in patients with more severe and 
chronic psychotic symptoms (Oorschot et al., 2009), previous studies have illustrated that a 
respectable number of valid diary reports can be achieved in this particular clinical sample.      
 Compliance rates in ESM studies are calculated by dividing the total number of valid 
diary reports (also called ESF) completed with the total number of expected reports. For 
instance, 10 diary reports over 6 days is equivalent to 60 expected reports. If a participant 
manages to complete 30 valid reports (completed within 15 minutes after the signal; 
Delespaul, 1995) out of the 60 expected reports, then the calculated compliance rate is 
equivalent to 50%. Oorschot and colleagues (2009) indicated that the compliance rate in 
schizophrenia sample was around 66%, although higher rates were reported from other 
studies (79% - Kimhy et al., 2010; 87% - Graholm et al., 2008).  
 
2.2.3. Limitations and Strengths  
 The key strength of the ESM is that it measures real life experiences as they occur in 
their natural context (Myin-Germeys et al., 2009). Due to this, the ecological validity is high 
and the chances of selective memory or recall bias is minimal (Kiviniemi & Rothman, 2006; 
Kikuchi, Yoshiuchi, Mikasaka, Ohashi et al., 2006; Myin-Germeys et al., 2009). As the ESM 
is designed to repeatedly collect multiple data at different time points over a prolonged period 
of time and more importantly, within the natural everyday life context of the participant, the 
ESM data offers: (a) an opportunity to examine the role of contextual factors and its 
interaction with thoughts, feelings, and behaviour of an individual, (b) a chance to explore 
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other potentially important underlying mechanisms or processes, and (c) a better 
understanding of how the variables under study function over time (Myin-Germeys et al., 
2009).  
 The ESM also has a number of limitations that need to be borne in mind. As a self-
report assessment, the ESM is prone to subjective personal biases (Christensen et al., 2003). 
However, it is important to note that the ESM was purposely devised to assess the 
individual’s subjective account in order for researchers to understand the nature of his/her 
personal experiences in everyday life. Hektner and colleagues (2007) pointed out that being 
able to measure the individuals’ subjective experiences may bring a more practical insight 
about the reality of some of the mental illnesses. 
 Another limitation is the relatively high financial cost of running an ESM study. Due 
to its prolonged data sampling, time consumption is also high in ESM studies. Some of the 
participants also find the repeated assessments and the overall length of the study quite 
intense and challenging. Such issues sometimes cause participants to skip or miss a 
significant amount of sampling times, “back fill” or “forward fill” their diaries (Granholm et 
al., 2007), and misreport the time of reports in their diary (Hektner et al., 2007). 
 
2.2.4. Validity and Reliability  
 As discussed briefly in the previous section, the fact that ESM relies on self-reports 
poses questions on the validity of its procedure. However, the fact that a good number of 
widely used psychometric measures in many clinical and research settings also rely on self-
reports, does not necessarily make the ESM a valid measure. As the completion of this self-
report measure depends on the prompts of a signalling device, the ESM reports are generally 
less prone to selective memory biases or “recall biases”. Kimhy and colleagues (2006), 
however, pointed out that due to the highly subjective nature of the ESM questions (i.e. 
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questions on thoughts & mood) and the natural tendency of these variables (e.g. mood & 
thoughts) to vary over time, the ESM data may not necessarily capture a valid behavioural 
outcome. Previous studies have illustrated that affective variability or instability is 
characteristic of individuals who are at risk of developing psychosis (Delespaul & de Vries, 
1987; Myin-Germeys et al., 2000; Palmier-Claus et al., 2011). Such variability in affect, 
along with the fluctuations of the psychotic symptoms over time (Delespaul, 1995; de Vries, 
1992), explains why the conventional reliability testing is not applicable for the ESM 
questionnaire. Instead, Delespaul (1995) has suggested employing a “multiple indicator” 
approach by looking at the reliability of correlated constructs (e.g. negative mood and 
psychotic symptoms).   
 
2.3. The ESM Studies in Psychosis  
 The use of the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) in psychosis research started 26 
years ago with a single case study of a patient with schizophrenia (Hurlburt & Melancon, 
1987). Prior to that, clinicians and researchers knew very little about the day to day 
experiences of those who suffer from psychosis. Since ESM was first employed in psychosis 
studies, researchers began to uncover some of the important aspects of the illness; from the 
frequency of hallucinatory and delusional experiences to the momentary fluctuations of 
mood, the incidence of substance misuse, the individual’s reactivity to minor stresses in 
everyday life, along with the people and places that provide a suitable context for the 
worsening or improvement of certain psychotic symptoms. However, to date, the ESM has 
not yet been utilised to explore the occurrence and fluctuation of hopeless or suicidal 
thoughts in a sample of individuals with psychosis. For the purpose of illustrating the 
reliability of the ESM as a valid research tool for assessing momentary experiences in 
psychosis, a summary of ESM studies published between 1987 and 2011 is presented on 
29 
 
Table 1. For the sake of brevity, only studies that are relevant to the ESM study in this thesis 
will be discussed.   
 Of the identified studies, 9 investigated affective variability and/or stress reactivity 
while the rest of the studies examined hallucinatory experiences (7), cognition and genetics 
(4), substance misuse (2), and anticipatory pleasure towards daily activities (1). Of the 9 
relevant studies, 3 were specifically focused on affective variability, 5 on stress reactivity, 
and 1 on the relationship between life events and stress reactivity on a day to day basis. All 
three studies on affective variability confirmed that affective variability is characteristic of a 
psychotic illness (Delespaul & deVries, 1987; Myin-Germeys et al., 2000; Palmier-Claus et 
al., 2011). Specifically, according to Myin-Germeys and colleagues (2000), patients with 
schizophrenia had less variability and intensity in their positive affective responses but 
greater variability and intensity in their negative affective responses. Contrary to the results 
of previous laboratory-based experiments (Gaebel & Woelwer, 1992; Kring, Kerr, Smith, & 
Neale, 1993; Kring & Neale, 1996), the ESM data presented by Myin-Germeys et al. (2000) 
gave emphasis to the importance of contextual factors in the psychopathology.  
 Of the three studies on affective variability, Palmier-Claus et al.’s, (2011) was the 
only one who investigated the association between ESM-measured affectivity, and baseline 
severity and frequency of suicidal behaviour (i.e. ideation, suicidal attempt, or self-harm). 
Although the study illustrated a link between affective variability and suicidal behaviour, the 
results were limited by a number of important issues: (1) the sample size is relatively small 
(N = 27), (2) the definition of suicidal behaviour is too broad (i.e. suicidal ideation was 
included), (3) the assessment of suicidal behaviour was based on a retrospective interview, 
and (4) the number of ‘suicidal’ individuals were not reported. More importantly, as affective  
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Table 1. Summary of ESM Studies in Psychosis  
Authors Sample size and characteristics Sampling 
Method 
Results 
Delespaul & deVries (1987) N = 11 patients with schizophrenia 
& 11 non-psychiatric controls 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Patients with schizophrenia displayed more variability in 
their thoughts, mood, & activity motivation 
 
Hurlburt & Melancon (1987) Single case study of a 23 year old 
patient with schizophrenia 
At least 10 
samplings/day 
over a 2-week 
period 
Patient reported 71 narrative descriptions of distorted 
images (e.g. blue glass appearing as yellow, patient seeing 
things in a crooked or tilted angles/shapes) including 
visualisation of her voice in the form of hand-printed, 
colourful displays 
 
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & 
deVries (2000) 
N = 58 schizophrenia patients with 
blunted or non-blunted affect & 65 
non-clinical controls 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Schizophrenic patients had less intensity & deviations in 
positive emotions but greater intensity & variability in 
negative emotions compared to the control group. 
Blunted & non-blunted sub-groups did not differ in their 
patterns of emotional experience. 
 
Myin-Germeys, Nicolson, & 
Delespaul (2001) 
N = 34 individuals with 
schizophrenia spectrum disorder 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Increases in negative emotion & inactivity were associated 
with delusional moments. 
Delusional moments intensified auditory hallucinations. 
 
Delespaul, deVries, & Van Os (2002) N = 57 individuals with 
schizophrenia spectrum disorder 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Intensity of auditory hallucination increased with 
engagement in leisure activities and decreased with social 
withdrawal. 
Higher baseline anxiety was associated with subsequent 
auditory hallucinations.  
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Table 1. Summary of ESM Studies in Psychosis    
Authors Sample size and characteristics Sampling 
Method 
Results 
Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, Jolles, 
Delespaul, & Van Os (2002) 
N = 42 patients with schizophrenia 
in remission 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Overall cognitive functioning did not influence emotional 
sensitivity to stress, although some data illustrated that 
higher cognitive functioning facilitated greater emotional 
sensitivity to stress. 
  
Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, 
Delespaul, & Van Os (2003) 
N = 42 patients with schizophrenia 
in remission 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Life events (LE) were not associated with subjective 
appraisal of stress (activity or event-related stress). 
LE was associated with emotional reactivity (increased 
NA & decreased PA). 
 
Lardinois, Myin-Germeys, Bak, 
Mengelers, Van Os, & Delespaul 
(2003) 
N = 35 individuals with psychosis 
spectrum disorder 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Voice-hearing patients with more effective coping 
strategies (e.g. not following the voices) experienced more 
distress. 
 
Myin-Germeys, Krabbendam, 
Delespaul, & Van Os (2004) 
N = 42 patients with schizophrenia 
in remission 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Female participants exhibited greater emotional reactivity 
(increased NA & decreased PA) to every daily life stresses 
compared to male participants. 
 
Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Van 
Os (2005) 
N = 42 psychosis spectrum patients 
in remission, 47 first degree 
relatives, & 49 non-psychiatric 
controls 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
An increase in subjective stress (activity & event-related 
stress) was associated with an increase in the intensity of 
psychotic experiences in the patient group.  
 
Kimhy, Delespaul, Corcoran, Ahn, 
Yale, & Malaspina (2006) 
N = 10 patients with schizophrenia 
and 10 healthy controls 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
The patient group and healthy control group did not differ 
in their ratings of stress. 
 
32 
 
Table 1. Summary of ESM Studies in Psychosis 
Authors Sample size and characteristics Sampling 
Method 
Results 
Gard, King, Gard, Horan, & Green 
(2007) 
N = 15 patients with schizophrenia 
and 12 healthy controls 
7 samplings/day 
over 7-day period 
Patient group exhibited a more reduced anticipatory 
pleasure towards goal-directed activities (e.g. work & 
studying) compared to the healthy controls 
 
Morrens, Krabbendam, Bak, 
Delespaul, Mengelers, Sabbe, 
Hulstijn, Van Os, & Myin-Germeys 
(2007) 
N = 25 patients with psychosis 
spectrum disorder 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
In some instances cognitive functioning was not associated 
with stress sensitivity while in other instances, the former 
was inversely related to the latter. 
 
Henquet, Rosa, Delespaul, Papiol, 
Fananas, Van Os, & Myin-Germeys 
(2009) 
N = 31 patients with psychosis 
spectrum disorder & 25 healthy 
controls 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
COMT Val(158)Met genotype moderates the association 
between cannabis use and psychotic experiences in 
everyday life. 
 
Lataster, Collip, Lardinois, Van Os, 
& Myin-Germeys (2010) 
N = 40 patients with psychosis 
spectrum disorder & 47 healthy 
controls (siblings of the patient 
group) 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Stress reactivity in patient group and healthy controls was 
significantly associated.  
Positive psychotic symptoms and stress reactivity in 
healthy controls were also significantly associated. 
 
Kimhy, Delespaul, Ahn, Cai, 
Shikhman, Lieberman, Malaspina, & 
Sloan (2010) 
N = 20 patients with psychosis 
spectrum disorder 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Momentary increases in stress had a negative correlation 
with concurrent parasympathetic activity and positive 
correlation with sympathovagal balance. 
 
Ben-Zeev, Morris, Swendsen, & 
Graholm (2010) 
N = 113 patients with 
schizophrenia and schizoaffective 
disorder 
Unknown 
sampling rate. 
7-day period. 
Negative self-esteem predicted delusional experiences 
while hallucination predicted delusions of control. 
Frequency of delusions of control was associated with 
reduced ability to gather information. 
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Table 1. Summary of ESM Studies in Psychosis   
Authors Sample size and characteristics Sampling 
Method 
Results 
Henquet, Van Os, Kuepper, 
Delespual, Smits, Campo, & Myin-
Germeys (2010) 
N = 42 patients with psychosis 
spectrum disorder & 38 healthy 
controls 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Daily cannabis intake in the patient group predicted 
increases in positive affect and decreases in negative 
affect. 
 
Thewissen, Bentall, Oorschot, 
Campo, Van Lierop, Van Os, & 
Myin-Germeys (2011) 
N = 82 patients with schizophrenia 
and schizoaffective disorder & 37 
healthy controls 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
An increase in anxiety and a decrease in self-self esteem 
predicted the onset of paranoid experiences. 
 
 
Swendsen, Ben-Zeev, & Graholm 
(2011) 
N = 145 patients with 
schizophrenia & schizoaffective 
disorder 
Unknown 
sampling rate. 
7-day period 
A bi-directional relationship was found between substance 
use and psychotic symptoms. 
 
 
Palmier-Claus, Taylor, Gooding, 
Dunn, & Lewis (2011) 
N = 27 individuals at ultra high risk 
of developing psychosis  
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Ultra high risk individuals who previously reported 
suicidal ideation exhibited greater affective variability.  
 
Varese, Udachina, Myin-Germeys, 
Oorschot, & Bentall (2011) 
N = 42 patients with schizophrenia 
spectrum disorder & 23 healthy 
controls 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Dissociation was associated with auditory hallucinations 
during highly stressful situations.  
 
Lardinois, Lataster, Mengelers, Van 
Os, & Myin-Germeys (2011) 
N = 50 non-affective psychosis 
individuals 
10 samplings/day 
over 6-day period 
Childhood trauma was associated with greater affective 
and psychotic reactivity to the stresses of everyday life. 
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variability has already been found in individuals with psychosis (Delespaul & de Vries, 1987;  
Myin-Germeys et al., 2000), the lack of a control group in Palmier-Claus et al.’s study (2011) 
made the interpretation of results quite difficult.  
 The ESM studies on stress reactivity, on the hand, demonstrated that the healthy 
controls were just as sensitive to the minor stresses in everyday life as the individuals 
affected by psychosis (Kimhy et al., 2006; Lataster et al., 2006). Such findings were 
unexpected as a previous study has indicated that the increase in the intensity of psychotic 
symptoms in this particular group was associated with the increase in the subjective stress 
caused by the minor strains in everyday life (Myin-Germeys, 2005). A year prior to this, 
Myin-Germeys and colleagues (2004) also found that across the psychosis spectrum disorder, 
sensitivity to stress was greater in females than males. Intriguingly, no link was found 
between stress sensitivity and the incidence of recent life events in patients with a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia (Myin-Germeys et al., 2003). Instead, life events were found to be 
associated with greater affective variability in this particular group (Myin-Germeys et al., 
2003). However, Myin-Germeys and colleagues (2003) pointed out that the incidence of life 
events did moderate the effect of minor stresses in everyday life on mood. 
 Overall, results of the previous ESM studies on affective and stress reactivity have 
important implications for the concept of cognitive reactivity to hopeless and suicidal 
thoughts as proposed by the Differential Activation Hypothesis of suicidal relapse (DAH; 
Lau et al., 2004). First, the unstable affectivity of individuals affected by psychosis, 
particularly the higher instability and intensity in positive affectivity (PA) than negative 
affectivity (NA), might suggest that the individuals with psychosis are at a greater risk for 
suicidal relapse. The more unstable and intense PA is than NA, the more likely the 
reactivation of hopeless or suicidal thoughts may occur amongst those with histories of 
suicidal attempt or deliberate self-harm. Second, the mediating effect of traumatic life events 
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on the individual’s affective responses to minor stresses in everyday life, sustains the idea 
that early psychosis individuals will be more vulnerable to suicidal relapses. It is now 
established that life following the initial episode of psychosis can be distressing for many 
individuals. The traumatic experience of the illness itself, along with the other life events 
associated with the illness (e.g. hospitalisation, leaving work or school due to psychosis, 
stigma, & many others), will render this particular group of individuals more vulnerable to 
affective variability when confronted with the everyday life stresses. Again, following the 
assumption of the DAH, the more unstable PA, the more likely it may lead to NA reactivating 
hopeless thoughts in previously suicidal individuals. 
 
2.4. The ESM: A potential tool to test the DAH 
 The last 26 years has demonstrated the competence of the ESM to capture data that 
were otherwise impossible to obtain from any laboratory setting. The ability of the ESM to 
assess momentary fluctuations in mood, along with the changes in contextual factors, makes 
this research technique an ideal tool to test the assumptions of the DAH for suicidal relapse. 
Since the core idea of the DAH rests on the interactive relationship between mood and 
hopeless/suicidal thoughts, it is vital to examine this relationship over a prolonged period of 
time and in its most natural context. Whereas a number of laboratory procedures nowadays 
can induce the appropriate emotional context necessary to elicit certain responses (whether it 
is affective, cognitive, or behavioural), these procedures are by no means comparable to what 
happens in real life. Although it can be argued that there are certain behaviours and 
psychological processes that can be successfully studied within the premises of a laboratory, 
there are also behaviours and processes which can only be meaningfully studied in their 
natural context. Suicidal thinking has already been established to occur in the context of a 
depressed mood and hopeless cognition (Lau et al., 2004). Such contexts are not only 
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unethical and precarious to replicate, these are also complicated emotional states that involve 
a number of other contextual factors. For example, persistent social isolation and lack of 
structured activities can both trigger feelings of despair. These are some of the contextual 
factors that only exist in the context of the individual’s “natural habitat”. This is when 
research techniques like the ESM is most needed. In testing the assumptions of the DAH, the 
use of ESM not only makes it possible to understand that interaction between affectivity and 
hopeless/suicidal cognitions, but also the interaction between the individual and his/her 
natural, day to day environment. The repeated sampling over a period of time (typically 6 
days) will help establish the pattern of fluctuations in mood and hopelessness across a range 
of contexts (e.g. people, places, activities, & events).  
 
2.5. Overview of Thesis  
 The overarching aim of this thesis is to investigate the mechanism of suicidal thinking 
in early psychosis. The central aim is to examine if the reoccurrence of suicidal or hopeless 
thoughts over time can be explained within the framework of the DAH of suicidal relapse 
(Lau et al., 2004). To do this, two contrasting methodological approaches were employed. 
First, in Chapter 3, an Experience Sampling Method (Delespaul, 1995; de Vries, 1992) is 
employed to assess the momentary fluctuations in hopelessness in response to the changes in 
mood over time. Second, in Chapters 4 and 5, a mood induction procedure is conducted in 
order to induce feelings of sadness, a context that is necessary to illustrate the mechanism of 
suicidal thinking as proposed by the DAH of suicidal relapse. In chapter 4, the Means-End 
Problem Solving (Platt & Spivack, 1975) task is carried out before and after the mood 
challenge in order to test if the change in mood altered the interpersonal problem ability, a 
behavioural marker that is closely linked with hopelessness. In Chapter 5, the Future 
Thinking Task (MacLeod et al., 1993) is also carried out before and after the mood challenge 
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(alongside the task in chapter 4), in order to test if the change in mood will reduce fluency for 
positive events, a signature characteristic of suicidality or hopelessness.  
 
2.6. Note on Collaboration  
 The author completed the research presented in this thesis in collaboration with a 
number of other individuals. The author’s supervisors, Professor Max Birchwood and Dr. 
Chris Jackson provided input on research development, design and write-up, and are 
therefore recognised as co-authors. Dr. Inez Myin-Germeys and Margreet Oorschot are 
recognised as co-authors on Chapters 3, where they contributed to the design of the ESM 
questionnaire and the analyses of data. Recruitment was solely carried out by the author of 
this thesis in collaboration with the team managers and care coordinators of the Early 
Intervention Service in Birmingham. All of the analyses were undertaken solely by the author 
of this thesis, with information and advice provided by the author’s supervisors. All write-ups 
were solely the work of the author of this thesis, with the author’s supervisors providing input 
in terms of feedback on drafts and ideas.   
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CHAPTER 3 
The Mechanism of Hopelessness Linked to the Mood Fluctuations 
in Everyday Life: An ESM Study 
 
3.0. Introduction 
Empirical research into the underlying mechanisms of the suicidal thinking process in 
the first episode psychosis sample is limited. Over the last decade, studies on suicidality in 
psychosis have been mainly focused on the incidence and risk factors of suicidal behaviour. 
So far, we know “what” makes these individuals want to end their own lives, and to a certain 
extent, we understand “why” they have come to feel this way. And yet, we know very little 
about the ‘how’ and the ‘when’ of this complex phenomenon. How does one acquire a 
suicidal mind? When and how does it start? The answers to these questions are especially 
crucial in the FEP sample as the stage of post-psychotic recovery is often characterised by a 
rapid increase in suicidal attempts (Power, 2010). The aim of this study is to address this gap 
in the literature by investigating the suicidal thinking process using the Differential 
Activation Hypothesis of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004) framework. Specifically, the core 
idea was to uncover the relationship between positive and negative affectivity, and 
hopelessness by employing the Experience Sampling Method (Delespaul & de Vries, 1987).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the DAH of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004) suggests 
that hopeless or suicidal thoughts occur as a feature of the maladaptive and dysfunctional 
thinking process during a severe episode of depression. The key idea of the hypothesis is that 
repeated episodes of depression will strengthen the link between the suicidal/hopeless 
thoughts and the depressed mood. The stronger the link, the easier it will be for a subsequent 
depressed mood to reactivate these suicidal/hopeless thoughts. Such ease in the reactivation 
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process is referred to as the “cognitive reactivity” to hopelessness (Lau et al., 2004). To date, 
CR to hopelessness as a proximal risk to suicidal thinking has only been validated in a sample 
of healthy and previously depressed individuals. So far, previous studies have only examined 
CR to hopelessness using a laboratory-based, experimental method called the “mood 
priming” or “mood induction procedure”. The MIP as its name suggests, is a procedure where 
a certain type of mood is induced or primed in an individual in order to examine occurrences 
(e.g. behavioural or cognitive) that can only be studied under a certain mood state. While the 
MIP has been established as an effective way to alter mood in healthy and previously 
depressed individuals (Hepburn et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2006 & 
2007; Hepburn et al., 2009), the extent to which it can mimic the natural mechanism of mood 
in real life is subject to speculations. Data from mood priming studies are especially difficult 
to interpret if the behavioural or cognitive occurrences under study have a known functional 
relationship with real life contexts. For example, suicidal ideation is a cognitive phenomenon 
that has been established to interact with the constantly dynamic individual and 
circumstantial or contextual factors. This is especially true in the case of the FEP sample as 
simple day to day activities (i.e. reading, socialising, & others) can be a struggle due to the 
persistence of cognitive impairments following the psychotic episode  (Power & McGowan, 
2011). Along with the lack of activity, social isolation/alienation, stigmatisation, and 
discrimination also characterise the everyday life of this particular clinical group. These 
circumstantial factors, together with the appropriate combination of distal and proximal risks, 
have been recognised to lead to a suicidal state (Power & Robinson, 2009). It is for this 
reason why the data collected via experimental methods such as the MIP become 
problematic. The lack of ecological validity in laboratory-based experimental procedures 
draws attention to the fact that naturally occurring phenomenon such as the suicidal thinking 
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cannot be effectively measured via artificial means, within the realms of a simulated 
environment.  
To complement the methodological limitations of the MIP (see studies on chapter 4 & 
5), a naturalistic yet highly systematic approach was employed in the current study. The 
Experience Sampling Method (Delespaul, 1995; de Vries, 1992), or also known as the 
Ecological Momentary Assessment (Stone & Shiffman, 1994), is a “structured diary keeping” 
technique that collects data on the individual’s real-time experiences in real-life contexts. In 
brief, the ESM entails keeping a record of the momentary changes in thoughts, mood, and 
contexts (e.g. places, people, events, & activities) whenever prompted by a signalling device 
(usually 10 times a day), over a period of time (e.g. 6 days). Unlike the traditional diary 
keeping method, the ESM is not merely a record of events but more importantly, it is a 
structured assessment of the individual’s everyday life experiences. Due to the highly 
subjective nature of the ESM data and its reliance on self-report measures, the ESM has been 
mainly criticised for its validity and reliability. As the purpose of the ESM is to measure how 
certain individuals perceive their experiences in everyday life, the validity of the ESM mainly 
depends on how correlated variables interact. For example, it is conceptually (and intuitively) 
logical to observe greater positive affectivity when the individuals are confronted with events 
that are more pleasant in nature. If similar studies replicate such a pattern of results, then the 
reliability of the ESM questionnaire is assumed. The validity and reliability of the ESM as a 
research tool in psychosis have already been demonstrated in a number of studies (Delespaul 
et al. 2002; Delespaul & de Vries, 1987; Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987; Myin-Germeys et al., 
2000; Myin-Germeys et al., 2001; Myin-Germeys et al., 2002; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; 
Lardinois et al., 2003, & many others). Previous studies have shown that individuals with 
psychosis are characterised by unstable affectivity (Delespaul & de Vries, 1987; Myin-
Germeys et al., 2000; Palmier-Claus et al., 2011). Myin-Germeys and colleagues (2000) have 
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indicated that patients with chronic schizophrenia are characterised by a less variable and a 
less intense positive affectivity and a more variable and a more intense negative affectivity. 
The affective variability of patients with chronic schizophrenia has also been found to be 
associated with the incidence of recent traumatic life events (Myin-Germeys et al., 2003).    
  In order to measure the relationship between mood and hopelessness as proposed by 
the DAH of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004), the ESM questionnaire in this study was 
specifically devised to measure positive and negative affectivity, hopelessness, and the 
corresponding contexts of the captured experiences (e.g. places, people, activities, & events 
at the time of sampling). The key intention is to examine the ease to which negative 
affectivity will trigger hopeless thoughts, or also known as the CR to hopelessness. Williams 
and colleagues (2006) first attempted to measure CR to hopelessness using the newly added 
subscale in the Leiden Index of Depression Scale (i.e. hopelessness/suicidality subscale), 
which was specifically devised to measure the individual’s susceptibility to hopeless thoughts 
when in a sad mood. The results of the study showed that individuals who had higher scores 
on the LEIDS’ hopelessness/suicidal ideation subscale also admitted to having suicidal 
ideations in the past when feeling depressed. Further, the results also indicated that the 
LEIDS’ hopelessness/suicidality subscale was predictive of the changes in positive future 
fluency, a behavioural outcome that is associated with hopelessness. By employing the 
LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale in the present study, mood-linked hopelessness data from the 
ESM can confirm if the CR to hopelessness, as measured by the LEIDS, is predictive of the 
individual’s vulnerability to hopeless thoughts in everyday life.   
As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, until now, there is a lack of 
understanding on the suicidal thinking process in individuals with early psychosis. Not 
knowing when and how suicidal thinking starts makes it difficult for clinicians to understand 
and manage suicidal behaviour in this particular group of individuals who are at a greater risk 
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of killing or hurting themselves. Although the DAH of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004) 
provides a potentially valuable framework for the mechanism of suicidal thinking, previous 
investigations have only illustrated the application of this framework in a sample of healthy 
and previously depressed individuals by employing a laboratory-based mood priming 
procedure. The lack of real-life contextual factors in the previous experimental studies on the 
DAH, along with the lack of literature on suicidal thinking process within the FEP sample, 
prompted the use of the ESM in the present study. By employing the ESM, the present study 
will be able to investigate if the assumption of the DAH on hopelessness as a mood-
dependent cognition holds true for the FEP sample with a history of suicidal attempt or 
deliberate self-harm. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to 
investigate the suicidal thinking process in FEP. This is also the first to apply the DAH 
framework and the ESM to explore the suicidal thinking mechanism in psychosis.   
To ensure clarity of the terminologies used in this chapter, the term momentary 
hopelessness is used to refer to the ESM-measured hopelessness, while generalised 
hopelessness is used to refer to the global hopelessness as measured by the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (Beck & Steer, 1988). The term cognitive reactivity or CR to 
hopelessness, on the other hand, is used to refer to the propensity of the individual to hopeless 
thoughts when in a sad mood. 
The first aim of this study is to examine the differences between the suicidal history 
group (those with a lifetime history of suicidal attempt & deliberate self-harm) and non-
suicidal group (those without a lifetime history of suicidal attempt & deliberate self-harm) by 
looking into their level of momentary hopelessness as measured by the hopelessness items in 
the ESM diary. Specifically, the present study intends to determine the effect of affectivity 
(positive & negative) and daily hassles/minor irritations (activity- & event-related) on the 
individual’s momentary hopelessness. 
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The second aim of the study is to investigate the effects of the minor stresses in 
everyday life on the individual’s positive and negative affectivity. Further, the incidence of 
recent life events will also be compared between groups. 
The final aim of this study is to assess the validity of the LEIDS’ hopelessness or 
suicidality subscale as a measure of CR to hopelessness. In particular, the present study 
examines if the CR to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS will be predictive of the 
individual’s vulnerability to momentary hopelessness in everyday life when faced with 
unpleasant events and challenging activities.  
 
3.1. Hypotheses 
Momentary Experiences in Everyday Life as Measured by the ESM 
In keeping with the assumptions of the DAH – 
 1. The suicidal history group will exhibit significantly higher levels of momentary 
hopelessness than the non-suicidal group. 
 
Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will -  
2. Demonstrate greater momentary hopelessness linked to negative affectivity, and less 
momentary hopelessness linked to positive affectivity.  
 
3. Display greater momentary hopelessness when dealing with unpleasant events and 
challenging activities  
 
4. Show greater negative affectivity and less positive affectivity when confronted with 
unpleasant events and challenging activities. 
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The Validity of LEIDS’ Hopelessness Subscale as a Measure of CR to hopelessness 
5. Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will exhibit higher levels of 
cognitive reactivity to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale.  
 
6. The individual’s cognitive reactivity to hopelessness, as measured by the LEIDS’, will be 
predictive of his/her susceptibility to momentary hopelessness when affectivity is negative. 
 
Finally, 
7. The individual’s cognitive reactivity to hopelessness, as measured by the LEIDS’, will be 
predictive of his/her susceptibility to momentary hopelessness when faced with unpleasant 
events and challenging activities. 
 
 
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Sampling 
The inclusion criteria for the study were: (a) able to give fully informed consent as 
judged by their care coordinator or other appropriate healthcare professional, (b) fluent in 
English, (c) have had their first episode of psychosis and fulfilled the ICD10 criteria for 
schizophrenia and schizophrenia related disorder (F20 F21 F22 F23), and (c) have a lifetime 
history of deliberate self- harm (DSH) or suicide attempt (as verified from historical risk 
assessments  and as assessed using the Columbia Suicide History Form or CSHF). 
Participants were excluded if: (a) their diagnosis of psychosis was due to an organic disease, 
(b) have moderate to severe learning disability, and (c) they were severely suicidal (as 
assessed using the InterSept for Suicidal Thinking Scale) at the time of assessment.  
Two groups of participants were identified within this sample: those with a lifetime 
history of suicidality and those without. The suicidal history group consisted of individuals 
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who had a lifetime history of deliberate self-harm (DSH) or suicidal attempt whilst the non-
suicidal group consisted of those who neither have a history of suicidal attempt nor DSH. In 
keeping with the criteria of the Columbia Suicide History Form (Oquendo, Halbestam, & 
Mann, 2003), an act was identified as a suicidal attempt if it was carried out with the intent to 
die, or the severity of the act itself posed a lethal threat to the individual’s life (e.g. severe 
physical damage or prolonged hospitalisation due to the act). Alternatively, an act was 
identified as a DSH if the individual deliberately engaged in a “self-poisoning or self-
injurious” behaviour without the intent to die, or the severity of the act itself was by no means 
life-threatening (Kreitman, 1977).  
 
3.2.2. Measures 
Columbia Suicide History Form (CSHF; Oquendo, Halbestam, & Mann, 2003; Appendix 6) 
The CSHF is a semi-structured interview, which accounts the number of lifetime 
suicide attempts and instances of the incident (e.g. method, medical lethality, & others). It has 
a very good inter-rater reliability correlation of .97 for identifying the history, number, and 
fatality of suicide attempts (Oquendo, Bongiovi-Garcia, Galfalvy, et al., 2007). Several 
clinical cross-sectional studies that used CSHF to document previous suicide attempts found 
that the recorded attempts correlate with more hopelessness, suicidal thinking, and subjective 
depression regardless of psychiatric diagnosis (Rush, First, & Blacker, 2008).  
 
The Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity - Revised version (LEIDS-R; Van der Does & 
Williams, 2003; Appendix 7) 
The LEIDS is a self-report measure, which was specifically devised to assess for the 
individual’s cognitive reactivity to sad mood. In order to measure CR, the conditional 
questions in the LEIDS questionnaire require individuals to imagine how they would feel, 
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think, or react if they are feeling sad or low (e.g. “When in a low mood, I take fewer risks”). 
Individuals rate their answers on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all & 5 = very strongly). 
The revised scale has six subscales including: (1) hopelessness/suicidality, (2) 
acceptance/coping, (3) aggression, (4) control/perfectionism, (5) harm avoidance, and (6) 
rumination (Van der Does and Williams, 2003). In keeping with the aim of the present study, 
only the LEIDS’ hopelessness/suicidality subscale was used in the analyses. The LEIDS’ 
hopelessness/suicidality subscale has a high internal consistency of .89 Cronbach’s alpha. 
Higher scores in this subscale indicate a greater CR to hopeless/suicidal thoughts (Van der 
Does & Williams, 2003). 
 
The Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia (CDSS; Addington et al., 1993; Appendix 8) 
The CDSS is a 9-item semi-structured interview scale, which was purposely 
developed to assess for the severity of depressive symptoms in individuals with 
schizophrenia. Compared to the other depression scales (e.g. Hamilton Depression Rating 
Scale), the overall CDSS rating has the minimum amount of overlap with the negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia (Collins et al., 1996). The superior ability of the CDSS to 
discriminate the depressive symptoms from the negative and extrapyramidal symptoms has 
made the CDSS a widely used depression scale for schizophrenia amongst many researchers 
and clinicians (Collins, Remington, Coulter, & Birkett, 1996; Lancon, Auquiere, Reine, et al., 
1999). The CDSS has a good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=0.79) and a high test-
retest reliability (intraclass correlation coefficient = .90; Addington et al., 1993).   
 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck & Steer, 1988; Appendix 9) 
The BHS is a self-report inventory which was devised to measure three main aspects 
of hopelessness: feelings about the future, loss of motivation, and expectations. It consists of 
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20 true/false items, 11 items of which are negatively phrased whilst the remaining nine items 
are positively phrased. Overall, the BHS is a well-constructed and validated instrument with 
an average reliability coefficient of .92 and test-retest reliability of .69 (Beck & Steer, 1988). 
 
InterSept Scale for Suicidal Thinking (ISST; Lindenmayer, Czobor, Alphs, Nathan, Anand, 
Islam, & Chou, 2003; Appendix 10)  
The ISST is a 12-item semi-structured interview schedule, which was designed to 
assess for suicidal ideation in schizophrenia and schizo-affective disorder. It has a very good 
psychometric properties including a high test re-test reliability (intraclass correlation 
coefficient = 0.90) and a very good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=0.88; 
Lindenmayer, Czobor, Alphs, Nathan, Anand, Islam, & Chou, 2003).   
 
The Experience Sampling Method (ESM; Delespaul, 1995; de Vries, 1992)  
The ESM Wristwatch  
The ESM is a structured diary keeping procedure that utilises semi-random time 
sampling method. The ESM in this study was conducted using a paper and pen diary method 
with a programmable digital wristwatch as a signalling device. The ESM wristwatch was set 
to emit 10 semi-random signals per day (between 7.30am and 10.30pm) over six consecutive 
days. The wristwatches (Timex Ironman USA) used in this study were all password-protected 
to ensure that the time sampling schedule were free from any alterations. The author pre-
programmed each watch with randomly allocated (drawn from a hat) time sampling schedule 
at least a day before the start of the ESM task. The time sampling schedule or TSS is a list of 
pre-determined, semi-random times upon which the watches are set to emit a signal or a 
bleep. The researcher adopted the three routinely used TSS’s, which were originally created 
by a team of ESM researchers at the University of Maastricht (Appendix 11). The times in 
48 
 
the TSS were pre-determined so that it is known exactly how long after the bleep the 
participants complete their diary assessments. Diary entry times are vital to assessing 
moment-to-moment changes in an individual’s thoughts, moods, events and activities as these 
experiences are all transitory in nature. The semi-randomness of the times in the TTS was 
equally important to ensure that the captured thoughts, feelings, and events are a part of the 
individual’s natural, day to day routine. By setting the bleep times at a schedule that is harder 
to predict, the participants were not be able to pre-plan their activities around the ESM 
schedule. The semi-random sampling times meant that each time the watch bleeped, 
participants were expected to have paused from their activities (only when it was possible and 
safe to do so) to complete one ESM questionnaire. 
 
The ESM Diary 
The ESM diary consisted of 12 identical sets of self-report ESM questionnaires (1 
ESM questionnaire = 2 diary pages) attached together in the form of an A6-size booklet. Each 
booklet had two spare sets of questionnaires in case additional assessments were completed 
on mistaken bleeps. Each participant received a total of 7 diary booklets, one diary per day 
over the 6-day ESM period and an extra diary in case of loss or accidental damage.   
All of the ESM items (affectivity, activity & events) used in the present study, with 
the exception of the hopelessness items, were adopted from the ESM questionnaire that was 
developed by Delespaul (1995).  This questionnaire has been validated in a sample of 
psychiatric patients in numerous studies (e.g. Delespaul et al., 2002; Lataster et al., 2010; 
Myin-Germeys et al., 2000; 2003; 2005; 2009, & many others).  
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Affectivity/Mood 
 As the word affectivity suggests, items under this section of the ESM diary 
questionnaire consisted of words that describe how positive or negative the individual’s mood 
is at the time of his/her diary entry. To help create a mindset that was relevant to that specific 
moment of time when the diary entry was made, this section was prefaced with “Right now, I 
feel…”. Questionnaire items measuring positive affectivity included four positively worded 
adjectives (“cheerful”, “content”, “energetic”, & “enthusiastic”) whilst items measuring 
negative affectivity (NA) included six negatively worded adjectives (“lonely”, “anxious”, 
“insecure”, “low”, “irritated”, & “guilty”). All of the items were rated using the 7-point 
Likert scale (1 = not & 7 = very), which is in keeping with the original, standardized ESM 
questionnaire used in previous studies (Delespaul et al., 2003; Lataster et al., 2010; Myin-
Germeys et al., 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 & many others). 
 
Hopelessness  
 Given that this is the first ESM study that investigated the concept of hopelessness 
vulnerability, items for this construct were initially tested in a pilot study conducted by Luke 
Brown in 2008 as a part of his Master of Science dissertation.  Brown’s pilot study collected 
data from a sample of both healthy and first-episode of psychosis individuals with the aim of: 
(a) testing the feasibility of the ESM in a clinical sample in the UK, (b) validate the link 
between mood and hopelessness proposed by the Differential Activation Hypothesis (DAH) 
for suicidal relapse, and (c) pilot the newly added hopelessness items on the ESM 
questionnaire.  
Items under the ‘hopelessness’ section of the ESM diary questionnaire was 
formulated to mimic the concept of positive future thinking, which is a feature of 
hopelessness (see future thinking study in Chapter 5).  The questionnaire items were a 
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combination of words and phrases that describe the individual’s feelings and expectations 
about the future. This section was divided into two sets. The first set of questions was 
prefaced with “Right now, I feel the future is…” followed by items on future expectations 
(“bright” & “hopeful”). The second set of questions was prefaced by the phrase “I feel…” 
followed by items on feelings about the future (“supported” & “the future has possibilities”).  
Similar to the affectivity section, all hopelessness items were rated using the 7-point Likert 
scale. In keeping with the term hopelessness, all of the ratings were reverse coded (1=7, 2=6, 
3=5, 4=4, 5=3, 6=2, & 7=1) as the questionnaire items were all originally positively worded.  
 
Daily Hassles or Minor Everyday Stresses: Challenging Activities vs. Unpleasant events 
Challenging Activities 
 The activity section of the ESM diary questionnaire was split into two parts. The first 
part is the activity type, which asks individuals to describe the activity that they were 
involved in prior to being prompted by the watch (“What am I doing just before the bleep 
went off?”). The second part is the activity appraisal, which asks the individuals to rate the 
degree of difficulty of their activity (“I prefer doing something else”, “I am active”, “This 
activity requires a lot of effort”, “This activity is challenging”, & “I’m good at this 
activity”). The open-ended question was coded using the ESM coding manual developed by a 
group of researchers at the University of Maastricht, whilst the activity appraisal items were 
rated using the 7-point Likert scale employed in the earlier sections of the ESM 
questionnaire. All of the activity items were adopted from the standardized ESM 
questionnaire used in previous studies (Delespaul et al., 2003; Lataster et al., 2010; Myin-
Germeys et al., 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 & many others). In keeping with the 
hypotheses, only the data from the activity appraisal section were used in the analyses. 
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Unpleasant Events 
 Similar to the activity section, items under the event section of the ESM diary 
questionnaire were also split into two parts. The first part is the event type, which consists of 
an open-ended question asking individuals to describe the most significant event that 
occurred to them since their previous diary entry (“Since the last bleep, the most important 
event that happened to me was…”). The second part is the event appraisal, which asks the 
individuals to rate the pleasantness/unpleasantness of the event (“It was…”) using a 7-point 
Likert scale (-3 = very unpleasant, 0 = neutral, 3 = very pleasant). Similar to the activity 
items, the event items were also adopted from the standardized ESM questionnaire used in 
previous studies (Delespaul et al., 2003; Lataster et al., 2010; Myin-Germeys et al., 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 & many others). In line with the hypotheses, only the data from the 
event appraisal was used. For the sake of clarity, all of the positive ratings were recoded as 
“0” whilst all of the negative ratings were re-coded as positive values. Recoding was applied 
so that higher ratings would signify more unpleasant events. 
 Please refer to figure 1 for an illustration of the ESM questionnaire. 
 
3.2.3. Procedure 
3.2.3. a. Case Identification 
 The participants in this study were recruited from the Early Intervention Service (EIS) 
in Birmingham from March 2009 to March 2011. The author of this study approached every 
care coordinator within EIS to identify service users who conformed to the inclusion criteria. 
As established in the earlier section, two groups of participants were identified: (1) suicidal 
history group, and (2) non-suicidal group. In order to ensure that all of the participants fulfil 
both the inclusion and exclusion criteria, care coordinators were provided with a leaflet that  
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Figure 1. The ESM questionnaire on Affectivity (A), Momentary Hopelessness (B),  
 Activity (C), and Event (D). 
A. Affectivity appraisal items 
Right now, I feel... Not  Moderately  Very 
 cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 content 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 lonely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 energetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 insecure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 irritated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
B. Hopelessness appraisal items 
Right now, I feel the future is... Not  Moderately  Very 
 bright 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 hopeful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
I feel...        
 supported 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 the future has possibilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
C. Activity appraisal items 
What am I doing just before the bleep went off?_________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Not  Moderately  Very 
 I prefer doing something else 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I’m active 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 I’m good at this activity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 This activity requires a lot of effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 This activity is challenging 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
C. Event- appraisal items 
Since the last beep, the most important event that happened to me was_______________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Very unpleasant     Neutral         Very pleasant 
It was...  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
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briefly explained the study and its recruitment criteria. Following referral, participants were 
approached over the phone or in person, depending on their preference. During the initial 
meeting, the research was presented a three-part study [ESM, Problem-solving (MEPS), & 
Future Thinking (FT)], with each study investigating the mechanism of hopeless thinking in 
contrasting methodologies – the ecological and experimental approach. In order to 
counterbalance the order to which the two sets of methodologies were conducted, the three 
studies were split into two sets. Set A consisted of the ecological methodology (Study 1: the 
ESM) and set B consisted of the experimental methodology (Studies 2 & 3: MEPS & FT 
studies). Those participants who agreed to take part in all the three studies were randomly 
allocated to sets AB or BA. Following written consent, the Columbia Suicidal History Form 
was conducted in order to determine lifetime histories of suicide attempt or deliberate self-
harm. An audit on the participant’s clinical case notes at EIS was also carried out in order to 
check for any historical records of suicidal behaviour. 
  
3.2.3. b. Pilot Feasibility Study of the ESM  
Prior to conducting this ESM study, a feasibility pilot research was conducted by 
Luke Brown, a Master’s student from the University of Birmingham who was also supervised 
by two of the co-authors of this PhD study (Prof Max Birchwood & Dr Chris Jackson). One 
of the main aims of the pilot study was to investigate the feasibility of the ESM in a UK-
based clinical sample of FEP patients with a history of suicidal behaviour. The standard 10 
bleeps/day sampling frequency was employed for over a period a 6 consecutive days. 
Following completion of the data collection, a focus group discussion was held to discuss the 
practicality of the ESM. “Irritation” due to the frequency of the prompts/bleeps and the 
overall diary keeping task being relatively “demanding/challenging” were amongst the 
prominent themes of the discussion. However, on the whole, everyone agreed that the ESM 
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was not an exceedingly difficult task to do because of the very little amount of time it takes to 
complete each diary entry. Overall results indicated that the ESM was a valid and feasible 
research tool for a UK-based FEP sample.  
 
3.2.3. c. The Experience Sampling Method  
The initial session involved completing all of the clinical measures and briefing the 
participant about the diary keeping procedure. Prior to consenting to take part in this study, 
all of the participants were provided with an information sheet (Appendix 1) that was 
reviewed and approved by the National Research Ethics Committee. Pre-ESM clinical 
measures consisted of the Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia, Beck’s Hopelessness 
Scale, and InterSePT Scale for Suicidal Thinking. Upon completion of all of the measures, a 
20-minute briefing session was carried out to explain the details of the ESM procedure. In 
keeping with the ESM protocol, participants were only informed of the “general” aim of the 
study, which was to examine the nature of their everyday life experiences. The specific aims 
of the study were only revealed in the debriefing session in order to avoid potential 
measurement biases.  
 During the briefing session, participants were asked to complete an ESM 
questionnaire as a form of practice to confirm that they have understood all of the items in the 
questionnaire and the overall ESM procedure. They were advised not to back-fill their diaries 
for signals or bleeps that they missed or falsify their diary entry times during the 6-day ESM 
period. More importantly, the researcher gave emphasis on the importance of completing 
their diary questionnaires immediately after the watch bleeped, without disclosing the time 
frame upon which entries must be made. A valid diary entry in this study must be completed 
less than 5minutes before but no more than 15 minutes after the bleep. This time frame was 
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adopted from previous ESM studies conducted in a similar clinical sample (Delespaul, 1995; 
Myin-Germeys et al., 2005).  
During the six-day ESM period, the researcher telephoned the participants on three 
separate occasions (end of the 1
st
, 3
rd
 and 6
th 
day) to help keep up their motivation, and also to 
check how they had been getting on so far with the diary keeping task. Throughout the 6-day 
ESM period, participants were also free to contact the researcher between the hours of 9am to 
5pm (Monday to Sunday). Upon completion of the ESM task, participants met with the 
researcher for a 20-minute debriefing session. The purpose of the debriefing was to: (a) check 
the completed diaries for any unintelligible entries, (b) count the total number of valid diary 
questionnaires (valid data must be ≥ 20 valid entries; Delespaul, 1995), (c) explain the 
specific aims of the study, (d) give participants an opportunity to ask questions, and (e) 
complete the ESM debriefing questionnaire (Appendix 12). Participants who had 20 or more 
valid diary questionnaires received a payment of £30 as an appreciation of their time and 
effort. Those who dropped out in the middle of the study or failed to meet the minimum 
number of valid entries required were paid according to the amount of time they have spent 
doing the study. 
 
3.2.4. Analysis Strategy 
The ESM data consisted of two levels: (1) participant level and, (2) day level, which 
simply means that there are multiple observations nested within each participant. The nesting 
of the ESM data meant that it violated the assumption of independent observations. To satisfy 
this assumption, a multi-level linear regression analysis was employed using Stata version 
11.0 (Stata Corp, USA). The main variables of interest were analysed using the stata  
xtreg command with mle (maximum likelihood estimation) option. The interpretation of 
results in multi-level regression is similar to that of a simple linear regression model. Both 
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models assume that the effect of each independent variable is always the same. However, 
both also recognise that the effect of one variable may depend on another (interaction effect). 
The interpretation of the β coefficients in multi-level linear regression analysis is also 
identical to that of standard linear regression, where beta (β) quantifies the degree and 
direction of the relationship between the independent (predictor) variables and the dependent 
(response) variables. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. 
The data was analysed in collaboration with Professor Myin-Germeys, one of the 
leading ESM researchers in psychosis at the University of Maastricht, the Netherlands. 
 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Factor Analyses on the ESM Questionnaire Items 
As discussed in the earlier section (The ESM Diary), all of the items used in the ESM 
questionnaire for this study, with the exception of the hopelessness items, were adopted from 
the ESM questionnaire that was developed and validated by Delespaul in 1995 and employed 
in many other ESM studies since then (Myin-Germeys et al., 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
& 2005). However, in order to ensure a more robust hypotheses testing, factor analyses were 
carried out on the entire questionnaire items that were later used in the multi-level regression 
(MLR) analyses. Specifically, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with orthogonal 
varimax rotations was conducted to determine how strongly each ESM questionnaire item 
(variable) was associated with the constructs (factors) that this study intended to measure.  
Three independent PCA’s were conducted for each of the variable groups: affect/mood, 
hopelessness, and challenging activities. The Kaiser’s eigenvalue-greater-than-one or K1 rule 
was employed in determining which factors to retain. In other words, only factors with 
eigenvalues greater than one were retained for the MLR analysis. 
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Positive and negative affectivity/mood 
The PCA analysis yielded two factors, which accounted for 93.24% of the total 
variance in mood. The first factor, which accounted for 55.63% of the variance, was labelled 
as positive affectivity (PA) due to the high loadings of variables which altogether strongly 
characterise a positive and bright mood. The variables under this construct include: Right 
now, I feel “cheerful”, “content”, “energetic”, and “enthusiastic”. The second factor, which 
accounted for 37.62% of the variance, was labelled as negative affectivity (NA) due to the 
high loadings of variables that characterise a type of mood that is negative and depressed. 
The variables under this construct include: Right now, I feel “insecure”, “low”, and 
“irritated”. On the other hand, variables such as: Right now, I feel “guilty”, “anxious”, and 
“lonely” did not correlate well with the construct of NA and were therefore removed from 
the factor and excluded from the multi-regression analysis. Table 2 displays the results of the 
factor analysis on affectivity items.   
 
Hopelessness 
 In agreement with the results of the pilot study (Brown, 2008), the PCA analysis in 
the present study yielded only one factor, which accounted for 94.4% of the total variance in 
the data. This factor was labelled as hopelessness due to the high loadings of variables, which 
when reverse-coded, define pessimistic thoughts about the future. The variables under this 
construct include: Right now, I feel the future is “bright”, “hopeful”, and I feel “the future has 
possibilities”. Alternatively, the variable I feel “supported” did not correlate well with the 
hopelessness construct and was therefore removed from the factor and excluded from the 
multi-regression analysis.  Table 3 displays the results of the factor analysis on hopelessness 
items.   
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Table 2. Results of the Factor Analysis on the Affective Items  
Affective Items 
 
Factor 1** 
Positive Affectivity 
Factor 2** 
Negative Affectivity 
Factor 3 
Guilt/Anxiety 
Uniqueness 
Right now I feel... 
Cheerful 
Content 
Energetic 
Enthusiastic 
 
0.7251 
0.6907 
0.8761 
0.8904 
 
 
 
  
0.1684 
0.2195 
0.2092 
0.1779 
 
Right now I feel... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
insecure 
low 
irritated 
 
 0.6583 
0.7217 
0.5945 
 
 0.4442 
0.2569 
0.5236 
Guilty 
anxious 
lonely 
  -0.0566 
-0.1781 
-0.0439 
0.6525 
0.7573 
0.6586 
**Factors with eigenvalues that are greater than 1.  Items under these factors constitute the components of cheerful and dysphoric  
variables used in the multi-level regression analyses.   
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Table 3. Results of the Factor Analysis on the Hopelessness Items  
Hopelessness Items Factor 1 Uniqueness 
Right now, I feel the future is...   
Bright 0.932* 0.110 
Hopeful 0.930* 0.116 
I feel...   
Supported 0.550 0.651 
the future has possibilities 0.861* 0.243 
*Items that constitute the components of the hopelessness variable used in the multi-level regression analyses 
(hopefulness items were reverse coded to describe hopelessness).  
 
Daily Hassles: Challenging Activities 
 The results of the PCA analysis identified one factor, which accounted for 107.3% of 
the variance in the data. This factor was labelled as “challenging activities” due to the high 
loadings of variables that characterise a difficult activity. The variables under this construct 
consist of: “this activity requires a lot of effort” and “this activity is challenging”.  The 
variables “I prefer doing something else”, “I’m active”, and “I’m good at this activity”, on the 
other hand, did not correlate with the challenging activities construct and was therefore 
removed from the factor and excluded from the multi-regression analysis. Table 4 displays 
results of the factor analysis. 
 In keeping with K1 rule mentioned earlier, only factors with eigenvalues greater than 
one were retained. In order to determine how well the variables that reflect the same 
construct/factor yield similar results, the cronbach alpha was calculated for all of the 
extracted factors. With the exception of negative affectivity, which has a good internal 
reliability, the rest of the factors (positive affectivity, hopelessness, & challenging activities) 
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have an excellent level of internal consistency. The data on descriptive statistics are 
summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 4. Results of the Factor Analysis on the Activity Appraisal Items  
Activity Appraisal Items Factor 1** 
Activity-related  stress 
Factor 2 
Undefined 
Uniqueness 
 
Preface: What I am doing just before  
               the bleep went off?.... 
I prefer doing something else 
I’m active 
I’m good at this activity 
This activity requires a lot of effort 
This activity is challenging 
 
 
 
0.8572 
0.8474 
-0.2325 
0.2878 
0.1828 
 
 
0.9459 
0.8591 
0.9664 
0.2633 
0.2819   
**Factor with eigenvalues that are greater than 1.  Items under factor 1 constitute the 
components of the challenging activities variable used in the multi-level regression analyses 
 
 
Table 5. Summary of Descriptive Statistics for the Key ESM Factors 
Factors No. of items Eigenvalue Alpha M (SD) 
Positive Affectivity 4 2.984 0.92 4.17 (1.45) 
Negative Affectivity 3 2.018 0.82 1.82 (1.12) 
Hopelessness 3 2.475 0.94 3.35 (1.63) 
Challenging Activities 2 1.511 0.90 4.74 (3.25) 
 
 
  
 61 
 
3.3.2. Sample Characteristics  
 Of the 105 individuals who were approached, only 5 individuals responded with an 
outright refusal. Out of the 100 recruited participants, a subsample of 4 (4%) changed their 
mind about participating (those who did the pre-ESM assessments but did not start the ESM 
diary task), 5 (5%) dropped out within the 6-day ESM assessment period whilst 16 (16%) 
failed to meet the minimum number of valid ESM diary entries required (>20; Delespaul, 
1995). In total, the final sample consisted of 75 participants (29 females and 46 males) of 
which, 35 (46%) were identified to have had a history of suicidal behaviour whilst 40 (54%) 
have had no history of suicidal behaviour.  
Altogether, the final sample of 75 participants completed a total of 2661 valid ESM 
observations (min = 20, max = 58, avg = 35.30), with the suicidal history group significantly 
completing more valid ESM observations than the non-suicidal group [mean (SD) = 39.61 
(11.1) and 38.33 (11.8) observations, respectively; t (2660) = 2.90, p = 0.003].  
 
3.3.3. Descriptive Statistics and T-tests 
Prior to starting the ESM study, all of the participants completed assessments on 
suicidal thinking (ISST), hopelessness (BHS), and depression (CDSS). Means, standard 
variation (SD), minimum (min) scores, maximum (max) scores, and t-statistics for age and 
key clinical symptoms are presented in Table 6. 
 
3.3.4. Hypotheses Testing  
 To test the hypotheses, independent t-tests on the main variables of interest and a 
series of Multilevel Regression (MLR) analyses were carried out using the Stata statistical 
software version 11 (Stata Corp, USA). For many social scientists, the MLR is often called as 
the multilevel/nested model analysis whilst many statisticians referred to it as mixed model  
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Table 6. Descriptive and T-test Statistics for Age and Key Clinical Symptoms 
Measured Variables 
 
Groups Min Max Mean SD SE t-statistics 
Age Non-suicidal 
Suicidal History 
17 
17 
47 
37 
23.97 
23.46 
5.40 
4.96 
.86 
.84 
-.47  
Hopelessness vulnerability 
(LEIDS – hopelessness subscale) 
 
 
 
Non-suicidal 
Suicidal History 
 
1 
2 
 
19 
20 
 
5.97 
12.77 
 
4.63 
5.04 
 
0.76 
0.85 
-5.95** 
Hopelessness 
(Beck Hopelessness Scale) 
 
 
 
Non-suicidal 
Suicidal History 
 
0 
1 
 
19 
19 
 
4.64 
9.71 
 
4.65 
5.34 
 
0.74 
0.90 
-4.34** 
Suicidal thinking 
(InterSept for Suicidal Thinking) 
 
 
 
Non-suicidal 
Suicidal History 
 
0 
0 
 
12 
15 
 
0.56 
3.31 
 
2.20 
4.82 
 
0.35 
0.82 
-3.10** 
Depression 
(Calgary Depression Scale for 
  Schizophrenia) 
 
Non-suicidal 
Suicidal History 
 
0 
0 
 
14 
15 
 
1.82 
5.34 
 
3.06 
4.96 
 
0.49 
0.84 
-3.63** 
*p<0.05, **p<0.001 
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analysis. For most people in education, the MLR is referred to as the Hierarchical Linear 
Model. As discussed earlier, the MLR is best suited to cross-sectional time-series data such as 
that of the ESM because it satisfies the assumption of independent observation, which is 
violated by the nesting of multiple ESM observations within the subjects or participants.  
 In Stata, multilevel (xt) regression (reg) was carried out using the “xtreg” command. 
The basic syntax for the “xtreg” command using the maximum likelihood estimation (mle) 
model is: xtreg y x1, i (varname) mle. Similar to the basic regression formula, the “y” 
(dependent/outcome variable) is followed by the “x” (independent/predictor variable). 
Following the principle of multiple regression, the number of independent or predictor 
variables depends on the variables of interest in the hypothesis [e.g. xtreg y x1 x2 x3, i 
(varname) mle]. The “i” (individual) is the identification variable where the multiple 
observations are nested, which is the participant level (variable name: subj_no) in the case of 
our analyses. The “mle” option (maximum likelihood estimation), as the name suggests, fully 
maximizes the likelihood of the random effects model. The random effects model assumes 
that the differences across cases are random and not correlated with the predictor variables. 
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. 
 
Momentary Experiences in Everyday Life as Measured by the ESM 
In keeping with the assumptions of the DAH – 
1. The suicidal history group will exhibit significantly higher levels of momentary 
hopelessness than the non-suicidal group. 
To test this hypothesis, an independent t-test was conducted to compare the 
magnitude of momentary hopelessness that was experienced by each group (suicidal history 
group vs. non-suicidal group) on a day to day basis. As predicted, the suicidal history group 
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(M = 3.56, SD = 1.37) showed significantly higher momentary hopelessness mean score than 
the non-suicidal [M = 3.16, SD = 1.86, t (2319.37) = 6.17, p <.001].  
 
2. Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will demonstrate greater 
momentary hopelessness linked to negative affectivity, and less momentary hopelessness 
linked to positive affectivity.  
 Prior to testing this hypothesis, preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that 
the Experience Sampling Method was able to detect the fluctuations in momentary 
hopelessness linked to both the negative affectivity and positive affectivity as suggested by 
the DAH for suicidal relapse. To do this, NA and PA (“x” or predictor variables) were 
separately fitted into the model predicting momentary hopelessness (“y” or outcome 
variable). To test if momentary hopelessness is linked to NA, multilevel regression was 
carried out using the syntax: 
 xtreg y(momentary hopelessness) x(NA), i(subj_no) mle 
To test if momentary hopelessness is linked to PA, the same form of syntax was employed 
but using PA as the predictor variable:  
 xtreg y(momentary hopelessness) x(PA), i(subj_no) mle 
The results showed that both NA and PA significantly predicted momentary hopelessness 
(statistics are shown in Table 7). 
To test the hypothesis, analyses were performed in two stages: First, the group 
(suicidal history group & non-suicidal group) variable was added as an independent predictor 
in the model predicting momentary hopelessness. The interaction term between group and 
affectivity (NA & PA) was also included to check if NA and PA remained as significant 
predictors. The syntax employed to carry out this initial stage of the analysis was: 
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xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x1(NA/PA) x2(group) x3(NA/PA*group),  
     i(subj_no) mle  
The results showed a significant main effect of NA and PA, and also interaction 
effects for both NA x group and PA x group combinations. Second, given the significant 
results for both NA and PA from the initial analyses, stratified analyses were conducted to 
determine the differences between each group.  
xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x1(NA/PA) if group = non-suicidal group,  
     i(subj_no) mle  
xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x1(NA/PA) if group = suicidal history group,  
    i(subj_no) mle  
The results revealed that the suicidal history group had a greater increase in 
momentary hopelessness linked to NA than the non-suicidal group. The suicidal history 
group also had the greater reduction in momentary hopelessness in relation to PA compared 
to the non-suicidal group. Table 7 displays summary of results. 
To control for the possible effects of the key clinical symptoms, scores from CDSS 
(depression), BHS (generalised hopelessness), and ISST (suicidal thinking) were separately 
added as covariates. Both NA and PA remained as significant predictors of momentary 
hopelessness after controlling for the previously identified key clinical symptoms.  
 In summary, the results were found to be consistent with the hypothesis as the suicidal 
history group exhibit greater momentary hopelessness linked to negative affectivity and 
reduced momentary hopelessness linked to positive affectivity compared to the non-suicidal 
group.  
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Table 7. Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Affectivity and Suicidality as Predictors of Momentary Hopelessness (N = 75) 
Predictor Variables χ2      β   SE p-value Lower CI Upper CI 
Negative affectivity (NA) .000 0.47 0.02 0.000 0.43 0.51 
NA*Group  
     NA 
     Group 
     NA x Group 
.000  
0.34 
-0.14 
0.18 
 
0.04 
0.28 
0.05 
 
0.000 
0.622 
0.000 
 
0.25 
-0.69 
0.08 
 
0.42 
0.41 
0.28 
NA if group = non-suicidal .000 0.34 0.42 0.000 0.25 0.42 
NA if group = suicidal 
 
 
.000 0.52 0.03 0.000 0.46 0.57 
Positive Affectivity (PA) .000 -0.48 0.02 0.000 -0.52 -0.45 
PA*Group 
     PA 
     Group 
     PA x Group 
.000  
-0.42 
0.70 
-0.12 
 
0.02 
0.25 
0.03 
 
0.000 
0.005 
0.000 
 
-0.47 
0.21 
-0.18 
 
-0.37 
1.20 
-0.05 
PA if group = non-suicidal .000 -0.42 0.02 0.000 -0.46 -0.37 
PA if group = suicidal .000 -0.54 0.02 0.000 -0.58 -0.50 
χ2 = F-statistic of the regression model 
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3. Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will display greater 
momentary hopelessness when dealing with unpleasant events and challenging activities.  
 Prior to testing this prediction, initial analyses were conducted to verify if unpleasant 
events and challenging activities in everyday life are linked to momentary hopelessness. To 
do this, unpleasant events and challenging activities (“x” or predictor variables) were 
separately fitted into the model predicting momentary hopelessness (“y” or outcome 
variable). To test if momentary hopelessness is linked to unpleasant events, multilevel 
regression was carried out using the syntax: 
 xtreg y(momentary hopelessness) x(unpleasant events), i(subj_no) mle 
To test if momentary hopelessness is linked to challenging activities, the same form of syntax 
was employed but using challenging activities as the predictor variable: 
 xtreg y(momentary hopelessness) x(challenging activities), i(subj_no) mle 
Results from this initial analyses indicated that unpleasant events but not challenging 
activities significantly predicted momentary hopelessness (statistics are shown in Table 8). 
Similar to the analyses in hypothesis 2, a two-fold analysis was carried out to test the 
hypothesis.  
 
Unpleasant events  
For first part of the analysis, the group (suicidal & non-suicidal) variable was added 
as an independent predictor in the model predicting momentary hopelessness. The interaction 
term between group and unpleasant events was also included to determine whether 
unpleasant events remain as a significant predictor. The syntax employed to carry out this 
initial stage of the analysis is: 
xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x1(unpleasant events) x2(group)  
  x3(unpleasant events*group), i(subj_no) mle  
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A significant main effect of unpleasant events and an interaction event x group was found. In 
the second part of the analysis, a stratified analysis was carried out to identify which group 
had greater increase in momentary hopelessness in relation to the unpleasant events.  
xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x1(unpleasant events) if group = non-suicidal  
    group,  i(subj_no) mle  
xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x1(unpleasant events) if group = suicidal  
     history group,  i(subj_no) mle  
As predicted, a greater increase in momentary hopelessness was found in the suicidal history 
group compared to the non-suicidal group when confronted with unpleasant events. The 
results remain unchanged after the key clinical symptoms, scores from CDSS (depression), 
BHS (generalised hopelessness), and ISST (suicidal thinking) were separately added as 
covariates. Table 8 displays summary of results. 
 
Challenging activities 
Whereas the results of the preliminary analyses earlier showed that challenging 
activities did not significantly predict momentary hopelessness on the whole, adding the 
group variable in the regression model might yield different results. Following the two-step 
analysis conducted previously, first, the group (suicidal & non-suicidal) variable was added 
in the model predicting momentary hopelessness. Similarly, the interaction term between 
group and challenging activities was also included to determine whether challenging 
activities remain as a significant predictor. The syntax employed to carry out this initial stage 
of the analysis is: 
xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x1(challenging activities) x2(group)  
  x3(challenging activities*group), i(subj_no) mle  
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No significant main effect of challenging activities and activity x group interaction effect 
were found. No further analysis was made as challenging activities did not significantly 
predict momentary hopelessness both on the whole and even after the group variable was 
added in the model. Table 8 displays summary of results. 
In summary, it was found that unpleasant events but not challenging activities 
predicted momentary hopelessness. Stratified analyses for each group showed that when 
faced with unpleasant events, the suicidal history group had a greater increase in momentary 
hopelessness compared to the non-suicidal group. The results hold true after controlling for 
depression (CDSS), generalised hopelessness (BHS), and suicidal thinking (ISST).  
 
4. Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will show greater negative 
affectivity and less positive affectivity when confronted with unpleasant events and 
challenging activities. 
 Similar to item 3, initial analyses were conducted to verify if the daily hassles 
(unpleasant events & challenging activities) are linked to mood or affectivity (NA & PA) 
prior to testing the hypothesis. To do this, unpleasant events and challenging activities (“x” 
or predictor variables) were separately fitted into the model predicting positive and negative 
affectivity (“y” or outcome variable). To test if affectivity (NA/PA) is linked to daily hassles 
(challenging activities/unpleasant events), multilevel regression was carried out using the 
syntax: 
 xtreg y(NA/PA) x(unpleasant events/challenging activities), i(subj_no) mle 
The results revealed that unpleasant events were a significant predictor for both negative 
affectivity and positive affectivity. Unlike the unpleasant events, challenging activities 
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Table 8. Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Daily Hassles (unpleasant events & challenging activities) and Suicidality as  
 Predictors of Momentary Hopelessness (N = 75) 
Predictor Variables χ2          β SE      p-value Lower CI Upper CI 
Unpleasant events (UE) .000 0.48 0.03 0.000 0.42 0.53 
UE*Group  
     UE 
     Group 
     UE x Group 
.000  
0.31 
0.18 
0.24 
 
0.04 
0.28 
0.05 
 
0.000 
0.516 
0.000 
 
0.22 
-0.37 
0.14 
 
0.40 
0.74 
0.35 
UE if group = non-suicidal .000 0.31 0.04 0.000 0.23 0.40 
UE if group = suicidal 
 
 
.000 0.56 0.03 0.000 0.49 0.62 
Challenging activities (CA) .228 0.01 0.01 0.228 -0.01 0.03 
CA*Group 
     CA 
     Group 
     CA x Group 
.052  
-0.01 
0.17 
0.04 
 
0.01 
0.31 
0.02 
 
0.389 
0.596 
0.073 
 
-0.04 
-0.45 
0.01 
 
0.01 
0.78 
0.07 
CA if group = non-suicidal
a
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
CA if group = suicidal
a
 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
χ2 = F-statistic of the regression model.  
a 
 = Stratified Analyses were not carried out because main effect of ARS was not significant in the 
analysis using 2
nd
 model on the table. 
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significantly predicted NA but not PA (statistics are shown in Table 9). 
To test the hypothesis, a two-fold analysis was carried out separately for each of the 
daily hassles: 
 
Unpleasant events 
First, the group (suicidal history group & non-suicidal group) variable was added as 
an independent predictor to the models predicting NA and PA. In order to find out if 
unpleasant events will remain as significant predictor of mood, an interaction term between 
affectivity and unpleasant events was also added in the model.  
xtreg y (NA/PA) x1(unpleasant events) x2(group) x3(unpleasant events *group),  
    i(subj_no) mle  
The results of these further tests showed significant main effects of unpleasant events in 
predicting both the NA and PA. It also revealed significant event x group interaction effect in 
both models predicting NA and PA.  
Second, independent stratified analyses for models predicting NA and PA were 
carried out to determine which group was more emotionally sensitive to unpleasant events.  
xtreg y (NA/PA) x1(unpleasant events) if group = non-suicidal group/suicidal  
   history group,  i(subj_no) mle  
As expected, stratified analysis in the model predicting NA revealed that the suicidal 
had a significantly greater increase in NA when confronted with unpleasant events compared 
to the non-suicidal group. On the other hand, stratified analysis in the model predicting PA 
also confirmed the hypothesis with the suicidal history group showing significantly greater 
decrease in PA when confronted with unpleasant events compared to the non-suicidal group. 
The results remained unchanged after depression (CDSS), generalised hopelessness (BHS), 
and suicidal thinking (ISST) were entered as covariates (statistics are shown in Table 9). 
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Challenging activities 
  Although the results of the preliminary analyses earlier indicated that challenging 
activities were significant predictors of NA, adding the group variable in the regression 
model might reveal different results. Following the two-step analyses conducted in the 
previous section; first, the group (suicidal & non-suicidal) variable was added an independent 
predictor to the models predicting NA and PA. An interaction term between group and 
challenging activities was also added in the model in order to validate whether challenging 
activities will remain as a significant predictor for NA and PA.  
xtreg y (NA/PA) x1(challenging activities) x2(group) x3(challenging activities  
    *group), i(subj_no) mle  
The results of this analysis indicated that there is a significant main effect of challenging 
activities and an activity x group interaction effect in both models predicting NA and PA. 
Table 9 displays summary of results. 
Second, individual stratified analyses were carried out for each models predicting NA 
and PA to determine which group is more emotionally sensitive to challenging activities.  
xtreg y (NA/PA) x1(challenging activities) if group = non-suicidal group/suicidal 
    history group,  i(subj_no) mle  
As expected, the results of stratified analyses in the model predicting NA revealed that the 
suicidal history group had a significantly greater increase in NA when faced with challenging 
activities compared to the non-suicidal group. These results remained unchanged after 
depression (CDSS), generalised hopelessness (BHS), and suicidal thinking (ISST) were 
entered as covariates. The results of the stratified analyses in the model predicting PA, on the 
other hand, were unable to discriminate the differences between each group. Challenging 
activities as a significant predictor of PA was only found in the non-suicidal group but not the 
suicidal history group. Such confounding outcome may be due to the fact that challenging 
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activities did not significantly predict PA in the preliminary analysis. Table 9 displays 
summary of results. 
In summary, the outcome was in keeping with the hypothesis as the suicidal history 
group exhibited greater NA and less PA when faced with unpleasant events compared to the 
non-suicidal group. In contrast, when faced with challenging activities, the suicidal history 
group only exhibited greater NA than the non-suicidal group. Stratified analysis on PA 
between groups produced incompatible results, thus making it unfeasible to discriminate the 
differences between the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group. This may be due to 
challenging activities significantly predicting NA, but not PA in the preliminary analysis. 
Similar results were found after controlling for depression (CDSS), generalised hopelessness 
(BHS), and suicidal thinking (ISST).  
 
The Validity of LEIDS’ Hopelessness Subscale as a Measure of CR to hopelessness 
5. Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will exhibit higher levels of 
cognitive reactivity to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale.  
In line with our hypothesis, the suicidal history group (M = 12.7, SD = 5.0) scored 
significantly higher on the Leiden Index of Depression Scale or LEIDS’ hopelessness 
subscale than the non-suicidal group (M = 6.1, SD = 4.6), t(71) = 5.90, p < .001. Similar 
results were found after controlling for depression (CDSS), generalised hopelessness (BHS), 
and suicidal thinking (ISST). 
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Table 9. Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on Daily Hassles (unpleasant events & challenging activities) and Suicidality as  
      Predictors of Changes in Affectivity (N = 75) 
Response Variable Predictor Variables χ2 β SE p-value Lower CI Upper CI 
Negative  Unpleasant events (UE) .000 0.56 0.02 0.000 0.51 0.60 
   Affectivity UE *Group  
     UE 
     Group 
     UE x Group 
.000  
0.22 
0.19 
0.51 
 
0.04 
0.17 
0.05 
 
0.000 
0.274 
0.000 
 
0.14 
-0.15 
0.42 
 
0.29 
0.52 
0.60 
 UE if group = non-suicidal .000 0.21 0.03 0.000 0.15 0.27 
 UE if group = suicidal .000 0.72 0.03 0.000 0.66 0.79 
 Challenging Activities (CA) .000 0.05 0.01 0.000 0.66 0.79 
 CA*Group 
     CA 
     Group 
     CA x Group 
.041  
0.02 
0.21 
0.05 
 
0.01 
0.21 
0.02 
 
0.023 
0.330 
0.002 
 
0.00 
-0.21 
0.02 
 
0.05 
0.63 
0.08 
 CA if group = non-suicidal .002 0.02 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.04 
 CA if group = suicidal .000 0.07 0.01 0.000 0.05 0.10 
        
Positive Unpleasant events (UE) .000 -0.53 0.03 0.000 -0.59 -0.47 
   Affectivity UE*Group  
     UE 
     Group 
     UE x Group 
.000  
-0.40 
-0.17 
-0.19 
 
0.06 
0.24 
0.07 
 
0.000 
0.478 
0.005 
 
-0.51 
-0.64 
-0.32 
 
-0.30 
0.30 
-0.06 
 UE if group = non-suicidal .000 -0.40 0.04 0.000 -0.51 -0.30 
 UE if group = suicidal .000 -0.59 0.02 0.000 -0.67 -0.51 
 Challenging Activities (CA) .342  0.01 0.01 0.342 -0.01 0.03 
 CA*Group 
     CA 
     Group 
     CA x Group 
.052  
 0.03 
-0.14 
-0.04 
 
0.02 
0.28 
0.02 
 
0.034 
0.596 
0.044 
 
-0.70 
-0.70 
-0.12 
 
0.40 
0.40 
-0.00 
 CA if group = non-suicidal .022  0.03 0.01 0.022 0.00 0.06 
 CA if group = suicidal .536 -0.01 0.02 0.536 -0.04 0.02 
χ2 = F-statistic of the regression model 
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6. The individual’s cognitive reactivity to hopelessness, as measured by the LEIDS, will be 
predictive of his/her susceptibility to momentary hopelessness when affectivity is negative. 
To test the hypothesis, a two-step analysis similar to hypothesis 4 was carried out. 
First, NA, scores on the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale, and an interaction term between these 
two were added as independent predictors to the model predicting momentary hopelessness.  
xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x1(LEIDS) x2(NA) x3(LEIDS*NA),   
    i(subj_no) mle  
As expected, the LEIDS predicted momentary hopelessness when affectivity is negative. 
Second, the LEIDS variable was dichotomised into upper and lower halves to identify if high 
and low scorers will differentially predict momentary hopelessness when affectivity is 
negative. Separate analyses were then carried out for the upper half and the lower half.  
xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x(NA) if dichotomised LEIDS = upper   
   half/lower half, i(subj_no) mle  
High LEIDS scorers or those with higher CR to hopelessness had a greater increase in 
momentary hopelessness when affectivity is negative compared to the low LEIDS scorers or 
those with lower CR to hopelessness. Table 10 displays the summary of results. 
 In summary, the outcome was in keeping with the hypothesis as those with higher CR 
to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale exhibited a greater 
increase in momentary hopelessness when affectivity is negative compared to the low scorers 
or those with lower CR to hopelessness. Similar results were found after controlling for 
depression (CDSS), generalised hopelessness (BHS), and suicidal thinking (ISST).  
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Table 10. Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on LEIDS Score on Hopelessness Subscale and Negative Affectivity as a Predictor of  
       Momentary Hopelessness (N = 75) 
Predictor Variables χ2 β SE p-value Lower CI Upper CI 
LEIDS-hopelessness subscale * NA .000 0.03 0.00 0.000 0.03 0.04 
NA if LEIDS score = lower half .000 0.40 0.03 0.000 0.04 0.47 
NA if LEIDS score = upper half .000 0.51 0.03 0.000 0.45 0.57 
χ2 = F-statistic of the regression model 
 
 
Table 11. Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis on LEIDS score on Hopelessness Subscale and Daily Hassles as a Predictor of  
       Momentary Hopelessness (N = 75) 
Predictor Variables χ2 β SE p-value Lower CI Upper CI 
LEIDS-hopelessness subscale * unpleasant events  .000 0.02 0.00 0.000 0.02 0.02 
Unpleasant events  if LEIDS score = lower half .000 0.11 0.02 0.000 0.07 0.07 
Unpleasant events  if LEIDS score = upper half .000 0.31 0.02 0.000 0.27 0.34 
       
LEIDS-hopelessness subscale *challenging activities .626 0.01 0.02 0.626 -0.06 0.03 
Challenging activities if LEIDS score = lower half .297 0.00 0.01 0.297 -0.02 0.02 
Challenging activities if LEIDS score = upper half .998 0.01 0.01 0.998 -0.01 0.04 
χ2 = F-statistic of the regression model 
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Finally, 
7. The individual’s cognitive reactivity to hopelessness, as measured by the LEIDS, will be 
predictive of his/her susceptibility to momentary hopelessness when faced with unpleasant 
events and challenging activities. 
 To test the hypothesis, a two-step analysis similar to hypothesis 6 was carried out 
separately for each type of daily hassles (unpleasant events & challenging activities).   
 
Unpleasant events 
First, unpleasant events, scores on LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale, and the interaction 
term between these two variables were added as independent predictors to the model 
predicting hopelessness.  
xi: xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x1(unpleasant events) x2(LEIDS)   
   x3(unpleasant events*LEIDS), i(subj_no) mle  
A significant LEIDS x unpleasant events interaction effect was found, which indicated that 
scores on LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale predicted momentary hopelessness when dealing 
with unpleasant events.   
Second, the LEIDS variable was dichotomised into upper and lower halves to identify 
if high and low scorers will differentially predict momentary hopelessness when faced with 
unpleasant events. Separate analyses were then carried out for the upper half and the lower 
half. 
xi: xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x(unpleasant events) if dichotomised LEIDS = 
    upper half/lower half, i(subj_no) mle  
In keeping with the hypothesis, high LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale scorers or those with 
higher CR to hopelessness had a greater increase in momentary hopelessness when faced with 
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unpleasant events compared to the low scorers or those with lower CR to hopelessness. Table 
11 displays the summary of results (please see page 76). 
 
Challenging activities 
Following the two-step analyses-- first, challenging activities, scores on LEIDS’ 
hopelessness subscale, and the interaction term between these two variables were added as 
independent predictors to the model predicting hopelessness.  
xi: xtreg y (momentary hopelessness) x1(challenging activities) x2(LEIDS)  
   x3(challenging activities *LEIDS), i(subj_no) mle  
Contrary to the hypothesis, CR to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness 
subscale did not predict momentary hopelessness during challenging activities. Due to this 
non-significant result, no further analyses were conducted. Table 11 displays the summary of 
results (please see page 76). 
 In summary, the individual’s CR to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS’ 
hopelessness subscale was found to be predictive of his/her susceptibility to momentary 
hopelessness when faced with unpleasant events but not with challenging activities. This 
pattern of results was unaffected after controlling for depression (CDSS), suicidal thinking 
(ISST), and generalised hopelessness (BHS).  
 
3.4. Discussion 
 This study set out to test the Differential Activation Hypothesis of suicidal relapse in 
early psychosis through the use of the Experience Sampling Method, a systematised diary 
keeping method, which semi-randomly samples affective, cognitive, and behavioural data as 
they occur in an individual’s everyday environment. Specifically, this study aimed to explore 
the link between momentary hopelessness and affectivity (positive vs. negative) in 
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individuals with a lifetime history of suicidal behaviour vs. without. Although the compliance 
rate of 59% (number of valid observations per participant = 35.3) was slightly lower than the 
reported rate in schizophrenia (66%; Oorschot et al., 2009), it is important to note that the 
sample in this present study were still at a difficult stage of recovery following the initial 
episode of psychosis (Harrison & Fowler, 2004).  
Given that this is the first study to have explored the occurrence, amplitude, and 
fluctuation of hopelessness in everyday life, findings from laboratory-based studies that 
investigated the link between hopelessness and suicidal behaviour will only be comparable to 
a certain extent. Unlike the mood-primed data on hopelessness from previous laboratory-
based cross-sectional studies, the ESM data on momentary hopelessness were repeatedly 
sampled from the individual’s natural environment for a prolonged period of time. For this 
reason, only indirect comparisons were made in some parts of the discussions.  
Consistent with the hypothesis, the suicidal history group exhibited greater amplitude 
of momentary hopelessness on a day to day basis compared to the non-suicidal group. This 
finding was consistent with other studies, which indicated a strong link between hopelessness 
and suicidality in the FEP sample (Cohen et al., 1994; Klonksy et al., 2012; Nordentoft et al., 
2002; Robinson et al., 2009).   
Also in keeping with the hypothesis, the suicidal history group also showed 
significantly larger increase in momentary hopelessness linked to negative affectivity and 
larger decrease in momentary hopelessness linked to positive affectivity. The pattern of 
results also indicated that momentary hopelessness was more strongly linked with NA than 
PA, which was in keeping with the DAH for suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004). Closer 
inspection of the changes in momentary hopelessness linked to affectivity revealed that the 
amount of increase in momentary hopelessness linked to NA in the suicidal history group (β 
= 50) was 32% greater than the non-suicidal group (β=38). In contrast, the difference in the 
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amount of reduction in momentary hopelessness linked to PA in the suicidal history group (β 
= 59) was 28% greater than the non-suicidal group (β = 46). This pattern of results was in 
agreement with the findings on Hepburn et al.’s mood-priming study (2006) which indicated 
that only the negative, but not the positive mood induction, prompted a change in the 
individual’s positive future fluency (a behavioural feature of hopelessness).  
 Unexpectedly, the data on daily hassles (unpleasant events & challenging activities) 
as a predictor of momentary hopelessness and affectivity (positive & negative) produced a 
mixed outcome. Contrary to hypothesis, the suicidal history group only exhibited greater 
increase in momentary hopelessness when confronted with unpleasant events but not with 
challenging activities. One possible explanation is that a good number of the participants 
were unemployed and had very limited range of social activities on a day to day basis. The 
data from the ESM diary revealed that most commonly reported activities included “watching 
telly or listening to music” and “sleeping or napping”, which accounts to 28% and 12% of the 
total reported activity respectively. Given that the ESM items on the activity appraisal 
section were devised to measure the subjective difficulty of the task, the nature of the 
activities that most of the participants engaged themselves in seemed to be quite relaxing, less 
varied, and less difficult as opposed to being challenging and complicated. In other words, 
the reported activities were simply not stressful enough to trigger significantly different 
amplitudes of hopelessness between the suicidal history group and non-suicidal group. The 
most commonly reported events, on the other hand, included experiences or happenings that 
were more personal to the participants such as face to face conversations, telephone calls, or 
visits by family members or friends (31%). Given that the ESM item on event appraisal was 
devised to measure the unpleasantness or pleasantness of the event, it is possible that 
displeasing personal events were likely to be perceived as more unpleasant by the individual.  
The significantly higher increase in momentary hopelessness in the suicidal history group 
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suggests that those with a history of suicidal behaviour were more prone to the activation of 
attenuated hopeless cognitions when faced with unpleasant events in everyday life compared 
to those without any history of suicidal behaviour.  
 As expected, further analyses revealed that unpleasant events not only impacts on 
momentary hopelessness, but also on the positive and negative affectivity of the individual. 
The results have shown that the suicidal history group had a significantly greater NA and less 
PA than the non-suicidal group when confronted with unpleasant events. However, when 
confronted with challenging activities, the suicidal history group only exhibited greater NA 
than the non-suicidal group while the groups did not differ at all on their PA. The pattern of 
results illustrating the significant impact of unpleasant events on the individual’s affectivity 
and momentary hopelessness was in keeping with the assumption of the DAH for suicidal 
relapse (Lau et al., 2004). Recalling the assumptions of the DAH for suicidal relapse, 
affectivity/mood and hopelessness are strongly associated to each other such that the previous 
determines the mechanism of the latter (Lau et al., 2004). It was therefore unsurprising that 
the changes in affectivity (greater NA & less PA) and momentary hopelessness in the suicidal 
history group were more distinct than the non-suicidal group. Interestingly, the affective 
reactivity to unpleasant events in the suicidal history group was found to be stronger in NA 
than PA. When faced with unpleasant events, the suicidal history group showed a bigger 
increase in NA than the non-suicidal group. Specifically, the results have indicated that the 
increase in NA in the suicidal history group was 70.83% greater than the non-suicidal group. 
In contrast to this, the decrease in PA in the suicidal history group was only 32.20% more 
than the non-suicidal group. In effect, this distinctly stronger link between unpleasant events 
and NA in the suicidal history group supports the validity of the DAH framework in the 
context of everyday life. It also  Unlike the artificial setting of laboratory-based studies, the 
real-life context of the ESM studies allows contextual factors such as the daily hassles (e.g. 
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unpleasant events) to influence the natural mechanism of affectivity. The results of the 
present study illustrating the role of daily hassles (unpleasant events) as a predictor of NA 
and momentary hopelessness extends the application of the DAH framework in the everyday 
life of  the FEP sample. In particular, the link between affective variability (e.g. increase in 
NA or decrease in PA) and unpleasant events have important implications for the concept of 
cognitive reactivity to hopeless and suicidal thoughts as proposed by the DAH of suicidal 
relapse (DAH; Lau et al., 2004). First, the distinctly greater sensitivity to unpleasant events of 
FEP individuals from the suicidal-history group (as illustrated by the increase in their NA) 
than those from the non-suicidal group suggest that FEP individuals with a history of suicidal 
behaviour are at a greater risk for future suicidal behaviour. On a day to day basis, it simply 
means that unpleasant events are more likely to elicit negative affective responses amongst 
individuals with histories of suicidal behaviour. These negative affective responses then 
reactivate a network of maladaptive thinking patterns which, given the right intensity and 
context, could potentially trigger reactivation of hopeless or suicidal thoughts. On the whole, 
the pattern of results suggests that the occurrence of unpleasant events in the everyday lives 
of FEP individuals with a history of suicidal behaviour can therefore act as a precursor to a 
more negative mood/affect, which according to the DAH of suicidal relapse can potentially 
trigger the recurrence of hopeless/suicidal cognitions.  
 Second, the evidence suggesting the mediating effect of psychosis as a traumatic life 
experience on the affective responses to minor stresses in everyday life (e.g. unpleasant 
events), supports the previous findings that FEP  individuals were more vulnerable to suicidal 
relapses. Dealing with the traumatic experience of psychosis and adjusting to changes 
brought by the psychotic illness can be difficult for many individuals. Having to confront one 
or both of these challenges at the same time is enough to render this particular group of 
individuals more vulnerable to the effects of minor stresses in everyday life. As evidenced by 
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the pattern of results discussed previously, such vulnerability is even intensified when the 
individual has previously felt hopeless/suicidal. Recalling the assumption of the DAH, the 
individual’s vulnerability to suicidal relapse is determined by how strong the link is between 
negative affect (e.g. depressed mood) and hopeless/suicidal thoughts. Given the enhanced 
affective sensitivity to unpleasant events as moderated by the experience of psychosis as a 
traumatic life event, and the susceptibility of FEP individuals with a history of suicidal 
behaviour to hopeless/suicidal thoughts when affect is intensely negative (e.g. depressed), the 
occurrence of severely unpleasant events to the lives of this group of individuals is almost 
tantamount to the reactivation of hopeless/suicidal thoughts.  
 The pattern of results on challenging activities as a predictor of affectivity, on the 
other hand, was more difficult to explain. The results from an earlier analysis indicated that 
challenging activities did not significantly predict momentary hopelessness. However, when 
challenging activities were tested as a predictor of affectivity, it predicted greater NA in the 
suicidal history group than the non-suicidal group. It is possible that due to the lack of 
complexity in the daily activities of the participants in the present study, the impact may have 
simply been too subtle to reactivate hopeless thoughts, but enough to alter negative 
affectivity. This further substantiates the concept of “differential activation” as the effects of 
the daily hassles can vary greatly from one event/activity to another. Similarly, this may also 
be the reason why challenging activities did not significantly predict greater reduction in PA 
in the suicidal history group as hypothesised. It was noted earlier that there was a general lack 
of complexity and variety in the day to day activities of the participants in the present study. 
It is therefore possible that the activities that were particularly challenging were simply not 
strong enough to predict differential reduction in PA between the two groups. It is plausible 
that a similar pattern of relationship found between unpleasant events and affectivity also 
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applies to the relationship between challenging activities and affectivity, which suggests that 
challenging activities might also have a stronger link with NA than PA.  
As hypothesised, the suicidal history group scored higher in the LEIDS’ hopelessness 
subscale than the non-suicidal group. This outcome is in agreement with the results by 
Williams and colleagues (2008), who found that those who had suicidal thoughts when 
feeling depressed in the past scored higher on the LEIDS hopelessness subscale. In keeping 
with the assumption of the DAH of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004), the cognitive reactivity 
(CR) to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale was predictive of the 
individual’s susceptibility to momentary hopelessness when affectivity is negative. Further 
analyses specifically showed that those who scored higher in the LEIDS’ hopelessness 
subscale predicted greater increase in momentary hopelessness when affectivity is negative 
compared to those who scored lower. This confirms the results found in previous mood-
priming studies (Hepburn et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2005, 2006, & 2007).  
Finally, the data for the final hypothesis of this study revealed dissimilar results. It 
was found that compared to those who have lower CR to hopelessness, those who have 
higher levels of CR to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale 
exhibited greater increase in momentary hopelessness when confronted with unpleasant 
events but not with challenging activities. These findings replicate the data on daily hassles as 
a predictor of momentary hopelessness. Earlier it was found that when faced with unpleasant 
events, the suicidal history group experienced greater increase in momentary hopelessness 
than the non-suicidal group. Similarly, when faced with the same unpleasant events, those 
who scored higher in LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale experienced a greater increase in 
momentary hopelessness than those who scored lower. On the other hand, the same pattern of 
results was observed with the data on challenging activities. Earlier it was found that when 
faced with challenging activities, the changes in momentary hopelessness did not differ 
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between groups. Correspondingly, when faced with the same challenging activities, the 
changes in momentary hopelessness also did not differ between the high- and low-scorers in 
the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale. Overall, these comparable results support the notion that 
suicidality is strongly associated with higher CR to hopelessness, which is in keeping with the 
assumptions of the DAH for suicidal relapse. It also supports the potential of the LEIDS’ 
hopelessness subscale as a measure of the individual’s CR to hopelessness. More importantly, 
the results are also indicative of the potential of the ESM as a reliable measure of 
vulnerability to hopelessness in everyday life. Unlike the LEIDS which is completed on the 
basis of how the individual would react/behave when he/she is feeling sad, the ESM data are 
collected from the individual’s real-time responses within his/her real-life environment. In 
other words, the ESM data are based on naturally occurring behaviour in everyday life as 
opposed to the imagined behaviour based on hypothetical mood condition. The ability of the 
ESM to capture real-life contextual factors also makes the ESM a better measure than the 
LEIDS.  
All in all, the results of this study extend the relevance of the DAH of suicidal relapse 
from being a model of suicidal vulnerability in a previously depressed sample to a potentially 
feasible model of suicidal relapse in an FEP sample. It also brings to light the role of daily 
hassles (e.g. minor unpleasant events & challenging activities) in the momentary changes in 
affect, which determines the reactivation of low-level attenuated hopelessness. Finally, the 
outcome of this study also adds an important contribution to the literature by illustrating the 
DAH as a valid cognitive model of suicidal vulnerability in psychosis that can be tested via a 
structured diary technique. 
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3.4.1. Strengths and limitations 
 To date, this is the first study to have used the ESM to investigate the validity of the 
DAH for suicidal relapse in a sample of first episode psychosis individuals. More 
importantly, this is also the first study to have investigated the underlying mechanism of 
suicidal thinking process by looking into the ebb and flow of momentary hopelessness in 
relation to the fluctuations of affectivity in everyday life. In addition, this is the very first 
study which examined the use of the Leiden Index of Depression Scales’ hopelessness 
subscale as a measure of CR to hopelessness in a sample of previous suicide attempters in 
FEP. This is also the first move which examined the use of the ESM as a measure of 
vulnerability to hopelessness (or momentary hopelessness) in everyday life. 
A number of limitations have to be considered in understanding the findings of the 
present study. First, the use of ESM had a number of methodological issues. Whereas most of 
the participants did not find the ESM particularly difficult, a number of participants found the 
task inconvenient and slightly irritating, which was mainly due to the overall duration of the 
task (6 days) and the daily frequency of time sampling (total = 10). Even though a good 
number of individuals thought that ESM was a good way of keeping them more mindful of 
their mood/feelings and thoughts, only a few individuals remained keen to take part again if 
given the opportunity. Due to the challenging nature of the ESM task, it simply dissuades the 
participants from doing it again. Some of the participants in the present study found the ESM 
quite interruptive to their activities, most especially outdoor activities (such as commuting on 
a bus & shopping) as it meant that they had to fill in their ESM diaries in public places. 
Whereas some took part for purely altruistic reasons, a lot of the participants were motivated 
by the monetary incentive upon successful completion of the task. Although these factors had 
no detrimental effect on the results of the present study, it may have contributed to the second 
limitation of this study, which is the slightly lower compliance rate (59%) compared to the 
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previously reported rate of 66% (Oorschot et al., 2009). However, it is important to consider 
that this is only speculative and there may be other reasons why the compliance rate was 
slightly lower in this study. As noted earlier, it is also possible that undertaking the ESM 
during a particularly difficult period (recovery following the FEP) might have been too 
challenging for the participants in general.  It is also possible that the lower compliance rate 
might have been influenced by the time frame during which the sampling is conducted (7.30 
until 22.30). The early start meant that the participants might have missed most of the early 
samplings as majority of them start their day between the hours of 10am to 12 noon.  
Finally, the data on challenging activities were not conclusive and should be treated 
with some caution. As the participants in the present study were still at the recovery stage 
following their first psychotic episode, their typical day were therefore limited to 
unstructured and solitary activities such as “watching telly, listening to music, sleeping or 
napping”. Altogether, these types of activities simply do not characterise challenging daily 
hassles. It is also important to note that there was a lack of activity appraisal items as only 
two out of five questionnaire items factored in the principal component analysis. The lack of 
questionnaire items might have caused the appraisal of challenging activities to be less 
effective. 
The present study has a number of implications. First, the results of this research 
demonstrated the link between momentary hopelessness and organic mood fluctuations in 
everyday life, which confirmed the application of the DAH of suicidal relapse in psychosis. 
With the link between momentary hopelessness and negative affectivity stronger in the 
suicidal history group than the non-suicidal group, it therefore suggests that although 
hopeless/suicidal thoughts are attenuated when the individuals are not currently suicidal, low 
levels of hopeless/suicidal thoughts remain reactive to subtle changes in NA. 
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Second, the feasibility of the ESM as an effective assessment tool for the individual’s 
vulnerability to hopelessness in everyday life, particularly in the FEP sample, may provide 
future researches an alternative means to further explore the mechanism of suicidal thinking 
in a context that is more organic to the individuals.  
Third, the confirmation of LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale as a valuable measure of 
hopelessness or suicidal vulnerability may create a platform for both researchers and 
clinicians to further pursue the potential of this scale and along with it, develop more 
effective ways to manage and prevent suicidal behaviour.     
In conclusion, the current study found that in there is a stronger link between NA and 
momentary hopelessness in the suicidal history group than the non-suicidal group in the 
context of everyday life, which is in keeping with the core idea of the Differential Activation 
Hypothesis of suicidal relapse. It also identified the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale as an 
effective measure of CR to hopelessness in the FEP sample. The findings of this study may 
represent a platform for both researchers and clinicians to further explore the mechanism of 
suicidal thinking in everyday life and develop interventions for suicidal behaviour in 
psychosis, which remains a serious challenge for clinical services. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Assessing the Link between Low Mood and Lack of Problem Solving Skills 
as a Behavioural Feature of Hopelessness: A Mood Priming Study 
 
4.0. Introduction 
Hopelessness, according to MacLeod and his colleagues (2005) is a “multi-faceted 
construct”. If defined literally, hopelessness is simply the absence of hope. As a symptom of 
depression, hopelessness is a negative view of oneself and the future. In simpler words, it is a 
belief that nothing is good enough, nothing will get better, and everything will only get 
worse. The more severe hopelessness becomes, the worse the depression is, and the higher 
the risks of a suicidal attempt. A number of studies have suggested that hopelessness is the 
link between depression and suicidal behaviour (Dyer & Kreitman, 1984; Minkoff, Bergman, 
et al., 1973; Nekanda-Trepka, Bishop, & Blackburn, 1983; Salter & Platt, 1990; Wetzel, 
Margulies, Davies et al., 1980). Of the significant risk factors identified for suicidal 
behaviour in both healthy and psychosis samples, hopelessness was found to be closely 
linked to both completed and attempted suicide (Abramson, Alloy, Hogan et al., 1998; Beck, 
Steer, Kovac et al., 1985; Beck, Brown, Berchick, Stewart, & Steer, 1990; Beck et al., 1993; 
Cohen et al., 1994; Conner, Duberstein, Conwell et al., 2001; Hawton & van Heeringen, 
2009; Klonksy et al., 2012; Nordentoft et al., 2002; Pinto & Whisman, 1996; Robinson et al., 
2009), along with greater insight (Barret et al., 2010; Crumlish et al., 2005; Flanagan & 
Compton; 2012; Foley et al., 2008). Whereas a grave physical illness represents an obvious 
threat to a person’s life, hopelessness characterises a more subtle yet often a very fatal killer. 
Over the years, a huge amount of effort has been made to understand this complex construct 
of hopelessness but there has been only a limited success in finding ways to effectively 
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manage it. There are two main reasons for this: One, the mechanism of hopelessness is so 
complex that it is still not yet fully understood. Two, there is a limited amount of information 
regarding the behavioural outcomes of hopelessness, which can be of practical use to both the 
clinician and the sufferer. In other words, what makes it hard for a person who is feeling 
hopeless to see alternative solutions to his/her problem besides pure pessimism? On a 
practical level, what are the day to day things that most people do that a person who is feeling 
hopeless struggles to do besides finding a reason to live? The present study aims to 
demonstrate that hopelessness can be a measured precursor to suicidal thinking.   
 The relationship between hopelessness and problem solving in a psychiatric sample 
was first explored by Schotte and Clum (1982). The results of their study prompted the 
conception of the diathesis – stress model, which suggests that chronic experiences of stress 
accompanied by lack of problem solving skills increases the individual’s vulnerability to 
depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation (Schotte & Clum, 1982). To date, a number of 
studies have shown that hopelessness is in fact, associated with a lack of problem solving 
skills in a sample of suicidal individuals. Williams and his colleagues (2005) described the 
relationship between hopelessness and problem solving impairment as that of a “vicious 
circle”. The vicious circle starts with problem solving impairment triggering suicidal 
ideation, the outcome of the combined effects between hopelessness, helplessness, and 
entrapment prompted by the inability to think of alternative solutions to a problem, and 
suicidal ideation further impairing the individual’s problem solving ability (Williams et al., 
2005). The most commonly used procedure to examine real life problem solving is Platt and 
Spivack’s (1975) Means Ends Problem Solving task. The MEPS task employs a social 
context for all of its problem scenarios, which makes the procedure relevant to the everyday 
life context of a wide range of research samples. The MEPS was initially developed in 1972 
(Platt & Spivack) to examine the problem solving abilities and adjustment of normal 
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adolescents. It is apparent that Schotte and Clum’s (1982) initial attempt to examine problem 
solving in a psychiatric sample through the use of the MEPS procedure played a vital role in 
establishing two findings in the literature of suicidal behaviour to date: (1) the link between 
problem solving and suicidal behaviour, (2) the use of MEPS procedure as a valid and 
reliable procedure to test problem solving impairment in a sample of suicidal individuals. 
Studies that looked into the problem solving abilities of individuals with histories of suicidal 
behaviour have consistently found a significantly impaired problem solving ability in this 
particular sample. For example, the initial study conducted by Schotte and Clum (1982) 
confirmed that suicidal individuals generated fewer numbers of relevant solutions in the 
MEPS task compared to the non-suicidal individuals. Similarly, Sadowsky and Kelly (1993) 
found when that previous suicide attempters exhibited greater problem solving impairment 
than the psychiatric controls who had never attempted. They also found that whereas both 
groups showed reduced problem solving abilities compared to healthy controls, problem 
solving in previous attempters was far more impaired than the psychiatric controls.  
Consistent with these findings, Pollock and Williams (2001) indicated that the severity of 
problem solving impairment in suicidal psychiatric patients was significantly greater 
compared to a sample of patients with a similar symptom level and after controlling for the 
effects of depression in both groups. In 2004, Williams and Pollock obtained a similar pattern 
of results as problem solving impairment was, once again, found to be greater in the suicidal 
patients than the psychiatric and healthy controls. Whereas these studies provide useful 
contributions to the literature, Williams and his colleagues (2005) pointed out the difficulty in 
interpreting these results. To date, the majority of the studies that have investigated the role 
of problem solving in suicidal behaviour had largely employed a retrospective approach 
where problem solving impairment was measured following the incidence of a suicidal 
behaviour. By using this approach, it is simply impossible to conclude whether problem 
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solving impairment was a stable trait that naturally characterises individuals with histories of 
suicidal behaviour, or a mere state or crisis – dependent response that causes individuals to 
behave in a certain way. Contrary to the popular belief that problem solving impairment is a 
stable trait (Schotte & Clum, 1982), a growing number of evidence suggest otherwise 
(Schotte et al., 1990; Ivanoff Smyth, Grochowski et al., 1992; Biggam & Power, 1999). For 
instance, results from Ivanoff et al.’s (1992) study showed that the history of suicidal 
behaviour had no effect on the problem solving performance of incarcerated offenders. 
Despite their findings confirming that problem solving impairment is not a trait phenomenon, 
Ivanoff and his colleagues (1992) suggested that “the role of problem solving deficits in 
suicidal behaviour may be more complex and interactive than dichotomous – that is, neither 
state nor trait”. With the trait phenomenon becoming increasingly contentious, Williams and 
his colleagues (2005) pointed out a question that is of critical value for future clinical work - 
“How can we determine which individuals remain vulnerable to future suicidal crises even 
when they appear to have completely recovered?” 
 The concept of “cognitive reactivity” to hopelessness is at the heart of the Differential 
Activation Hypothesis of suicidal relapse and is defined as the vulnerability to hopeless 
thinking or thoughts. In brief, the DAH of suicidal relapse suggests that during the early 
episodes of depression, a link is formed between low mood and a pattern of negative and 
maladaptive thoughts, of which hopelessness becomes a part of as a result of an intensely 
negative self-referential thinking during a severe episode of depression (Malone, Oquendo, 
Haas et al., 2000; Lam, Schuck, Smith, Farmer, & Checkley, 2003). The link that is formed 
between low mood and hopelessness is then reinforced every time the individual experiences 
a depressive episode. The stronger the link between depressed mood and hopelessness is, the 
more vulnerable the individual is to hopeless thoughts when feeling particularly low in mood. 
According to authors of the DAH for suicidal relapse, “it is not the resting level of 
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hopeless/suicidal cognitions that is important in rendering someone vulnerable to future 
suicidal crises... it is the ease with which these patterns of thinking can be activated that is 
important” (Williams et al., 2006). Such ease refers to the individual’s level of cognitive 
reactivity to hopelessness. Given that the precondition to testing cognitive reactivity requires 
an appropriate trigger (depressed mood), mood priming techniques were previously used to 
test the assumptions of the DAH. 
In order to determine who remains vulnerable to suicidal relapse amongst the 
recovered attempters, the present investigation attempts to replicate the mood priming study 
conducted by Williams and colleagues (2005) in sample of previously depressed patients. 
The key objective was to employ the DAH framework of suicidality to a sample whose 
diagnosis is psychosis. Specifically, the sample consists of first episode psychosis individuals 
who were within the first 3 years of psychosis onset. Studies have previously shown that the 
risk of suicidal attempts and deliberate self-harm was usually highest during the first 5 years 
following the onset of psychosis (Brown, 1997; Harris & Barraclough, 1997; Hawton et al., 
2005; Palmer et al., 2005). The first aim of the study is to examine suicidal vulnerability 
amongst FEP patients by looking into their ability to generate solutions to real-life problems. 
More importantly, it is the study’s particular interests to compare the effects of the 
experimentally induced feelings of sadness on the problem solving ability of those at high 
risk of suicidal relapse (with histories of lifetime suicidal attempt/s or DSH) and those at low 
risk (without any history of suicidal attempt/s or DSH). The second aim of the study is to 
assess the use of the Leiden Index of Depression Scale’s hopelessness subscale as a measure 
of cognitive reactivity to hopelessness and test if scores on this subscale will be associated 
with the pre- to post-induction change in problem solving performance. During the 
conception of the DAH of suicidal relapse, the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale was devised in 
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order to measure the individual’s susceptibility to hopeless/suicidal thoughts when in a sad 
mood (see chapter 3’s “measures” section).   
 
4.1. Hypotheses 
Effects of the Mood Challenge on Problem Solving Ability 
 In keeping with the DAH, the impact of the sad mood induction procedure will be 
more evident in the suicidal history group than the non-suicidal group. Specifically,  
1. Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will exhibit a greater pre- to 
post- induction decrease in the number of problem-solving solutions.  
 
2. Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will show a greater pre- to 
post-induction decrease in the effectiveness ratings of problem solving solutions. 
 
Effects of the Mood Challenge on Happiness and Despondence Ratings 
Also in line with the assumption of the DAH,  
3. The suicidal history group will exhibit a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in 
happiness ratings and a greater pre- to post-induction increase in despondence ratings 
compared to the non-suicidal group. 
 
The Validity of LEIDS as a Measure of Cognitive Reactivity to Hopelessness 
Prior to the mood challenge, measurements of cognitive reactivity to hopelessness were taken 
using the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale. Measured CR to hopelessness will be tested using 
the DAH framework. Consistent with the DAH,  
4. The suicidal history group will also show significantly greater CR to hopelessness as 
measured by the LEIDS compared to the non-suicidal group. 
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4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Sampling 
 N.B. The same sampling procedure described in Chapter 3 was also employed in this 
study. 
 
4.2.2. Measures 
 N.B. The measures described in the Chapter 3 (CHSF, LEIDS-R, CDSS, BHS, and 
ISST) were also employed in this study. 
 In order to avoid contamination of answers, the BHS was always administered first 
followed by the Calgary Depression Scale for Schizophrenia and InterSept for Suicidal 
Thinking. These measures for depression (CDSS) and suicidal thinking (ISST) may 
potentially evoke feelings of hopelessness by bringing to mind certain thoughts and feelings 
associated with the individual’s previous depressive experience. 
 
Visual Analogue Scale - Mood Rating (McCormack, Horne, & Sheather, 1988; Appendix 13)  
As the name suggests, the mood rating VAS measures the participant’s subjective 
mood through the use of an analogue scale (a 10cm continuous line between end points “not 
at all” and “extremely”). For the purpose of this study, only the two VAS items were used: 
(1) happiness, and (2) hopelessness. Each item is preceded by a statement printed above the 
10cm line “At this moment, I feel...” and a description of mood printed just under the line 
“happy” or “hopeless”.  Participants rate their agreement/disagreement to each of the VAS 
mood rating items by marking a position (vertical line) along the 10cm continuous line that 
best represents how they feel. In keeping with the methodology used in Williams et al.’s 
study (2005), the VAS mood rating was administered on four different time points during the 
testing session: once prior to starting the testing session, once before the sad mood induction 
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procedure, once immediately after the sad MIP, and once at the end of the mood priming 
task. 
 
Means-End Problem Solving Task (Platt & Spivack, 1975; Appendix 14)  
The MEPS task consists of 10 short stories or social problem scenarios where each 
scenario is presented with its own beginning and ending. The MEPS task aims to assess the 
participant’s social problem skills by measuring his or her ability to generate step-by-step 
means or solutions to the hypothetical social problem scenarios. Scoring is based on the 
number of relevant and effective solutions generated for each of the problem scenarios. Due 
to its good construct validity and internal consistency (from 0.80 to 0.84; Platt & Spivack 
1972, 1975), the MEPS task remains as a widely used social problem solving skills test in 
many depression studies. Having adopted the MEPS procedure used in Williams et al.’s 
mood priming study (2005), this study only used six out of the original ten social problem 
scenarios (numbers 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 &10). The version of the MEPS items used was determined 
mainly by the gender of the participant. The female version was administered only to the 
female participants while the male version was administered only to the male participants. 
The MEPS items on both versions were identical with the exception of the names of the 
protagonists.   
 
4.2.3. Procedure 
4.2.3. a. Case Identification 
The participants in this study were recruited from the Early Intervention Service in 
Birmingham from March 2009 to March 2011. The author of this study approached every 
care coordinator within EIS to identify service users who conformed to the inclusion criteria.  
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As established in the earlier section, two groups of participants were identified: (1) suicidal 
history group, and (2) non-suicidal group. In order to ensure that all of the participants fulfil 
both the inclusion and exclusion criteria, care coordinators were provided with a leaflet that 
briefly explained the study and its recruitment criteria. Following referral, participants were 
approached over the phone or in person, depending on their preference. During the initial 
meeting, the research was presented a three-part study [ESM, Problem-solving (MEPS), & 
Future Thinking (FT)], with each study investigating the mechanism of hopeless thinking by 
employing contrasting methodologies – the ecological and experimental approach. In order to 
counterbalance the order to which the two sets of methodologies were conducted, the three 
studies were split into two sets. Set A consisted of the ecological methodology (ESM) and set 
B consisted of the experimental methodology (MEPS & FT studies). Those participants who 
agreed to take part in all the three studies were randomly allocated to sets AB or BA. 
Following consent, the participant was asked to complete the Columbia Suicidal History 
Form in order to confirm any history of suicidal attempt or deliberate self-harm. In addition, 
the author also conducted an audit on the participant’s clinical case notes at EIS in order to 
check for any historical entries of DSH or suicidal attempt. The LEIDS questionnaire was 
also conducted immediately following consent, which was on average at least a week prior to 
the testing session, in order to avoid two possible sources of contamination: (1) 
contamination from responses to other measures administered prior to the testing session (e.g. 
BHS or CDSS), one of these measures might evoke an emotional response which could 
potentially influence their responses on LEIDS or vice versa, and (2) contamination from any 
residual effects of the sad mood induction procedure.  
 Prior to starting the testing session, participants were briefed about the details of the 
study and given an opportunity to ask questions. Following this, a set of questionnaires 
measuring hopelessness (BHS), depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking (ISST) was 
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completed. The MEPS and Future Thinking tasks (chapter 5) were both carried out on two 
occasions, once after the completion of questionnaires which is just prior to the sad mood 
induction procedure (pre-induction) and once after the sad MIP (post-induction). In line with 
Williams et al.’s study (2005), the tasks were completed in the same order for both pre-and 
post-induction, with the MEPS task first followed by the FT task.  A debriefing was carried 
out at the end of the testing session to discuss the actual purpose of the MEPS task and more 
importantly, to check if the participant’s mood had returned to its normal level. Participants 
who remained upset at the end of the testing session were offered a Happy Mood Induction 
Procedure to counteract the effects of the sad MIP. In keeping with what was agreed in the 
consent form, participants were also informed that their care coordinators will be requested to 
closely monitor on their mood for as long as they think it is necessary to do so. Out of the 
three participants who reported feeling upset, only two agreed to complete the happy MIP. 
All three participants consented to have their care coordinators informed in order to ensure 
that their mood will be monitored closely until deemed necessary. As an appreciation of their 
time and contribution, all of the participants received a payment of £20 at the end of the 
testing session.  
  
4.2.3. b. The Sad Mood Induction Procedure  
 The sad MIP used in this study was adopted from Williams et al.’s mood priming 
study in 2005. Their version of the sad MIP employed the combined techniques of the Velten 
procedure and musical mood induction procedure. Prior to starting the sad MIP, participants 
were briefed about the purpose and details of this procedure. The researcher explained that 
the sad MIP will induce them to feel sad by reading a set of 30 Velten negative statement 
cards (Appendix 15) while listening to a sad music playing in the background. The music 
used in this procedure was Prokofiev’s Russia Under the Mongolian Yoke, which was re-
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mastered at half-speed using Wavepad Sound Editor version 5.13. Participants were 
instructed to read each card carefully and internalize the thoughts and feelings evoked by the 
negative statement written on each card (e.g. “I am discouraged and unhappy about 
myself.”). While doing this, participants were asked to identify the cards which they felt were 
more effective in making them feel sad and to put these cards on a separate pile. This set of 
cards was then later used in the two booster versions of the sad MIP, one prior to post-mood 
induction MEPS and another one prior to the post-mood induction Future Thinking task 
(chapter 5). The booster sad MIP was simply a shorter version of the original sad MIP with 
fewer negative Velten statement cards to go through. 
  
4.2.3. c. Means-Ends Problem Solving Task  
The MEPS task was presented to the participants as a ‘story-telling’ task, which aims 
to explore their creativity. Six problem scenarios were split into two sets of three. Set 1 
consisted of scenarios about ‘relationship difficulties with boyfriend/girlfriend’, ‘finding a 
lost wristwatch’, and ‘making friends in a new neighbourhood’ (MEPS items 2, 3, & 4). Set 2 
consisted of scenarios about ‘starting relationship ’, ‘difficulties with friends’, and 
‘difficulties with supervisor at work’ (MEPS items 6, 8, & 10). Each participant was 
randomly allocated to sets 1/2 or 2/1 in order to counterbalance the presentation of MEPS 
items before (pre) and after (post) the sad mood induction procedure.  
The participants were given one problem scenario to solve at a time. The researcher 
read each problem scenarios to the participants who, at the same time, followed what was 
being read on a separate card. Each scenario begins with a brief description of the protagonist 
facing a problem and ends with the protagonist successfully solving it while leaving the 
middle part of the scenario unknown. The participants were then given a time limit of 2 
minutes to supply the middle part of the story by describing what they thought had happened, 
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which led to the successful ending of the story. All of the MEPS tasks were recorded using a 
dictaphone in order to allow the raters to score the task at a later point. In keeping with 
Williams et al.’s study (2005), each scenario was scored two ways: (1) for the number of 
relevant means/solutions, and (2) for the effectiveness of the solutions. The scoring was 
completed separately by two blind raters. The blind raters were psychology undergraduate 
students who were properly trained by the author of the study prior to scoring the MEPS task. 
A solution/mean was rated as “relevant” if the course of action led to the desired ending of 
the story (Platt & Spivack, 1975). Only actions that were taken by the protagonist were rated 
as valid. On the other hand, a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all & 7 = extremely effective) 
was employed to rate the effectiveness of the solutions for each of the stories. The intra-class 
correlation between the ratings of the two independents raters for the number of solutions was 
r = .81, p <.001 whilst the intra-class correlation for the effectiveness ratings was r = .92, p 
<.001. The two raters reviewed all of the recorded tasks again until 100% agreement was 
reached on the number of solutions and effectiveness ratings. The average number of 
solutions and effectiveness ratings for each task (pre- & post-induction MEPS) were 
calculated by adding the scores of the three problem scenarios divided by three. 
 
4.2.4. Analysis Strategy 
To test the hypotheses, a mixed between/within repeated measures analysis of 
variance was conducted using an IBM SPSS Statistics software version 21 for Windows. In 
order to control for the possible effects of the key clinical symptoms (e.g. generalised 
hopelessness, depression, and suicidal thinking), two sets of analysis of covariance using the 
repeated measures design were conducted. The purpose of the initial ANCOVA was to test 
for any clinical symptom that significantly interacts with the main outcome variable on the 
whole. If a significant interaction is found, the ANCOVA was repeated between groups with 
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the specific clinical symptom entered as a covariate. An alpha level of .05 was used for all 
statistical tests. 
 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Sample Characteristics 
 Of the 105 individuals who were approached, only 3 individuals responded with an 
outright refusal. Out of the recruited 102 participants, a subsample of 3 (2.94%) changed their 
mind about participating in the study (those who previously completed the LEIDS screening 
measure but refused to do the mood-priming study) while the other 2 (1.96) opted out from 
the MEPS task (but carried on completing the other task in the mood-priming study). In total, 
the final sample consisted of 97 participants (37 females and 60 males) of which, 48 
(48.98%) had a lifetime history of suicidal behaviour while 49 (50%) had no history of 
suicidal behaviour in their lifetime. The participants’ age and key symptom scores are 
summarised in Table 12.  
 
Table 12. Means and Standard Deviations of Age and Key Symptom Scores for the Non- 
   Suicidal Group and Suicidal History Group 
 Non-suicidal group (N = 49) Suicidal history group (N = 48) 
Variable M SD M SD 
Demographic     
     Age 
 
23.86 5.00 23.16 4.66 
Symptom Score     
     BHS 5.61 4.43 9.92 5.90 
     CDSS 1.73 2.47 3.96 3.99 
     ISST .39 1.52 1.77 3.12 
Note: BHS = Beck Hopelessness Scale, CDSS = Calgary Depression Scale, and ISST = InterSept Scale for 
Suicidal Thinking 
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4.3.2. Descriptive Statistics and T-tests 
Generalised Hopelessness 
 Current levels of generalised hopelessness were measured using the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale. An independent t-test revealed a significant difference between groups, 
with the suicidal history group (M = 9.92, SD = 5.90) showing a higher level of generalised 
hopelessness compared to the non-suicidal group (M = 5.61, SD = 4.43), t(95) = 3.92, p < 
.001, d = .82.  
 
Depression 
 Symptoms of depression were assessed using the 10-item Calgary Depression Scale 
for Schizophrenia. Scores between the two groups were compared and an independent t-test 
revealed a significant difference between the suicidal history group (M = 3.96, SD = 3.99) 
with the non-suicidal group (M = 1.73, SD = 2.47) with the suicidal history group showing 
higher levels of depression than the non-suicidal group, t(95) = 3.23, p  = .002, d =.67.  
 
Suicidal Thinking 
 Levels of suicidal ideation a week prior to testing were measured using the InterSept 
Scale for Suicidal Thinking. Scores from both groups were compared using an independent t-
test, which revealed a significant difference between the suicidal history group (M = 1.77, SD 
= 3.12) and the non-suicidal group (M = .39, SD = 1.52) with the suicidal history group 
showing higher levels of suicidal ideation than the non-suicidal group, t(95) = 2.91, p = .005, 
d = .56.  
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4.3.3. Hypotheses Testing 
Data transformation was carried out on all of the continuous variables (e.g. dependent 
& covariates) prior to conducting the ANOVA in order to satisfy the assumption of normality 
and equality of variances. The data were transformed using the square root conversion 
following Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) and Howell’s (2007) suggested guideline in data 
transformation. The guideline suggests that square root transformation was more appropriate 
if the data distribution was moderately skewed (positive or negative skewness). Also, the use 
of square root employs the minimum amount of transformation to improve normality 
compared to the other transformation procedures (e.g. logarithmic & inverse). This was 
evident when a set of data was converted using square root and logarithmic transformation 
for the purpose of contrast.  Overall, data transformed via square root had better improvement 
in normality when contrasted against data transformed via logarithmic method.  
 In keeping with Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Howell (2007), all means and 
standard deviations reported in the following analyses were original values from the 
untransformed data.  
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. All analyses were carried out 
with group (suicidal history group vs. non-suicidal group) as a between-subjects factor.  
 
Effects of the Mood Challenge on Problem Solving Ability 
 In keeping with the DAH, the impact of the sad mood induction procedure will be 
more evident in the suicidal history group than the non-suicidal group. Specifically,  
1. Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will exhibit a greater pre- to 
post-induction decrease in the number of problem-solving solutions.  
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 To test this hypothesis, a two-fold analysis was employed. First, independent t-tests 
were conducted to compare the MEPS scores of each group (suicidal history group vs. non-
suicidal group) before and after the sad mood induction procedure. Second, a mixed repeated 
measure ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of the sad mood induction procedure 
on the problem solving ability of the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group. To 
conduct the mixed-repeated measure ANOVA, the variable group (suicidal vs. non-suicidal) 
was entered as a between-subjects factor and mood (mood 1 = pre-induction & mood 2 = 
post-induction) as within factor. The main aim of employing an ANOVA was to look into the 
interaction effect between mood (pre- & post-induction) and group (suicidal & non-suicidal) 
on problem solving ability.  
Results of the independent t-test on the pre-mood induction MEPS task showed that 
the suicidal history group (M = 6.44, SD = 2.02) generated fewer relevant means than the 
non-suicidal group (M = 7.37, SD = 1.79), t (95) = 2.40, p = 0.018, d = .31. Similar results 
were found on the post-mood induction task as the suicidal history group (M = 4.17, SD = 
1.80), once again, generated less number of relevant means than the non-suicidal group (M = 
6.22, SD = 1.57), t (95) = 6.00, p < .001; d = .73. Summary of means and standard deviations 
are displayed in Table 13. 
In line with the hypothesis, a mood x group interaction effect was observed as the 
suicidal history group had a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the number of problem 
solving means compared to the non-suicidal group [F(1, 95) = 13.19, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = 
.12]. There was also a significant within-subjects main effect of mood brought by the 
decrease in the overall MEPS scores following the mood-induction procedure [F (1, 95) = 
80.78, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .46], and a significant between-subjects main effect of group due 
to the fewer problem solving solutions in the suicidal history group than the non-suicidal 
group [F(1, 95) = 21.73, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .19]. The results remained significant after 
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controlling for generalised hopelessness (BHS), depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking 
(ISST). 
 
Table 13. Means and Standard Deviations of the Pre- and Post- Mood Induction Number of 
    Problem Solving Solutions 
 Non-suicidal group (N = 49) Suicidal history group (N = 48) 
Variable M SD M SD 
Pre-induction 7.37 1.79 6.44 2.02 
Post-induction 6.22 1.57 4.17 1.80 
 
 In summary, the results confirmed the hypothesis as the suicidal history group 
exhibited a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the number of problem solving solutions 
compared to the non-suicidal group. Figure 2 illustrates the average number of solutions 
generated by the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group before and after the sad 
mood induction procedure.  
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Figure 2. Average Pre- and Post-Induction Number of Problem Solving Solutions for the  
   Suicidal  History Group and Non-Suicidal Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will show a greater pre- to 
post-induction decrease in the effectiveness ratings of problem solving solutions. 
 Following the analysis in hypothesis 1, independent t-tests were conducted in order to 
compare the effectiveness of the problem solving means generated by each group before and 
after the mood induction. A mixed repeated measure ANOVA was also conducted to 
determine if the mood challenge had a differential effect on the effectiveness ratings of the 
problem solving solutions generated by the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group. 
Similar to the repeated measures ANOVA conducted in hypothesis 1, group was entered as a 
between-subjects factor and mood (mood 1 = pre-induction & mood 2 = post-induction) as a 
within-subjects factor. Again, the interaction effect between mood (pre- & post-mood 
induction) and group (suicidal & non-suicidal) was of key interest in this analysis. 
Results of independent t-test on the pre-mood induction effectiveness ratings showed 
no significant difference between the suicidal group (M = 5.16, SD = 1.45) and the non-
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suicidal group (M = 5.99, SD = 1.90), t (95) = 1.30, p = .196. In contrast, t-test results on the 
post-mood induction effectiveness ratings showed that the suicidal group (M = 3.91, SD = 
2.01) scored significantly lower than the non-suicidal group (M = 5.06, SD = 1.96), t (95) = 
2.43, p = .017, d = .50. Table 14 displays summary of means and standard deviations. 
 
Table 14. Means and Standard Deviations of the Pre- and Post- Mood Induction Effectiveness 
    Ratings of Problem Solving Solutions 
 Non-suicidal group (N = 49) Suicidal history group (N = 48) 
Variable M SD M SD 
Pre-induction 5.99 1.90 5.16 1.45 
Post-induction 5.06 1.96 3.91 2.01 
 
Contrary to the hypothesis, no significant group x mood interaction effect was found 
[F(1, 95) = 1.42, p = .237]. However, a significant within-subjects main effect on mood was 
found as caused by the decrease in the effectiveness ratings following the mood induction 
[F(1, 95) = 16.25, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .15]. Between-subjects main effect of group was also 
found as caused by the considerably lower effectiveness ratings in the suicidal history group 
than the non-suicidal group [F(1, 95) = 5.70, p =.019, partial ƞ2 = .06].  
 In summary, results of the repeated measures ANOVA did not support the hypothesis. 
The suicidal history group did not show a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the 
effectiveness ratings of problem solving solutions as predicted. Figure 3 displays the average 
effectiveness ratings for each group before and after the sad mood induction procedure. 
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Figure 3. Average Pre- and Post-Induction Effectiveness Ratings of Problem Solving  
  Solutions for the Suicidal History Group and Non-Suicidal Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effects of the Mood Challenge on Happiness and Despondence Ratings 
Also in line with the assumption of the DAH,  
3. The suicidal history group will exhibit a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in 
happiness ratings and a greater pre- to post-induction increase in despondence ratings 
compared to the non-suicidal group. 
 Replicating the two-step analysis in hypothesis 1 and 2, independent t-tests were 
conducted in order to compare the levels of momentary happiness and hopelessness in each 
group before and after the mood induction. A mixed repeated measure ANOVA was also 
conducted to determine if the effect of the sad mood induction procedure on the levels of 
happiness and despondence and whether the effect will vary between the suicidal history 
group and the non-suicidal group. Following the ANOVA analyses in hypotheses 1 and 2, the 
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group variable was entered as the between-subject factor while mood (mood 1 = pre-
induction & mood 2 = post-induction) was entered as the within-subject factor. Again, the 
interaction effect between mood (pre- & post-mood induction) and group (suicidal & non-
suicidal) was of key significance in this hypothesis testing. 
 
Happiness Ratings 
Independent t-test on pre-mood induction happiness ratings revealed no significant 
difference between the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group [mean (SD) = 5.33 
(2.09) & 5.73 (2.00), respectively; t (95) = .96, p = .337]. In contrast, independent t-test on 
post-mood induction happiness ratings showed a significant difference with the suicidal 
history group scoring lower than the non-suicidal group [mean (SD) = 4.06 (1.72) & 5.04 
(1.98), respectively; t (95) = 2.48, p = .015; d = .50]. Summary of means and standard 
deviations are displayed in Table 15. 
As predicted, results indicated a significant time x group interaction effect due to the 
greater pre- to post-induction decrease in happiness ratings within the suicidal history group 
in comparison to the non-suicidal group following the mood induction [F(1, 95) = 4.723, p 
=.082, partial ƞ2 = .032]. Results also showed a significant within-subjects main effect of 
mood as caused by the decrease in the happiness ratings following the mood induction [F(1, 
95) = 42.68, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .31]. There was, however, no significant between-subjects 
main effect of group [F(1, 95) = 3.091, p =.082]. The results remained significant after 
controlling for generalised hopelessness (BHS), depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking 
(ISST).   
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Despondence Ratings  
Independent t-test on pre-mood induction momentary despondence ratings revealed 
no significant difference between the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group [mean 
(SD) = 3.28 (2.34) & 2.80 (2.51), respectively; t (95) = 1.10, p = .276]. In contrast, 
independent t-test on post-mood induction hopelessness ratings showed a significant 
difference with the suicidal history group scoring lower than the non-suicidal group [mean 
(SD) = 4.87 (2.44) & 3.36 (2.48), respectively; t(95) = 2.78, p = .007; d = .56]. Table 15 
displays summary of means and standard deviations. 
   
Table 15. Means and Standard Deviations of the Pre- and Post- Mood Induction Happiness 
     and Despondence Ratings 
 Non-suicidal group (N = 49) Suicidal history group (N = 48) 
Variable M SD M SD 
Happiness Ratings     
     Pre-induction 5.73 2.00 5.33 2.09 
     Post-induction 5.04 1.98 4.06 1.72 
Despondence Ratings     
     Pre-induction 2.80 2.51 3.28 2.34 
     Post-induction 3.36 2.48 4.87 2.44 
 
In agreement with the hypothesis, a significant group x time interaction effect [F (1, 
95) = 4.48, p =.037, partial ƞ2 = .04] was found due to the greater pre- to post- induction 
increase in despondence ratings within the suicidal history group in comparison to the non-
suicidal group. A within-subjects main effect of mood was also found due to the decrease in 
post-mood induction despondence ratings [F(1, 95) = 32.71, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .26]. 
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Additionally, a significant between-subjects main effect of group was found, with the suicidal 
history group showing higher despondence ratings compared to the non-suicidal group [F(1, 
95) = 4.18, p =.044, partial ƞ2 = .04]. The results remained significant after controlling for 
generalised hopelessness (BHS), depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking (ISST). 
In summary, the results were consistent with the hypothesis as the suicidal history 
group exhibited a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in happiness ratings and a greater 
pre- to post-induction increase in hopelessness ratings compared to the non-suicidal group. 
Figure 4 illustrates the fluctuation of happiness ratings and despondence throughout the 
testing session.  
 
The Validity of LEIDS as a Measure of Cognitive Reactivity to Hopelessness 
Prior to the mood challenge, measurements of cognitive reactivity to hopelessness were taken 
using the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale. Measured CR to hopelessness will be tested using 
the DAH framework. Consistent with the DAH,  
4. The suicidal history group will also show significantly greater CR to hopelessness as 
measured by the LEIDS compared to the non-suicidal group. 
An independent t-test was conducted in order to compare the means of the two groups 
on LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale. As hypothesised, the suicidal history group (M = 12.63, 
SD = 5.25) showed significantly higher mean score than the non-suicidal group (M = 6.20, 
SD = 4.13), t(95) = 6.34, p < .001, d = 1.36).  
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Figure 4. Average VAS Despondence (A) and Happiness (B) Ratings on the Pre- and Post-Induction Tasks for the Suicidal History Group  
         and the Non-Suicidal Group 
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The DAH of suicidal relapse suggests that the occurrence of low mood will trigger 
hopelessness. As a behavioural feature of hopelessness, 
5. The deterioration in problem solving ability following the mood challenge will be 
correlated with greater levels of CR to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS. 
 To test this hypothesis, a difference score was first calculated by subtracting the pre-
mood induction number of problem solving means (PSM) from the post-mood induction 
number of PSM. Next, a bivariate correlation was carried out on the difference score (or the 
pre- to post-induction change in the number of problem solving means) and the LEIDS’ 
hopelessness subscale scores. Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no significant correlation 
between scores on LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale and the pre- to post-induction decrease in 
the number of problem solving solutions (r = -.11, N = 97, p = .280). Similar results were 
found when correlation was conducted on the original data. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
 The key objective of this study was to explore the applicability of the DAH of suicidal 
relapse in understanding the suicidal thinking mechanism in FEP individuals, who are at high 
risks of suicidality as a result of their history of suicidal attempt or DSH. Encouraged by the 
studies conducted by a group of researchers who developed the idea of the DAH (e.g. 
Teasdale, Williams, Lau, Segal, & Barnhofer) along with the aspiration to make a valuable 
contribution to the literature of suicidal behaviour, the current study was conducted with the 
aim of shedding light on the phenomenon of suicide in a clinical group which is at a higher 
risk of hurting or killing themselves. Previous studies have shown that suicide in 
schizophrenia was highest during the early phase of the illness, typically during the first five 
years after the initial psychotic episode (Brown, 1997; Harris & Barraclough, 1997; Palmer et 
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al., 2005). But in keeping with suicide in other high risk groups, understanding who and 
when individuals may choose to harm themselves, remains a major challenge for clinicians. 
 In line with the literature on social problem solving as a behavioural marker 
associated with suicidal behaviour, this study employed the Means Ends Problem Solving 
task (Platt & Spivack, 1975) with the aim of comparing the performances of a high risk 
suicidal history group and low risk non-suicidal group, in a baseline mood (pre-induction) vs. 
sad induced mood condition (post-induction). The use of the sad mood induction procedure 
played a crucial part in assessing if the assumption of the DAH on cognitive vulnerability to 
suicidal relapse was applicable to the FEP sample.  
 As predicted, the results indicated that the suicidal history group had a significantly 
greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the problem-solving means compared to the non-
suicidal group. The same findings were found when current levels of hopelessness (BHS), 
depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking (ISST) were used as covariates. This suggests that 
the decrease in the post-induction number of relevant solutions in the suicidal history group 
was mainly due to the downward shift in mood and the group’s pre-existing CR to 
hopelessness as suggested by the DAH framework. These findings were consistent with 
previous studies (Sadowsky & Kelly 1993, Pollock & Williams, 2001; Pollock & Williams, 
2004) but were at variance with the data from Williams et al.’s mood priming study (2005), 
which reported no significant difference in the number of post-induction problem-solving 
solutions between those with a history of mood depressive disorder and suicidal ideation, 
those with MDD but without the history of suicidal ideation, and those with neither MDD or 
suicidal ideation. These conflicting results might be partially due to the dissimilar sample 
characteristics. Firstly, whereas their study only recruited those who were symptom-free from 
depression for at least 8 weeks, this study only excluded those who were severely depressed 
and suicidal at the time of assessment; this was because low mood is a prevalent feature of 
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psychosis at all phases of the disorder (Birchwood et al., 2000). However, it is important to 
note that due to the active involvement of the care coordinators in the recruitment process of 
this study, only those who were relatively stable in mood were actually referred for 
recruitment. Secondly, whereas Williams et al.’s (2005) previous study included the 
experience of suicidal ideation as part of the criteria for suicidal behaviour, the current 
study’s criteria for suicidality were strictly limited to actual suicidal attempts or incidents of 
deliberate self-harm.  Thirdly, whereas the main clinical diagnosis of the sample in their 
study was MDD, the clinical diagnosis and focus of this study was early psychosis and 
schizophrenia. It is vital to note, however, that the particular characteristics of the sample 
used in this study was key to extending the use of the DAH from being a general theory of 
suicidal relapse in previously depressed individuals to a framework that can potentially 
elucidate suicidal vulnerability in early psychosis, a particularly crucial period for young 
individuals who are still trying to come to terms with the trauma of the initial episode 
(Harrison & Fowler, 2004; Jackson & Iqbal, 2000; Jackson, et al., 2004; Riedesser, 2004; 
Tarrier, Khan, Cater, & Picken, 2007) and the subjective distress associated with this 
experience (Brunet, Birchwood, Upthegrove, Michail, & Ross, 2012; McGorry, Patrick, 
Chanen et al., 1991). Whereas depression in its severe form can develop into psychosis, 
depression can also develop out of the traumatic experience that an episode of psychosis can 
bring (Birchwood, Iqbal, Trower et al., 2000). Hafner and his colleagues (1998) have 
suggested that the adolescence of young people with schizophrenia is characterised by 
periods of low mood and crises of self-esteem. By using the first-episode of psychosis 
sample, the present study was able to explore if the DAH also applies to psychosis. The DAH 
suggests that suicidal relapse occurs when depressed mood and hopelessness are strongly 
linked to each other such that the experience of low mood will trigger hopelessness, which is 
a known risk factor for suicidal behaviour. If this link between low mood and hopelessness 
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were assumed to develop through repeated depressive episodes, how many episodes are 
sufficient enough to create such a robust link between the two? Do traumatic life events (i.e. 
psychotic experiences & hospitalisation) provide a context that hastens the formation of a 
strong link between the depressed mood and feelings of hopelessness? Whereas the answers 
to this question remain unknown, the fact that the present study found significantly fewer 
numbers of relevant means compared to the non-suicidal group following the mood challenge 
and Williams et al.’s (2005) study did not find any differences in a sample of MDD patients, 
suggests that there seems to be a greater vulnerability to hopeless thinking within the 
psychosis sample when mood is relatively low. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no significant difference in the degree of pre- to 
post-induction change in the effectiveness ratings of the problem-solving means generated in 
both groups. Although the effectiveness ratings were considerably reduced following the sad 
MIP and the effectiveness ratings of the suicidal history group in general was significantly 
lower than the non-suicidal group, the effect of the sad MIP on the effectiveness ratings 
simply did not differ between groups. These results suggest that although the difference in the 
post-induction effectiveness ratings between the suicidal history group and the suicidal 
history group was not substantial enough to be detected, the overall effectiveness ratings of 
the suicidal history group was significantly lower than the non-suicidal group. Interestingly, 
this significant between-group distinction on the effectiveness of their problem-solving 
solutions was not simply caused by their differences in current levels of generalised 
hopelessness (BHS), depression (CDSS), or suicidal thinking (ISST), as the results were re-
tested with these key clinical symptoms as covariates. Intriguingly, it remains a mystery as to 
why the groups did not differ in their effectiveness ratings following the sad mood induction 
procedure. The only possible reason for this is that the pre-existing group differences on the 
pre-induction effectiveness scores caused the decrease in post-induction effectiveness scores 
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to diminish. Such a possibility was demonstrated when the groups significantly differed in the 
post-mood induction effectiveness ratings after controlling for the effects of the pre-mood 
induction effectiveness ratings. However, should pre-existing differences need controlling 
when the groups were naturally different to start with?   Whereas pre-existing differences are 
customarily controlled for in standard pre-post experimental designs, the current study 
embraced the notion that the suicidal history group and non-suicidal group have naturally 
occurring, if not acquired, intrinsic differences. The fact that one group of individuals have 
attempted to kill or hurt themselves at some point in their lives when the other group of 
individuals have not, underlines that the two groups were distinct in significant ways. For 
instance, a number of previous studies have already illustrated the differential problem-
solving abilities between those with and without histories of suicidal behaviour in a 
psychiatric sample (Curry et al., 1992; Reinecke et al., 2001; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; 
Williams et al., 2005; Arie, Apter, Orbach et al., 2008).  
Also in agreement with the predictions of the present study, the suicidal history group 
exhibited a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in happiness ratings and a greater pre- to 
post- induction increase in despondence ratings as measured by the Visual Analogue Scale 
compared to the non-suicidal group. Importantly, these distinctly greater degree of changes in 
the pre- to post-induction mood ratings (e.g. greater decrease in happiness & greater increase 
in despondence) exhibited by the suicidal history group were not just consequences of higher 
levels of generalised hopelessness (BHS), depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking (ISST) 
as appropriate tests were made to check if the results remain significant after controlling for 
the key symptoms. Overall, this pattern of results was consistent with the findings in 
Williams et al.’s (2005) study where participants with mood depressive disorder and histories 
of suicidal ideation exhibited less happiness and more despondence following the sad mood 
induction procedure. The present study confirms the results of the previous investigation but 
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in a sample of first-episode of psychosis whose vulnerability to suicide is not only at high risk 
(Brown, 1997; Harris & Barraclough, 1997; Palmer et al., 2005), but also largely 
unpredictable at the individual level (Power, 2010). Current findings indicate that despite the 
particularly difficult and emotionally stressful post-psychotic period currently experienced by 
both groups, only those with histories of suicidal behaviour exhibited greater sensitivity to the 
sad MIP as evidenced by their considerably greater degree of changes in their pre- to post-
induction happiness and despondence ratings. However, it is also important to consider that 
the differential effects of the sad MIP on both groups may only be due to the natural, pre-
existing group differences in mood prior to the mood induction. It can be argued that the 
suicidal-history group might already had significantly greater despondence ratings prior to 
the sad MIP than the non-suicidal group and was therefore more likely to respond with 
greater despondence than the latter group to the sad MIP. Results of independent t-tests, 
however, revealed that the groups did not differ in their overall despondence and happiness 
ratings. In other words, there were no pre-existing group differences in the pre-induction 
despondence ratings that could have biased the data in favour of the suicidal-history group. 
As the DAH focuses on the individual’s cognitive vulnerability to hopelessness, it was crucial 
that the results of independent t-tests have established that the degree of change in pre- to 
post-induction mood ratings was not simply due to the pre-existing vulnerability to hopeless 
thinking during the pre-induction stage. Due to this, it was easier to determine that the degree 
of change in the pre- to post-induction problem-solving abilities was mainly due to the 
individual’s cognitive vulnerability to hopelessness when in a sad mood and not simply due 
to the worsening of a pre-existing vulnerability or mood state.    
 In line with the assumption of the DAH, the suicidal history group exhibited greater 
cognitive reactivity to hopelessness by scoring higher in the hopelessness subscale of the 
Leiden Index of Depression Scale – Revised version. However, contrary to the hypothesis, 
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the CR to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS’s hopelessness subscale did not correlate 
well with the number of problem-solving solutions following the mood induction. One 
possible reason is that a number of participants (conservative estimate of less than 10) 
reported filling in the LEIDS questionnaire to be a difficult challenge. This particular group 
of participants expressed some difficulty imagining a hypothetical sad mood state, which was 
necessary if the LEIDS was to measure CR to hopelessness properly. Nevertheless, this group 
of participants was relatively small in number and cannot account for the lack of association 
between CR to hopelessness and number of relevant problem solving solutions.  It is also 
possible that the lack of association between the two was due to the fact that experimentally 
induced change in number of problem solving solutions does not accurately represent suicidal 
vulnerability in real life thus, was unable to demonstrate a detectable link with CR to 
hopelessness. Finally, there is also a possibility that the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale was 
simply not able to effectively capture the key elements that embody CR to hopelessness in 
this particular sample. 
 In conclusion, the results of this study were consistent with previous findings that 
individuals with histories of suicidal behaviour were more impaired at solving problems 
particularly when mood is low, which were in keeping with the assumptions of the 
Differential Activation Hypothesis of suicidal relapse. This significantly noticeable problem 
solving impairment found in participants with histories of suicidal behaviour, especially 
following the sad mood induction, suggest that a subtle shift in mood (from neutral to sad 
mood induced) can impair the problem solving ability of this sample and reactivate some low 
level feelings of hopelessness. All in all, the results of this study support the assumptions of 
the Differential Activation Hypothesis in a number of ways. First, it illustrated the that DAH, 
as a hypothesis of suicidal relapse in a previously depressed sample, is also a valid model of 
suicidal relapse in a sample whose primary diagnosis is psychosis instead of depression. 
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Second, this study contributes more evidence to the literature that supports the DAH’s as a 
valuable model of suicidal vulnerability by confirming that the DAH is not just a mere 
cognitive paradigm, but also a model that can be tested concretely via quantifiable 
behavioural markers (e.g. problem solving ability).  
 
4.4.1. Strengths and limitations 
 This study has some limitations which need to be borne in mind. First, there was only 
one manipulated treatment variable (sad MIP) employed in this study, which meant that the 
comparison of problem-solving abilities between the suicidal and non-suicidal groups were 
only limited to the effect of this particular manipulation. Whereas the DAH only accounts for 
the individual’s CR to hopelessness when in a depressed mood, other manipulations (i.e. 
happy or neutral MIP) could have illustrated the mechanism of hopelessness when the 
individual’s mood is happy or neutral.  Although the absence of a neutral or a happy mood 
induction did not have an unfavourable effect in the results of the present study, the neutral 
mood, in particular, could help establish if the changes in the number of relevant solutions 
following the mood induction were indeed due to shift in mood and not from other 
undesirable factors (e.g. boredom or loss of interest in the study, tiredness, & possible 
participant bias). Second, the results for the effectiveness ratings of the relevant means 
showing no difference between the suicidal history group and non-suicidal group following 
the mood induction contradicted previous research (Williams et al., 2005). It is vital to 
consider, however, that the suicidal history group showed significantly lower effectiveness 
ratings than the non-suicidal group after controlling for the pre-induction effectiveness 
ratings. Finally, although the key predictions in the study were confirmed and in keeping with 
the assumptions of the DAH as a model for suicidal relapse, this study was only able to 
illustrate the effects of minor shifts in mood on the problem solving ability of an individual. 
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Although the ESM study (chapter 3) suggests that the DAH is ecologically valid and the 
results of the present study are consistent with the ESM data, a follow study is still needed in 
order to verify if the observed suicidal vulnerability as measured in the problem-solving task 
following the mood induction will predict suicidal relapse in real life. To date, no studies 
were able to demonstrate this and should therefore also be seen as a useful avenue for future 
research.  
This study has a number of strengths. First, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this 
study is the first to explore the mechanism of suicidal thinking in psychosis using the mood 
priming technique. Second, the sample is of a reasonably size compared to the sample size of 
a similar study conducted by Williams et al.’s study (N = 34); having recruited nearly three-
fold of the sample size of a clinical group that is often not easy to engage, this is a positive 
achievement. Third, Birmingham as a culturally diverse city offered this study an excellent 
opportunity to investigate a sample that was of a good mix in terms of their ethnicity and 
social backgrounds (i.e. religion & family structures).  
Overall, the findings of this study have important clinical implications. The 
prevention and management of suicidal behaviour in psychosis have not been greatly 
successful so far. To date, this is the first study to have explored the suicidal thinking 
mechanism in early psychosis and the significant results from this study present two valuable 
implications: (1) that the mood priming technique is a safe and effective method for studying 
the suicidal thinking processes, and (2) that the use of behavioural measures (e.g. problem 
solving tasks) following a mood challenge is a useful way to compare suicidal/hopeless 
thoughts relative to mood. Further, the findings of this study could serve as a platform for 
other researchers to further explore problem solving ability as one of the key behavioural 
markers for suicidal vulnerability in psychosis. Most importantly, the results supporting the 
assumption of the DAH for suicidal relapse could also serve as a platform for other 
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researchers to further investigate the application of the DAH as a framework of suicidality in 
psychosis. Specifically, extending the DAH as a guide to suicide risk assessments in first 
episode psychosis could be of great value to clinicians. Previous studies have shown that the 
stage following the initial psychotic episode is particularly crucial as the risks for both 
attempted and completed suicide are not only high but also largely unpredictable (Brown, 
1997; Harris & Barraclough, 1997; Palmer et al., 2005; Power, 2010).  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Assessing the Link between Low Mood and Lack of Positive Future 
Fluency as a Behavioural Feature of Hopelessness: A Mood Priming Study 
 
 
5.0. Introduction 
 
Individuals who are at the early stages of psychosis, especially those who are still 
recovering from an initial psychotic episode, have been found to have a high level of suicidal 
ideations (Birchwood, Mason, MacMillan, & Healy, 1993; Rooke & Birchwood, 1998; Iqbal, 
Birchwood, Chadwick, & Trower, 2000) and suicidal attempts (Brown, 1997; Harris & 
Barraclough, 1997; Heila Isometsa, Henriksson et al., 1997, 1999; King, Baldwin, Sinclair et 
al., 2001; Nordentoft et al., 2002; Palmer et al., 2005; Power, 2010; Walsh et al., 2001). The 
role of hopelessness as a risk factor for suicidal behaviour (both ideations & attempts) in 
early psychosis has already been illustrated in previous studies (Nordentoft et al., 2002; 
Hawton et al., 2005; Pompili, Lester, Grispini et al., 2009). Theoretically, the function of 
hopelessness as a part of the suicidal thinking mechanism has also been demonstrated in 
different ways (Schotte & Clum, 1987; Williams et al.’s, 2005; Johnson, Gooding, &Tarrier, 
2008). Empirically, hopelessness has been found to be associated with certain cognitive and 
behavioural characteristics, such as deficits in autobiographical memory (Williams, 1996; 
Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996; Pollock & Williams, 2001; Arie et al., 2008), impaired 
interpersonal problem solving (O’Connor, R., O’Connor, D. et al., 2004; Pollock & Williams, 
1998; Pollock & Williams, 2001; Williams, 1996; Goddard et al., 1996; Williams et al., 
2005), and lack of fluency for positive events (Hepburn et al., 2006; MacLeod et al., 1993; 
1997; 2005; MacLeod & Cropley, 1995; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; O’Connor, Connery, & 
Cheyne, 2000).  
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 Over the last two decades, the conceptualisation of hopelessness has changed 
somewhat. A growing number of evidence suggests that hopelessness is more than just an 
expectation of more negative events instead; it is an expectation of fewer positive events 
happening in someone’s future (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). Until the beginning of the 1990’s, 
the characterisation of hopelessness as a risk factor for suicidal behaviour was somewhat 
vague. Despite numerous attempts to examine this multifaceted construct, hopelessness 
remained as something whose pernicious effects have been seen and heard of, but was never 
quite fully understood amongst clinicians and researchers alike. In 1993, MacLeod and his 
colleagues devised a task-based measure called the “Future Thinking Task” in order to 
explore the individual’s ability of to generate examples of positive and negative, personal 
future events. The FT task’s procedure was originally based from the verbal future fluency 
task (Lezak, 2004) except in the FT task; fluency was based on the generation of future 
expectations or example of future events rather than words. The initial version of the FT task 
involved asking participants to think of as many examples of future events as they can, across 
various time periods (next week, next year, & next 5 – 10 years). The task was performed 
under two conditions: (a) negative and (b) positive. In the positive condition, participants 
were asked to think of examples of pleasurable future events (e.g. “things that they are 
looking forward to”) while in the positive condition, they were asked to think of examples of 
unpleasant future events (e.g. “things that they are not looking forward to”; MacLeod et al., 
1993). Findings from the initial use of the FT task indicated that the previously suicidal group 
generated more examples of positive events than the control group. However, the groups did 
not differ in their number of negative future events (MacLeod et al., 1993). Similar results 
were found in MacLeod & Byrne’s study in 1996 on a sample of depressed individuals, 
which indicated a markedly reduced fluency for positive events in the depressed group 
compared to the control group. However, whereas the groups did not differ in the number of 
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negative events in MacLeod et al.’s study (1993), the depressed group showed more fluency 
for negative events than the control group (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). A year later, MacLeod 
and colleagues (1997) found the same pattern of results that was illustrated in MacLeod & 
Byrne’s study (1996). Intriguingly, an opposite pattern of results was revealed when the FT 
task was conducted in a sample of non-clinical adolescents with symptoms of depression and 
anxiety. Specifically, Miles, MacLeod and Pote’s study (2004) indicated that the participants 
with greater depressive and anxiety symptoms exhibited more fluency for negative events 
than the control group, but both groups did not differ in their fluency for positive events. 
Despite the inconsistent findings, the link between depression and reduced fluency for 
positive events as a proxy for hopelessness remained evident (MacLeod et al., 1996, 1998, 
2005; Sidley, Calam, Wells, Hughes, & Whitaker, 1999). Then again, it is important to note 
that a large number of these previous studies on future thinking and hopelessness have 
focused mainly on healthy, or clinically depressed, sometimes in-patient, previously suicidal 
individuals. Most of these studies also measured future fluency following identification of 
suicidal behaviour (ideations & attempts), which suggest that interpretations are leaning 
towards the idea that the lack of positive future fluency is a stable trait of previously suicidal 
individuals. However, it also a fact that the life circumstances of the clinically depressed and 
suicidal individuals are characterised by a number of emotional, social, and economic 
difficulties, and traumatic events (Hawton et al., 2005; Isometsa, Heikkinen, Henriksson, 
Aro, & Lonqvist, 1995; Leverich, Altshuler Frye, Suppes et al., 2003; O’Connor, 2011; 
Rihmer, 2005, 2007). Altogether, these difficult circumstances represent a context that 
renders positive future fluency impairment as a state-phenomenon in this particular sample. 
Having combined the trait and state features of suicidality, the Differential Activation 
Hypothesis of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004) suggests a model that puts emphasis on the 
role “cognitive reactivity” to hopelessness (trait) when in a sad mood (state). As already 
 126 
 
discussed in chapter 1, the DAH framework proposes that the occurrence of a sad mood 
determines the  mechanism of suicidal/hopeless thoughts (Lau et al., 2004).  
As a behavioural outcome that is closely linked with hopelessness, it is important for 
clinicians to understand how positive future fluency responds to negative shifts in mood. It is 
equally crucial to find out if positive future fluency remains reactive to mood changes 
following a full recovery from the depression that facilitated the occurrence of hopeless 
thoughts. By employing a mood priming technique, the present study will be able to test if the 
assumption of the Differential Activation Hypothesis on hopelessness as a sad mood-
dependent cognition holds true for the first episode psychosis sample with a history of 
suicidal attempt or deliberate self-harm. The present study will therefore explore if the 
experience of psychosis will influence the relationship between mood and hopeless thoughts 
as suggested by the DAH. 
The first aim of this study is to examine the link between hopelessness and future 
fluency in psychosis using the assumptions of the DAH of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004).  
Specifically, the present study seeks to examine the effect of mood on the positive and 
negative future fluency of FEP individuals, with and without a history of suicidal attempt or 
deliberate self-harm, by employing the mood challenge in order to evoke a sad mood in the 
participants. The mood challenge is crucial in testing the assumptions of the DAH as the post-
induction future fluency will provide a valuable contrast to the future fluency prior to the 
effects of the “induced” sadness. Whereas Williams and his colleagues have already tested 
the DAH of suicidal relapse in both healthy and previously depressed samples with histories 
of suicidal ideations, to date, this is the very first study to test the application of the DAH as a 
model of suicidal vulnerability in a sample of FEP patients.  
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The second aim of the study is to look into the effects of the mood challenge on the 
perceived valence and likelihood of future events. The study also intends to look into the 
effects of the mood challenge on the levels of momentary happiness and hopelessness.  
The final aim of this study is to assess the use of the Leiden Index of Depression 
Scale’s (Van der Does & Williams, 2003) hopelessness subscale as a measure of cognitive 
reactivity to hopelessness and test if scores on this subscale will be associated with the pre- to 
post-induction change in positive future fluency. As mentioned in chapter 4, the LEIDS’ 
hopelessness subscale was devised during the conception of the DAH for suicidal relapse in 
order to measure the individual’s susceptibility to hopeless/suicidal thoughts when in a sad 
mood (chapter 3).   
 
 
5.1. Hypotheses 
 
Effects of the Mood Challenge on Future Fluency 
 In keeping with the DAH, the impact of the sad mood induction procedure will be 
more evident in the suicidal history group than the non-suicidal group. Specifically,  
1. The suicidal history group will exhibit a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the 
number of positive events than the non-suicidal group. However, the degree of change in the 
pre- to post-induction number of negative events will not differ between the two groups. 
 
Effects of the Mood Challenge on the Perceived Valence and Likelihood of Future Events 
Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will – 
2. Demonstrate a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the positive valence ratings on 
good events (positive events) and a greater pre- to post-induction increase in the negative 
valence ratings on bad events (negative events). 
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3. Exhibit a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the likelihood ratings of good events 
and a greater pre- to post-induction increase in the likelihood ratings of bad events.  
 
Effects of the Mood Challenge on Happiness and Despondence ratings 
In keeping with the assumption of the DAH, 
4. The suicidal history group will reveal a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in happiness 
ratings and a greater pre- to post-induction increase in despondence ratings. 
 
The Validity of LEIDS as a Measure of Cognitive Reactivity to Hopelessness 
Prior to the mood challenge, measurements of cognitive reactivity to hopelessness using the 
LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale were taken. Measured CR to hopelessness will be tested using 
the DAH framework. In line with the DAH,  
5. The suicidal history group will exhibit greater CR to hopelessness, as measured by the 
LEIDS, compared to the non-suicidal group. 
 
The DAH suggests that the occurrence of low mood will trigger hopelessness. As a 
behavioural feature of hopelessness, 
6. The decline in fluency for positive events following the mood challenge will be associated 
with greater levels of cognitive reactivity to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS.  
 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Sampling 
N.B. The sampling procedure of the present study was identical to the one employed 
in the Experience Sampling Method study in Chapter 3.  
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5.2.2. Measures 
 N.B. Measures described in Chapter 3 (CHSF, LEIDS-R, CDSS, BHS, and ISST) 
were also employed in this study. 
 
Visual Analogue Scale - Mood Rating  
 N.B. The mood rating VAS described in the Chapter 4 was also employed in this 
study. 
 
Future Thinking Task (MacLeod et al., 1993) 
 The Future Thinking Task (MacLeod et al., 1993, 1998) is a verbal task where 
participants are instructed to generate examples of personal experiences or events that they 
think are likely to happen in their future. In the original FT task developed by MacLeod et al. 
(1993), participants were asked to generate examples of future events in two different 
conditions (positive and negative) over three different time periods (next week, next year, and 
next five to ten years). In the positive condition, participants were asked to generate examples 
of pleasurable future events, or “experiences that they were looking forward to”. In the 
negative condition, participants were asked to generate examples of unpleasant future events, 
or “experiences that they were not looking forward to”. In keeping with the version of the FT 
task employed in Hepburn et al.’s (2006) mood-priming study, the FT task in this study was 
conducted over four different time periods (next week including today, next month, next year, 
and next 5 to 10 years) as opposed to the standard 3 time periods (next week, next year, & 
next 5 to 10 years). The reason for this was to achieve an equal number of time periods for 
the pre- and post-induction tasks. For example, the pre-induction FT task covers the next 
week and the next month time periods while the post-induction FT task covers the next year 
and the next 5 to 10-year time periods. 
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5.2.3. Procedure 
5.2.3. a. Case Identification 
The current study and the Means Ends Problem Solving task (Chapter 4) were both 
conducted in a single testing session, using exactly the same sample. However, the sample 
sizes of these two studies were slightly different as two participants opted out from the MEPS 
task, but both agreed to complete the current study (MEPS study N = 97, FT study N = 99). 
The two participants who opted out of the MEPS agreed to complete the FT task simply 
because they felt that the FT task is less challenging than the MEPS task. As previously 
discussed in the MEPS study (see chapter 5), the participants in this study were recruited 
from the Early Intervention Service in Birmingham from March 2009 to March 2011. The 
participants were split into two groups: (1) suicidal history group, and (2) non-suicidal group. 
Care coordinators were informed about the inclusion and exclusion criteria of the study in 
order to ensure that only eligible service users were approached. Following referral from the 
care coordinators, participants were approached over the phone or in person, depending on 
their preference. Once consent was obtained, the Columbia Suicidal History Form was 
conducted to assess for the individual’s lifetime histories of suicide attempt or DSH. In 
addition, the author of this study also carried out an audit on the participant’s clinical case 
notes at EIS in order to check for any historical records of suicidality. 
 As explained in the testing procedures of the MEPS study in the previous chapter, the 
testing session began with a briefing about the details of the study. Participants were given an 
opportunity to ask questions and/or clarify any issues or concerns about their participation 
and/or the nature of the study. Following this, a set of questionnaires measuring hopelessness, 
depression, and suicidal thinking (BHS, CDSS, & ISST respectively) was completed. The 
Future Thinking and the MEPS tasks (chapter 5), as mentioned earlier, were both carried out 
on two occasions, once after the completion of questionnaires which was prior to the sad 
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mood induction procedure (pre-induction) and once immediately after the sad MIP (post-
induction). Having based the present investigation on Hepburn and colleagues’ study (2005), 
the tasks were completed in exactly the same order for both pre and post-sad MIP. The MEPS 
task was always presented first followed by the FT task. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, a debriefing was carried out at the end of the testing session for two main purposes: 
(1) to discuss the actual purpose of the FT task (and the MEPS), and (2) to check if the 
participant’s mood had returned to its normal level. Participants who remained upset at the 
end of the testing session were offered a Happy Mood Induction Procedure to counteract the 
effects of the sad MIP. Of the three participants who reported feeling upset, only two 
completed the happy MIP. Participants were also informed that their care coordinators will be 
requested to closely monitor on their mood for as long as they think it is necessary to do so. 
This issue on risk overruling confidentiality was carefully discussed with the participants 
prior to them signing the consent form. All three participants agreed to have their care 
coordinators informed and all of them recovered well without any further deterioration of 
their mental health.   
 
5.2.3. b. Sad Mood Induction Procedure 
 As the FT task and MEPS tasks were both conducted in one testing session, the 
participants undertook the same sad MIP procedure described in chapter 5. 
  
5.2.3. c. Future Thinking Task  
 As the current study was a replication of Hepburn and her colleagues’ (2006) mood 
priming study on future fluency, the FT task was also conducted in two blocks of trials, one 
prior to and another one following the sad mood induction procedure. Each block of trials 
contained equal numbers of conditions over four different time periods (Block A = positive 
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week, negative month, positive year, negative 5–10 years & Block B = negative week, 
positive month, negative year, positive 5–10 years).  Each participant was randomly allocated 
to blocks A/B or B/A in order to counterbalance the presentation of conditions before (pre) 
and after (post) the sad mood induction procedure. The time periods were presented one at a 
time in chronological order. The participants were given a time limit of 1 minute to generate 
as many future events as they can think of within the time period and condition specified by 
the researcher. Examples of future events generated were then recorded by the researcher on 
an FT task response sheet while making sure that the participant remained focused in 
finishing the task. Upon completion of all time periods, the researcher read each example of 
future events and asked the participant to rate it in two ways: (1) perceived valence, and (2) 
likelihood. Valence ratings were obtained by asking the participants to rate how 
positive/negative they would feel if the events were to actually happen using a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all positive/negative & 7 = extremely positive/negative). Alternatively, 
likelihood ratings were obtained by asking participants to rate the probability that their future 
expectations were to occur using a similar 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all likely & 7 = 
extremely likely). In keeping with Hepburn et al.’s (2005) rating procedures, future 
expectations were all rated first for positivity and then negativity. According to Hepburn’s 
and her colleagues (2005), ratings for positivity (positive valence) and negativity (negative 
valence) should not be performed concurrently as participants might rate negativity as an 
inverse of positivity or vice versa. By rating them separately, we were able to measure 
negativity and positivity as two separate dimensions of affect. A number of studies have 
already demonstrated that negativity is not merely the opposite equivalent of positivity 
(MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). However, it is important to note that the hypotheses of the present 
study only examined the positive valence of good events and negative valence of bad events. 
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In keeping with hypotheses and for the sake of brevity, results and discussion were therefore 
limited only to the valences specified previously.  
Overall, a set of three scores were calculated upon completion of the future thinking 
task (FT task). Calculations were based on the formulae used in Hepburn et al.’s study. First, 
the total future fluency scores were calculated by summing the total number of future events 
generated in each of the four time periods within the specified condition (positive or negative 
FT task)  and mood state (pre- & post-induction). Examples of future events across all time 
periods must be unique and any repeated examples were only counted the first time they were 
cited. Second, the valence scores were calculated by summing the total valence ratings 
divided by the total number of future events generated within the specified condition and 
mood. Third, following the calculation of the valence scores, the average likelihood scores 
were calculated by adding the total likelihood ratings of each future event divided by the total 
number of future expectations within the specified condition and mood state. The analyses in 
the hypotheses testing focused mainly on the post-mood induction scores for future fluency 
(positive & negative) and the associated features of future thinking (valence & likelihood). 
The key objective was to compare the effects of the sad mood induction procedure on the 
overall performance of the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group in the FT task. 
Although examples of future events were not identical on the pre- and post-mood induction 
tasks (due to alternating positive & negative conditions within the 4 time periods), 
comparisons on pre- and post-induction valence and likelihood scores were therefore 
interpreted with caution. Instead of examining how each group of participants re-rated the 
same events on two varying mood states, analyses in the current study were mainly focused 
on comparing the general level of perceived valence (positive & negative) and likelihood 
ratings between groups prior to and after the mood induction procedure.  
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5.2.4. Analysis Strategy 
To test the hypotheses, a mixed between/within repeated measures analysis of 
variance was conducted using an IBM SPSS Statistics software version 21 for Windows. In 
order to control for the possible effects of the key clinical symptoms (e.g. generalised 
hopelessness, depression, and suicidal thinking), an analysis of covariance using the repeated 
measures design were conducted.  
 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Sample Characteristics 
 Of the 105 individuals who were approached, only 3 individuals responded with an 
outright refusal. Out of the recruited 102 participants, only a subsample of 2 (1.96%) changed 
their mind about participating in the study (those who previously completed the LEIDS 
screening measure, but refused to do the mood-priming study). In total, the final sample 
consisted of 99 participants of which, 49 (49.49%) had a lifetime history of suicidal 
behaviour while 50 (50.51%) had no history at all of suicidal behaviour in their lifetime. Of 
the 49 participants with a lifetime history of suicidal behaviour, 27 (55.10%) were males and 
22 (44.90%) were females. Alternatively, of the 50 participants without a lifetime history of 
suicidal behaviour, 35 (70%) were males and only 15 (30%) were females.  Due to the 
relatively small discrepancy in the sample size between the study discussed in the Chapter 4 
(N = 97) and the present study (N = 99), the mean age and key symptom scores were almost 
identical. However, for the sake of accuracy, the participants’ age and key symptom scores in 
the present study are summarised in Table 16.  
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Table 16. Means and Standard Deviations of Age and Key Clinical Symptoms for the  
   Non-Suicidal Group and Suicidal History Group 
 Non-suicidal group (N = 50) Suicidal history group (N = 49) 
Variable M SD M SD 
Demographic     
     Age 23.86 4.95 23.08 4.65 
Symptom Score     
     BHS 5.58 4.39 9.96 5.84 
     CDSS 1.70 2.46 3.88 3.99 
     ISST 0.38 1.51 1.73 3.10 
Note: BHS = Beck Hopelessness Scale, CDSS = Calgary Depression Scale, and ISST = InterSept Scale for 
Suicidal Thinking 
 
 
5.3.1. Descriptive Statistics and T-tests 
Generalised hopelessness 
 Current levels of generalised hopelessness were measured using the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale. An independent t-test revealed a significant difference between groups, 
with the suicidal (M = 9.96, SD = 5.84) group showing a higher level of generalised 
hopelessness compared to the non-suicidal group (M = 5.58, SD = 4.39), t(97) = 4.07, p < 
.001, d = .85. The BHS scores for each group are shown in Table 16.  
 
Depression 
 Symptoms of depression were assessed using the 10-item Calgary Depression Scale 
for Schizophrenia. Scores between the two groups were compared and an independent t-test 
revealed a significant difference between the suicidal history group (M = 3.88, SD = 3.99) 
and the non-suicidal group (M = 1.70, SD = 2.46), with the previous group showing higher 
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levels of depression than the latter group, t(97) = 3.21, p = .002, d =.66. The CDSS scores for 
each group are shown in Table 16.  
 
Suicidal Thinking 
 Levels of suicidal ideation during the past 7 days prior to testing were measured using 
the InterSept Scale for Suicidal Thinking. Scores from both groups were compared using an 
independent t-test, which revealed a significant difference between the suicidal history group 
(M = 1.73, SD = 3.10) and the non-suicidal group (M = .38, SD = 1.51), with the previous 
group showing higher levels of suicidal ideation than the latter group, t(97) = 2.92, p = .004, 
d = .61. The ISST scores for each group are also shown in Table 16.  
 
5.3.2. Hypotheses Testing 
 Following the data conversion in the previous chapter, square root data transformation 
was also employed on all of the continuous dependent variables and covariates prior to 
conducting the analysis of variance in order to satisfy the assumption of normality and 
equality of variances. Again, in keeping with Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Howell 
(2007), all means and standard deviations reported in this chapter were original values from 
the untransformed data.  
An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests. All analyses were carried out 
with group (suicidal history group vs. non-suicidal group) as a between-subjects factor.  
 
Effects of the Mood Challenge on Future Fluency 
In keeping with the DAH, the impact of the sad mood induction procedure will be more 
evident in the suicidal history group than the non-suicidal group. Specifically,  
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1. The suicidal history group will exhibit a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the 
number of positive events than the non-suicidal group. However, the degree of change in the 
pre- to post-induction number of negative events will not differ between the two groups. 
 
To test this hypothesis, a two-step analysis was conducted. To test this hypothesis, a 
three-step analysis was conducted. First, independent t-tests were conducted on future 
fluency scores to test the difference between the means of each group in both conditions 
(positive & negative events) conducted on two separate mood states (pre- & post-mood 
induction). Future event scores were obtained by summing the total number of expectations 
generated in each condition (positive & negative) during the two testing time points (pre- & 
post-mood induction). Second, a mixed repeated measures ANOVA was carried out to 
examine the effect of the sad mood induction procedure (sad MIP) on positive and negative 
future fluency, and most importantly, to determine if the effect of the sad MIP differed 
between the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group. The hypothesis will be 
validated on the basis of a significant interaction effect. To conduct the ANOVA, the variable 
mood (pre- vs. post-induction future fluency scores) was entered as the within-subject factor 
and group (suicidal history group vs. non-suicidal group) as the between-subject factor. 
Third, an Analysis of Covariance using the repeated measure design was conducted in order 
to test if the key clinical symptoms (e.g. generalised hopelessness, depression, and suicidal 
thinking) have an effect of the mood x group interaction. To perform the ANCOVA, mood 
(pre- vs. post-mood induction) was entered as the dependent variable, group (suicidal history 
group vs. non-suicidal group) as the fixed factor, while generalised hopelessness (as 
measured by the BHS), depression (as measured by the CDSS), and suicidal thinking (as 
measured by the ISST) were entered as covariates. Separate ANCOVA’s were conducted for 
each of the covariates to ensure better accuracy. 
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Positive events 
Results of independent t-test on pre-mood induction positive Future Thinking Task 
(FTT) scores showed that the suicidal history group (M = 8.86, SD = 2.43) had significantly 
fewer number of positive events than the non-suicidal group (M = 10.02, SD = 2.68), t(97) = 
2.10, p = .031, d = .44).  Similar results were found from the independent t-test on post-mood 
induction positive event scores as the suicidal history group (M = 6.78, SD = 2.18) had 
significantly less number of positive events than the non-suicidal group (M = 9.26, SD = 
3.73), t(84.70) = 3.55, p = .001; d =.72). The Levene’s test for the post-induction t-test 
indicated unequal variances (F = 7.48, p = .007) so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 97 
to 84.70. Summary of means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 17. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, there was a significant group x mood interaction 
effect with the suicidal history group showing a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the 
number of positive events compared to the non-suicidal group [F(1, 97) = 4.91, p =.029, 
partial ƞ2 = .05]. This finding held true after controlling for generalised hopelessness (BHS), 
depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking (ISST).   
The ANOVA also confirmed a significant within-subjects effect of mood as caused by 
the decrease in post-induction number of positive events [F(1, 97) = 35.62, p <.001, partial ƞ2 
= .27]. There was also a between-subjects main effect of group due to the suicidal history 
group showing significantly fewer examples of positive events compared to the non-suicidal 
group [F(1, 97) = 11.12, p =.001, partial ƞ2 = .10]. The pattern of results remained unaffected 
after controlling for the previously identified key clinical symptoms.   
 
Negative events 
 The independent t-test on the negative Future Thinking Task (FTT) scores showed no 
significant difference between the suicidal history group and non-suicidal group on both the 
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pre-mood induction [mean (SD) = 7.49 (3.21) and 6.54 (3.22), respectively; t(97) = 1.59, p = 
.114] and post-mood induction number of negative events [mean (SD) = 8.04 (3.56) and 6.92 
(2.70), respectively; t(97) = 1.66, p = .101]. Table 17 displays summary of means and 
standard deviations. 
 Also in agreement with the hypothesis, there was no significant mood x group 
interaction effect [F(1, 97) = 3.30, p =.072]. There was also no between-subjects main effect 
of group as the number of negative events did not differ between the suicidal history group 
and non-suicidal group [F(1, 97) = .09, p =.080]. In contrast, there was a significant within-
subject effect of mood due to the decrease in the number of negative events following the 
mood challenge [F(1, 97) = 4.30, p =.041, partial ƞ2 = .04]. The pattern of results was 
unaffected following an ANCOVA to control for generalised hopelessness (BHS), 
depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking (ISST).   
  
Table 17. Means and Standard Deviations of the Pre- and Post- Mood Induction Number of 
    Positive and Negative Events 
 Non-suicidal group (N = 50) Suicidal history group (N = 49) 
Variable M SD M SD 
Positive Events     
     Pre-induction 10.02 2.68 8.86 2.43 
     Post-induction 9.26 3.73 6.78 2.18 
Negative Events     
     Pre-induction 6.54 3.22 7.49 3.21 
     Post-induction 6.92 2.70 8.04 3.56 
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 In summary, the results confirmed the hypothesis as the suicidal history group 
exhibited a significantly greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the number of positive 
events than the non-suicidal group. Also as predicted, both groups did not differ in their pre- 
to post-induction changes in their number of negative events. Figure 5 illustrates the number 
of positive and negative events for each group. 
 
Effects of the Mood Challenge on the Perceived Valence and Likelihood of Future Events 
Compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group will – 
2. Demonstrate a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the positive valence ratings on 
good events (positive events) and a greater pre- to post-induction increase in the negative 
valence ratings on bad events (negative events). 
 Following the three-step analysis in the hypothesis 1, independent t-tests, ANOVA, 
and ANCOVA were conducted to test this assumption. The ANOVA and ANCOVA 
variables were all identical to the ones used in hypothesis 1 with exception of the within-
subjects factor levels for mood as the current analyses requires pre- and post-induction 
valence scores. The valence scores were obtained by asking the participants to rate how 
positive or negative they would feel if their future expectations (positive & negative future 
events) were to occur. The positive and negative valence ratings were calculated by summing 
the individual valence ratings of each future event divided by the total number of future 
events in each of the condition (positive & negative). 
 
Positive Valence Ratings on Good Events 
 The independent t-tests showed that the suicidal history group had significantly lower 
positive valence ratings on good events compared to the non-suicidal group on both the pre-
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Figure 5. Average Pre- and Post-Induction Number of Positive Events (A) and Negative Events (B) for the Suicidal History Group and  
        Non-Suicidal Group 
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mood induction [mean (SD) = 5.52 (.94) and 6.24 (.64), respectively; t(97) = 4.31, p <.001; d 
= .83] and post-mood induction tasks [mean (SD) = 4.47 (1.03) & 5.72 (1.02), respectively; 
t(97) = 5.90, p <.001; d = 1.19]. Summary of means and standard deviations are displayed in 
Table 18 below. 
As predicted, there was a mood x group interaction effect as caused by the 
significantly greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the positive valence ratings on good 
events in the suicidal history group compared to the non-suicidal group [F (1, 97) = 7.56, p 
=.007, partial ƞ2 = .07].  The significant mood x group interaction held true after controlling 
for depression (CDSS) and suicidal thinking (ISST). However, controlling for generalised 
hopelessness (BHS) reduced the mood x group interaction effect to non-significance [F (1, 
95) = 2.14, p =.147].  
Similarly, the initially significant main effect of mood [F (1, 97) = 60.65, p <.001, 
partial ƞ2 = .38] was also reduced to non-significance after controlling for generalised 
hopelessness as measured by the BHS [F (1, 95) = 1.31, p =.255]. However, the significant 
finding was unaffected after controlling for depression (CDSS) and suicidal thinking (ISST). 
On the other hand, there was a significant between-subjects main effect of group as caused by 
the considerably lower positive valence ratings on good events in the suicidal history group 
compared to the non-suicidal group, and this held true after controlling for the previously 
named key clinical symptoms [F(1, 97) = 37.70, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .28]. 
 
Negative Valence Ratings on Bad Events 
 Results of independent t-tests indicated significantly higher negative valence ratings 
on good events in the suicidal history group than the non-suicidal group on both the pre–
mood induction [mean (SD) = 1.65 (.80) & 1.30 (.82), respectively; t(97) = 2.54, p = .013; d 
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= .52] and post-mood induction tasks [mean (SD) = 1.85 (.94) & 1.47 (.81), respectively; 
t(97) = 2.30, p = .024; d = .45]. Table 18 displays summary of means and standard deviations. 
 Again as predicted, there was a significant mood x group interaction effect due to the 
suicidal history group exhibiting greater pre- to post-induction increase in the negative 
valence ratings on bad events compared to the non-suicidal group [F(1, 97) = 7.20, p =.009, 
partial ƞ2 = .07]. This finding remained significant after controlling for generalised 
hopelessness (BHS), depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking (ISST). 
 The results also revealed a significant within-subjects main effect mood as caused by 
the significantly higher negative valence ratings following the post-mood induction [F(1, 97) 
= 21.67, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .18]. There was also a significant between-subjects main effect 
of group as the suicidal history group had considerably higher negative valence ratings 
compared to the non-suicidal group [F(1, 97) = 38.55, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .28]. Again, the 
results remained significant after controlling for the identified key clinical symptoms. 
 
Table 18. Means and Standard Deviations of the Pre- and Post- Mood Induction Valence  
   Ratings on Positive and Negative Events 
 Non-suicidal group (N = 50) Suicidal history group (N = 49) 
Variable M SD M SD 
Positive Valence on Good Events    
     Pre-induction 6.24 .64 5.92 .94 
     Post-induction 5.72 1.02 4.47 1.03 
Negative Valence on Bad Events    
     Pre-induction 1.30 .82 1.65 .80 
     Post-induction 1.47 .81 1.85 .94 
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 In summary, although the suicidal history group initially exhibited significantly 
greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the positive valence ratings on good events than the 
non-suicidal group as predicted, the groups failed to differ after controlling for generalised 
hopelessness. In contrast, results of on negative valence ratings on bad events were consistent 
with the hypothesis as the suicidal history group showed a greater pre- to post-induction 
increase in the negative valence ratings on bad events compared to the non-suicidal group. 
Figure 6 illustrates the pre- and post-induction positive valence ratings on good events and 
negative valence ratings on bad events for the suicidal history group and non-suicidal group. 
 
3. Exhibit a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the likelihood ratings of good events 
and a greater pre- to post-induction increase in the likelihood ratings of bad events.  
 To test the hypothesis, the three-step analysis employed in hypotheses 1 and 2 was 
carried out. The ANOVA and ANCOVA variables match the ones used in hypothesis 1 and 2 
with the exception of the within-subjects factor levels for mood as the current analyses 
requires pre- and post-induction likelihood ratings. The likelihood ratings were obtained by 
asking the participants how likely do they think their future expectations were to actually 
happen. The overall likelihood score of good/positive events were calculated by summing the 
individual likelihood ratings of all the good events divided by the number of good events 
generated. The overall likelihood score of bad/negative events, on the other hand, were 
calculated by summing the individual valence ratings of all the bad events divided by the 
total number of bad events generated. 
 
Likelihood Ratings on Good Events 
Results of independent t-tests confirmed that the suicidal history group in general had 
lower likelihood ratings on good events than the non-suicidal group on both pre-mood
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Figure 6. Average Pre- and Post-Induction Positive Valence Ratings of Good Events (A) and Negative Valence Ratings of Bad Events (B) for 
      the Suicidal History Group and Non-Suicidal Group  
 
 
 
 
A B 
 146 
 
induction [mean (SD) = 5.01 (.94) & 6 (.67), respectively; t(81.01) = 5.91, p <.001; d = 1.19] 
and post-mood induction tasks [mean (SD) = 3.98 (.81) and 5.27 (1.16), respectively; t(97) = 
6.60, p <.001; d = 1.35]. Levene’s test indicated unequal variances on pre-mood induction t-
test (F = 6.89, p = .010) so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 97 to 81.01. Summary of 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 19. 
As expected, mood x group interaction effect was found as the suicidal history group 
showed a significantly greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the likelihood ratings of 
good events [F(1, 97) = 5.42, p =.022, partial ƞ2 = .05]. The interaction effect remained 
significant after controlling for generalised hopelessness (BHS), depression (CDSS), and 
suicidal thinking (ISST). A significant main effect of mood was also found due to the 
particularly lower likelihood ratings of good events following the mood induction [F(1, 97) = 
98.06, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .50]. Similarly, a significant between-subjects main effect of 
group was found due to the considerably lower likelihood ratings in the suicidal history group 
compared to the non-suicidal group [F(1, 97) = 3.50, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .34]. The results 
remained unaffected after the key clinical symptoms were controlled for. 
 
Likelihood Ratings on Bad Events 
Independent t-tests confirmed that the suicidal history group had higher likelihood 
ratings on bad events or negative future expectations than the non-suicidal group on both pre-
mood induction [mean (SD) = 4.56 (1.20) & 3.36 (1.44), respectively; t(83.70) = 4.23, p 
<.001; d = .84] and post-mood induction tasks [mean (SD) = 5.48 (1.13) and 4.53 (1.40), 
respectively; t(97) = 3.65, p <.001; d = .75]. Levene’s test indicated unequal variances on 
pre-mood induction t-test (F = 6.55, p = .012) so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 97 
to 83.70. Table 19 displays summary of means and standard deviations. 
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The predicted mood x group interaction effect was found as the suicidal history group 
exhibited a significantly greater pre- to post-induction increase in the likelihood ratings of 
bad events compared to the non-suicidal group [F(1, 97) = 4.00, p =.048, partial ƞ2 = .04]. 
This finding held true after controlling for generalised hopelessness (BHS), depression 
(CDSS), and suicidal thinking (ISST). 
A significant within-subjects main effect of mood was also found due to the 
substantially lower likelihood ratings of bad events following the sad mood induction 
procedure [F(1, 97) = 94.78, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = .49]. Likewise, a significant between-
subjects main effect of group was found as caused by the higher likelihood ratings of bad 
events in the suicidal history group compared to the non-suicidal group [F(1, 97) = 18.16, p 
<.001, partial ƞ2 = .16]. This pattern of results held true after controlling for the key clinical 
symptoms. 
 
Table 19. Means and Standard Deviations of the Pre- and Post- Mood Induction Likelihood 
    Ratings on Positive and Negative Events 
 Non-suicidal group (N = 50) Suicidal history group (N = 49) 
Variable M SD M SD 
Likelihood Ratings on Good Events    
     Pre-induction 6.00 .67 5.01 .94 
     Post-induction 5.27 1.16 3.98 .81 
Likelihood Ratings on Bad Events    
     Pre-induction 3.36 1.44 4.56 1.20 
     Post-induction 4.53 1.40 5.48 1.13 
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 In summary, the pattern of results were consistent with the hypothesis as the suicidal 
history group had a significantly greater pre- to post-induction decrease in the likelihood 
ratings of good events and a significantly greater pre- to post-induction increase in the 
likelihood ratings of bad events in comparison to the non-suicidal group. Figure 7 
demonstrates the pre- and post-induction likelihood ratings for both good and bad events for 
the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group. 
 
Effects of the Mood Challenge on Happiness and Despondence Ratings 
In keeping with the assumption of the Differential Activation Hypothesis (DAH), 
4. The suicidal history group will reveal a greater pre- to post-induction decrease in happiness 
ratings and a greater pre- to post-induction increase in despondence ratings. 
 In keeping with the three-step analysis conducted in the previous hypotheses, first, 
independent t-tests were conducted on the happiness and despondence ratings (as measured 
by the Visual Analogue Scale) to test if the means of each group differed on both testing time 
points (pre- & post-mood induction). Second, a mixed repeated measure ANOVA was carried 
out to examine the effect the sad MIP on the happiness and despondence ratings and to check 
if the effects of the sad MIP differed between groups. Third, an ANCOVA was conducted to 
check for any statistically relevant covariates that could possibly account for the significant 
interaction effect between the mood (dependent variable) and group (independent variable). 
Again, the variables for the ANOVA and ANCOVA analyses were kept identical to the 
variables in the previous analyses with the exception of within-subjects levels of mood as the 
current hypothesis examines the pre- and post-induction mood ratings (happiness & 
despondence). 
 
 
 149 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Average Pre- and Post-Induction Likelihood Ratings of Good Events (A) and Likelihood Ratings of Bad Events (B) for the Suicidal  
       History Group and Non-Suicidal Group 
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Happiness Ratings 
Independent t-test on pre-mood induction happiness ratings confirmed no significant 
difference between the means of the suicidal history group (M = 5.34, SD = 2.09) and the 
non-suicidal group (M = 5.73, SD = 2.00), t(97) = .96, p = .377. In contrast, independent t-test 
on post-mood induction happiness ratings showed a significant difference as the suicidal 
history group (M = 4.09, SD = 1.71) in general scored lower than the non-suicidal group (M = 
5.04, SD = 1.98), t(97) = 2.42, p = .017; d = .48). Summary of means and standard deviations 
are shown in Table 20. 
In agreement with the hypothesis, there was a significant mood x group interaction 
effect due to the significantly greater pre- to post-induction decrease in happiness ratings in 
the suicidal history group compared to the non-suicidal group [F(1, 97) = 4.38, p =.039, 
partial ƞ2 = .04]. The same held true after controlling for generalised hopelessness (BHS), 
depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking (ISST). 
There was also a significant within-subjects main effect of mood due to the decrease  
in happiness ratings following the mood induction [F(1, 97) = 44.25, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = 
.31]. The main effect of mood remained significant after controlling for the key clinical 
symptoms. Interestingly, there was no significant between-subjects main effect on group 
[F(1, 97) = 3.35, p =.070] therefore, no further analyses were conducted although the p-value 
was only marginally over the conventional .05 significance level.  
 
Despondence Ratings 
Independent t-test on pre-mood induction momentary hopelessness ratings revealed 
no significant difference between the suicidal group (M = 3.29, SD = 2.32) and the non-
suicidal group (M = 2.78, SD = 2.49), t(97) = 1.19, p = .239. In contrast, independent t-test on 
post-mood induction hopelessness ratings showed the suicidal group (M = 4.95, SD = 2.38) 
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scoring significantly higher than the non-suicidal group (M = 3.38, SD = 2.46), t(97) = 3.01, p 
= .003, d = .61). Table 20 displays summary of means and standard deviations for both 
happiness and despondence ratings. 
Also consistent with the hypothesis, there was a significant mood x group interaction 
effect due to the significantly greater pre- to post-induction increase in despondence ratings 
in the suicidal history group compared to the non-suicidal group [F(1, 97) = 4.90, p =.029, 
partial ƞ2 = .05]. The interaction effect remained significant after controlling for generalised 
hopelessness (BHS), depression (CDSS), and suicidal thinking (ISST). 
 
Table 20. Means and Standard Deviations of the Pre- and Post- Mood Induction Happiness 
    and Despondence Ratings 
 Non-suicidal group (N = 50) Suicidal history group (N = 49) 
Variable M SD M SD 
Happiness Ratings     
     Pre-induction 5.73 2.00 5.34 2.09 
     Post-induction 5.04 1.98 4.09 1.71 
Despondence Ratings     
     Pre-induction 2.78 2.49 3.29 2.32 
     Post-induction 3.38 2.46 4.95 2.38 
 
The ANOVA showed a significant within-subjects effect of mood due to the increase 
in despondence ratings following the mood induction [F(1, 97) = 37.08, p <.001, partial ƞ2 = 
.28]. There was also a between-subjects main effect of group as caused by the higher 
despondence ratings in the suicidal history group in comparison to the non-suicidal group 
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[F(1, 97) = 4.90, p =.029, partial ƞ2 = .05]. The main effects of mood and group remained 
unaffected after controlling for the key clinical symptoms. 
 In summary, overall results were in agreement with the hypothesis as the suicidal 
history group exhibited a significantly greater pre- to post-induction decrease in happiness 
ratings and a significantly greater pre- to post-induction increase in despondence ratings in 
comparison to the non-suicidal group. Figure 8 illustrates the fluctuation of momentary 
happiness and despondence for the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group. 
 
The Validity of LEIDS as a Measure of Cognitive Reactivity to Hopelessness 
Prior to the mood challenge, measurements of cognitive reactivity to hopelessness using the 
LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale were taken. Measured CR to hopelessness will be tested using 
the DAH framework. In line with the DAH,  
5. The suicidal history group will exhibit greater CR to hopelessness, as measured by the 
LEIDS, compared to the non-suicidal group. 
 As predicted, the suicidal history group (M = 12.67, SD = 5.20) showed significantly 
higher cognitive reactivity to hopelessness as measured by the hopelessness subscale of the  
Leiden Index of Depression Scale – revised version (LEIDS) than the non-suicidal group (M 
= 6.40, SD = 4.32), t(97) = 6.21, p <.001, d = 1.31). 
  
The DAH suggests that the occurrence of low mood will trigger hopelessness. As a 
behavioural feature of hopelessness, 
6. The decline in fluency for positive events following the mood challenge will be associated 
with greater levels of cognitive reactivity to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS.  
To test this hypothesis, first, an overall positive future fluency difference score was 
calculated by subtracting the pre-induction number of positive events from the post-induction  
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Figure 8. Average VAS Despondence (A) and Happiness (B) Ratings on Pre-Task, Pre-Induction, Post-Induction, and Post-Task Mood States  
             in the Suicidal History Group and Non-Suicidal Group 
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number of positive events. Second, a bivariate correlation was carried out on the overall 
difference score of positive future fluency and scores from the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, there was no significant correlation between the difference 
score of positive future fluency and scores on LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale (r = .01, N = 99, 
p = .936). In other words, the pre- to post-induction change in fluency for positive events was 
not associated with the level of cognitive reactivity as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness 
subscale.  
 
5.4. Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to investigate the application of the DAH framework 
in understanding the suicidal thinking process of FEP individuals with or without a lifetime 
history of suicidal attempts or DSH. Specifically, the intent was to examine if the future 
fluency of those with a history of suicidal behaviour was influenced by the subtle changes in 
mood as caused by the sad MIP. A number of previous studies have indicated that the lack of 
positive future fluency is strongly associated with hopelessness, which is a key risk factor for 
suicidal behaviour (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod, et al., 1997, Hunter & O’Connor, 
2003; Hepburn et al., 2006). The design of this study was based from the previous mood 
priming study on future fluency conducted by Hepburn and her colleagues in 2006.  
 In agreement with the key hypothesis of this study, the shift in mood as caused by the 
sad MIP significantly reduced the positive future fluency or the individual’s ability to 
generate examples of positive/good future events, with a particularly more pronounced effect 
in the suicidal history group than the non-suicidal group. In contrast, although the shift in 
mood increased the negative future fluency or the ability to generate examples of negative/bad 
future events of the entire sample following the sad MIP, the degree of pre- to post-induction 
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change did not significantly differ between groups as expected. This pattern of results was 
consistent with the data from Hepburn et al.’s (2006) study, which indicated a reduced 
positive future fluency and an unchanged negative future fluency following the sad MIP in a 
sample of non-depressed participants. Such a pattern of results was also found in a number of 
studies that examined future fluency as a behavioural feature of hopelessness in individuals 
who were suicidal and depressed (MacLeod et al., 1993; MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, & 
Jacobsen, 1997; MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee, & Mitchell, 1997; MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001; 
Conaghan & Davidson, 2002; Hunter & O’Connor, 2003). According to MacLeod and his 
colleagues (2005), the lack of pre- to post-induction change in the number of negative events 
may be attributed to the ceiling effect on the affective impact of the bad events in general. 
Due to the limited affective impact of the individual positive events, the intensity of its 
collective impact largely relies on its quantity. Unlike the positive events, the affective impact 
of the individual negative events is more intense and thus, requiring less to achieve its 
maximum possible effect or “impact threshold”. In line with this idea from MacLeod et al. 
(2005), it is possible that the generation of negative future events did not vary between the 
suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group across the mood conditions (pre- & post-
induction) simply because the “impact threshold” of the negative events has already been 
reached prior to the mood challenge. It is also possible that the pre- and post-induction 
number of negative events did not differ due to the aversive nature of the events overall. 
Aversive events are likely to be perceived as more negative in terms of its affective impact. In 
order to further explore this possibility, a thorough examination of the score sheets for the 
negative future thinking task (pre- and post-sad MIP) was carried out. Based on careful 
observation, issues about mental health emerged as the predominant theme of the negative 
future events generated before and after the mood induction. Issues surrounding mental health 
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mainly included relapsing (e.g. being sectioned & hospitalisation), medication (e.g. ‘being on 
it’ & ‘not being able to get off it’), worsening of other related symptoms (e.g. ‘becoming more 
depressed, anxious, paranoid, or afraid’ & ‘voices getting worse’), not recovering from their 
mental illness (e.g. ‘being stuck’, ‘being the same’, & ‘being just as I am now’), isolation (e.g. 
‘losing contact with friends’ & ‘not having any friends’), and having the stigma (e.g. ‘being 
seen as different’, or ‘not being normal’). Jackson and colleagues (2004) have indicated that 
hospitalisation and treatment experiences during the initial episode of psychosis were 
predictive of post-traumatic stress.  It is possible that due to the aversive nature of these 
negative events, the extent to which individuals can tolerate the emotional impact of these 
events was already at its maximum prior to the mood challenge. It is also possible that the 
groups did not differ in their fluency for negative events simply because they both shared 
comparable worries and fears regarding their future mental health. 
On the other hand, a number of studies have suggested that the impaired fluency for 
positive events in the suicidal and depressed individuals were mainly due to the elevated 
feelings of hopelessness (MacLeod et al., 1993; MacLeod, Tata, et al., 1997; MacLeod, 
Pankhania, et al., 1997; Sidley et al., 1999; Hepburn, et al., 2006). Recalling the assumptions 
of the DAH, low mood is believed to be linked together with feelings of hopelessness through 
repeated episodes of depression. The stronger the link, the easier it becomes for low mood to 
reactivate these feelings of hopelessness. While previous studies have already established the 
link between the lack of positive future fluency and hopelessness in suicidal and depressed 
individuals, the present study indicates that the fluency-hopelessness link is also evident in 
FEP individuals with histories of suicidal attempts and DSH. The evidence of such a link 
supports the assumptions of the DAH, which suggests that once hopelessness is already 
embedded within the network of negative thinking process, even a slight dampening in mood 
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can impair the individual’s fluency for future events. More importantly, further analyses 
showed that this observed impairment in fluency for positive events following the sad MIP 
was not merely a marker of current generalised hopelessness (BHS), depression (CDSS), and 
suicidal thinking (ISST). However, the fact that life circumstances following the initial 
psychotic episode can be very traumatic for many individuals (Harrison & Fowler, 2004; 
Jackson & Iqbal, 2000; Jackson, Trower, Reid et al. 2009; Riedesser, 2004; Tarrier et al., 
2007), there remains a possibility that these particularly distressing contextual factors 
moderated the effect of the mood challenge on positive future fluency in this particular 
sample. It is reasonable to speculate that individuals who are in distress are less likely to have 
a positive view of their future.  In a study conducted by O’Connor and Cassidy (2007), they 
found that distress was strongly linked with reduced fluency for positive events in high-stress 
optimists and low-stress pessimists.  
 Contrary to the hypothesis, the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group did 
not differ on the positive valence ratings of good events following the mood challenge. 
Although the initial analysis indicated that the suicidal history group showed significantly 
lower positive valence ratings of good events following the mood induction compared to the 
non-suicidal group, controlling for generalised hopelessness reduced the initial finding to non-
significance. Intriguingly, controlling for generalised hopelessness also caused the overall 
positive valence ratings of good events before and after the mood induction (within-subjects 
main effect) not to differ. However, the positive valence ratings remained different between 
the two groups (between-subjects main effect). This pattern of results seemed to suggest that 
the perceived valence of future good events was not sensitive enough to the subtle changes in 
transitory mood. According to the Hopelessness theory (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 
1989), generalised hopelessness is sustained by a faulty thinking processes (i.e. magnification 
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& overgeneralization), which in this case has possibly caused the perceived valence appraisal 
of good events to operate in an entirely systemic and stable mode as opposed to reactive. It is 
worthy to note, however, that despite the lack of difference in the post-induction positive 
valence ratings of good events between groups, the suicidal history group exhibited lower 
positive valence ratings than the non-suicidal group. Consistent with the hypothesis, the 
suicidal history group had considerably higher negative valence ratings of bad (or negative) 
events following the sad MIP. Despite the lack of change in the number of bad events 
following the mood induction, this finding seemed to suggest that the transitory shift in mood 
caused the participants to perceive negative events as more unpleasant. In keeping with the 
assumptions of the DAH, the subtle dampening in mood triggered a hopeless thinking style, 
which in this case was a more negative perception of the affective impact of bad events. 
Overall, this finding is consistent with the “impact threshold” that was discussed earlier. In 
the initial speculation it was suggested that the number of post-induction bad events did not 
differ due to the possibility that the perceived affective impact of bad events was already at its 
maximum prior to the mood induction. The observed increase in the perceived negative 
valence of bad events, however, suggest otherwise. This finding seems to suggest that the 
“impact threshold” was only facilitated by the shift in transitory mood, which occurred as an 
effect of the mood induction. The increase in the perceived negative valence of bad events 
following the mood induction enhanced the perceived affective impact of the bad events 
collectively, which justifies the lack of difference in the pre- and post-induction number of 
bad events. In other words, the number of bad events generated across mood states (pre- & 
post-induction) did not differ simply because the overall affective impact of bad events, albeit 
the quantity was unchanged, was perceived to be a lot more unpleasant.  
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 As predicted, the suicidal history group had significantly lower likelihood ratings for 
good events and higher likelihood ratings for bad events. This pattern of results was 
consistent with the findings of previous studies that examined the link between the depressed 
mood and future thinking in non-psychosis sample, which indicated that a depressed mood 
was associated with lower likelihood of good/positive events (MacLeod & Cropley, 1995) 
and higher likelihood of bad/negative events (Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992; MacLeod 
et al., 1997). Similarly, a study on the previously suicidal but non-psychosis sample indicated 
that lower likelihood ratings were significantly associated with generalised hopelessness as 
measured by the BHS (MacLeod et al., 2005). One of the possible explanations for this mood-
linked perception of likelihood was explained in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) study on 
heuristics and biases when judging the likelihood of uncertain events. According to Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974), the likelihood of an uncertain event occurring is determined by the 
perceived ease with which an individual can remember occurrences of similar events, a 
judgemental heuristic that is also referred to as “availability”. If such ease of recollection is 
facilitated by the mood congruence effect (Bower, 1981), it is therefore logical that the 
suicidal history group, as being more vulnerable to the effect of the mood challenge, 
remembered more events whose emotional content matches the sad emotional state that they 
were in. In other words, individuals who are in a negative or sad mood will tend to rate the 
likelihood of a good event as less likely simply because it is harder for them to recall 
occurrences of similar events whose emotional content is in conflict with their current mood. 
It is for this exact reason why the likelihood of bad events was greater in the suicidal history 
group. Due to the negative shift in mood following the mood challenge, bad events were seen 
as more likely simply because it was easier for the individuals to recall occurrences of similar 
events whose emotional content matches their negative or sad mood state. 
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As also hypothesised, following the mood challenge, the suicidal history group 
exhibited lower levels of happiness ratings and higher levels of despondence ratings as 
measured by the Visual Analogue Scale than the non-suicidal group. This pattern of results 
were consistent with that of the mood priming study conducted by Hepburn and her 
colleagues (2006), who found that the sad mood induction procedure was an effective method 
to alter levels of happiness and despondence in a sample of non-depressed volunteers. 
Interestingly, the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group did not differ on their 
levels of happiness and despondence prior to the mood challenge. The similarity in the 
groups’ pre-induction mood ratings suggests that there were no pre-existing group differences 
that could have biased the data in favour of the suicidal history group (e.g. as being more 
despondent and less happy than the non-suicidal group). As the DAH focuses on the 
individual’s cognitive vulnerability to hopelessness, it was crucial that the results of 
independent t-tests have established that the greater degree of change in pre- to post-induction 
mood ratings in the suicidal-history group was not simply due to the pre-existing vulnerability 
to hopeless thinking during the pre-induction stage. Due to this, it was easier to determine that 
the degree of change in the pre- to post-induction future fluency was mainly due to the 
individual’s cognitive reactivity to hopelessness when in a sad mood and not simply due to 
the worsening of a pre-existing vulnerability or mood state.    
 This pattern of data suggests that although the suicidal history group had significantly 
higher levels of generalised hopelessness than the non-suicidal group on the whole, the 
suicidal history group’s momentary feelings of despondence were more differentially active. 
This finding is in keeping with the results of the ESM study in chapter 3, which revealed that 
compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group had a greater fluctuation of 
momentary hopelessness in response to the shifts in transitory mood (decrease of positive 
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affectivity & increase of negative affectivity) caused by the relatively stressful minor events 
in everyday life.  
 As expected, the suicidal history group exhibited higher cognitive reactivity to 
hopelessness as measured by the hopelessness subscale of the Leiden Index of Depression 
Scale – revised version (LEIDS). Intriguingly, however, the CR to hopelessness as measured 
by LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale did not correlate with the pre- to post-induction change in 
positive future fluency. The lack of association between CR to hopelessness and change in 
positive future fluency in the non-suicidal group, whose number of positive events was also 
significantly altered following the mood challenge, is not particularly easy to explain. It is 
possible that the lack of association was due to the fact that experimentally induced changes 
fluency for positive events did not accurately represent suicidal vulnerability in real-life 
situations thus, not showing a detectable link with CR to hopelessness as measured by the 
LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale. It is also possible that the hopelessness subscale of the LEIDS 
was simply not able to effectively capture the key elements that embody cognitive 
vulnerability to hopelessness in this particular sample.  
 In summary, the results of this study indicate that overall, the suicidal history group 
had significantly fewer positive events to look forward to than the non-suicidal group, which 
is in agreement with previous studies. More importantly, the data from the present study also 
suggest that the change in positive future fluency in the suicidal history group is a marker of 
greater sensitivity to the subtle changes in mood following the mood challenge, which 
confirms the assumption of the Differential Activation Hypothesis (DAH).  As expected, the 
mood challenge did not alter the negative future fluency in both groups, which was also 
illustrated in the findings of a similar mood priming study (Hepburn et al., 2006). Whereas 
the suicidal history group failed to exhibit less positive valence of good events, the group 
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exhibited greater negative valence of bad events as predicted. However, results on the 
likelihood ratings showed a more consistent pattern of results with previous studies as the 
suicidal history group illustrated lower likelihood ratings for good events and higher 
likelihood ratings for bad events.  
 In keeping with the DAH, the suicidal history group exhibited notably reduced 
momentary feelings of happiness and substantially elevated momentary feelings of 
despondence in response to the sad mood induction procedure. Results on the use of the 
LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale as a measure of cognitive vulnerability to hopelessness 
produced a mixed pattern of results. As hypothesised, the suicidal history group had 
significantly higher levels of CR to hopelessness than the non-suicidal group. The CR to 
hopelessness as measured by LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale, however, did not correlate with 
the pre- to post-induction change in positive future fluency as expected.  
 All in all, the results of this study extend the relevance of the DAH of suicidal relapse 
from being a model of suicidal relapse in a previously depressed sample to a potentially 
workable model of suicidal vulnerability in a sample whose diagnosis is psychosis. It also 
adds an important contribution to the literature by illustrating the DAH as a valid cognitive 
model of suicidal vulnerability in psychosis that can be tested via a concrete behavioural 
marker (e.g. future fluency). 
  
5.4.1. Strengths and limitations 
 The results of the present study are subject to a number of limitations. The fact that the 
FT and the MEPS tasks were both conducted in one single testing session, it means that the 
present study shares the same methodological limitations that were discussed in great detail in 
the MEPS study (chapter 5). Whereas the absence of a neutral or a happy mood induction did 
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not have an unfavourable effect in the results of the present study, understanding the link 
between hopelessness and different mood states might be of significant value for future 
clinical work. The lack of difference between groups on the positive valence ratings of good 
events was also not in agreement with the previous similar study (Hepburn et al., 2006).  
Finally, given that mood challenge was intended to induce subtle changes in mood, the results 
of this study must be interpreted with caution. Although the ESM study (chapter 3) suggests 
that the DAH is ecologically valid and the results of the present study are consistent with 
ESM data, a follow-up study will provide a valuable confirmation if the observed suicidal 
vulnerability as measured by the lack of fluency for positive events following the mood 
induction will predict a future suicidal behaviour in real life. Where there are a number of 
limitations, there are also a number of strengths to this study. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first study to have examined the suicidal thinking process in psychosis 
using the mood priming technique. The sample size of the study is also seen as one its 
strengths. Compared to the previous studies (e.g. Hepburn et al., 2006 where N = 52 non-
depressed volunteers; Williams et al., 2007 where N = 32 volunteers with & without histories 
of depression), the sample of 99 is relatively large, especially given a clinical group that is 
often not easy to engage, let alone recruit for a study that can be potentially upsetting or 
emotionally challenging. Also, the culturally diverse population of Birmingham made it 
possible for this study to obtain a sample with a good mix of ethnicity and social backgrounds 
(i.e. religion & family structures) underlining the generalizability of the findings.  
 Given that both problem solving impairment (as measured by the MEPS task) and 
reduced fluency for positive events (as measured by the FT task) are considered as 
behavioural outcomes closely linked with hopelessness, the clinical implications of the 
present study are therefore very much comparable to the study  in the chapter 4 (MEPS 
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study). It remains the case that the management of suicidal behaviour in young people with 
psychosis is difficult and challenging for many clinicians. The results of this study, offer a 
potentially effective way to explore the mechanism of suicidal relapse in psychosis. 
Specifically, by employing the mood priming technique and the FT task to illustrate the 
differences between the suicidal history group and the non-suicidal group, the present study 
was able to demonstrate two important things: (1) that mood challenge is a safe and effective 
mood priming technique even for a sample of individuals with psychosis and histories of 
suicidal behaviour, and (2) that positive future fluency as a behavioural marker of 
hopelessness may be of potentially useful value for future studies on suicidal behaviour in 
early psychosis.  
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CHAPTER 6 
General Discussion 
 
6.0. Introduction  
 The overarching aim of this thesis is to investigate the mechanism of suicidal thinking 
in early psychosis when the suicide rate is at its highest. The core objective is to examine if 
the recurrence of suicidal or hopeless thoughts over time can be understood within the 
framework of the DAH of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004). In order to achieve this, this 
thesis employed two contrasting methodologies: (1) the ecological approach of the ESM, and 
(2) the experimental approach of the sad mood induction procedure.  The overall results from 
this thesis support the DAH of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004), and provide 
recommendations for the application of the DAH framework in order to further explore 
suicidal thinking in early psychosis. 
 
6.1. Summary of findings 
 In the initial chapter it was noted that there was a lack of theoretical model to explain 
suicidal behaviour in general psychotic disorders, especially in FEP when the risks of suicide 
are greater (Brown, 1997; Harris & Barraclough, 1997; Palmer et al., 2005). Despite the 
enormous amount of information about the risk factors of suicidal behaviour in early 
psychosis, there is a limited amount of information about the underlying mechanisms of the 
suicidal thinking process in this clinical group. In order to address this gap, the framework of 
the DAH of suicidal relapse (Lau et al., 2004) was employed. The central idea of this 
hypothesis suggests that once suicidal or hopeless thoughts are featured in an earlier 
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depressive episode, these hopeless thoughts form a link with the depressed mood, along with 
the network of maladaptive cognition. Repeated depressive episodes strengthen this link such 
that subsequent occurrences of depressed mood will trigger these hopeless/suicidal thoughts. 
To empirically test the differential activation process, two contrasting methodologies were 
employed.  In chapter 3, the ESM (de Vries, 1992) was conducted in order to capture the 
differential activation of hopeless or suicidal thoughts in the context of the individual’s 
everyday life. The ESM is a systematic diary keeping method, which requires individuals to 
fill in a self-report questionnaire at predetermined times of the day within his/her real-life 
environment (de Vries, 1992). The key advantage of the ESM is that it measures key variables 
of interest in real-life contexts as they occur. Overall, the findings of the ESM study were 
largely in line with the hypotheses. In comparison to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal 
history group exhibited higher levels of momentary hopelessness in everyday life as expected. 
The suicidal group also exhibited greater momentary hopelessness linked to negative 
affectivity (NA) and reduced hopelessness linked to positive affectivity (PA), compared to the 
non-suicidal group. When confronted with unpleasant events, the suicidal group had a greater 
increase in momentary hopelessness and NA, and a greater decrease in PA, compared to the 
non-suicidal group. However, when confronted with challenging activities, the suicidal 
history group exhibited greater NA than the non-suicidal group. However, the groups did not 
differ in their momentary hopelessness and PA when faced with difficult activities. In the 
discussion it was noted that there were a lack of structured activities in this group on a day to 
day basis, and the main events of their typical weekly routines were face to face 
conversations, telephone calls, or visits by family members or friends, which may explain 
why event-related stress had more meaningful interactions with affectivity and momentary 
hopelessness.  
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 As expected, measures of cognitive reactivity to hopelessness were found to be higher 
in the suicidal history group than the non-suicidal group. Cognitive reactivity to hopelessness 
was measured using the hopelessness subscale of the Leiden Index of Depression Scale – 
revised version (Van der Does & Williams, 2003). Consistent with the hypothesis, higher CR 
to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale was found to be predictive 
of the individual’s susceptibility to momentary hopelessness when affectivity is negative. 
Similarly, higher CR to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS was also found to be 
predictive of the individual’s propensity to momentary hopelessness when faced with 
unpleasant events. However, CR to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS did not predict 
momentary hopelessness when faced with stressful activities. Overall, the pattern of results 
suggests that momentary hopelessness is more strongly linked with NA than PA, which is 
consistent with the assumption of the DAH for suicidal relapse.  
 In chapters 4 and 5, the sad mood induction procedure was conducted in order to test 
the differential activation of hopeless or suicidal thoughts by inducing individuals to certain 
feelings of sadness, prior to being re-tested using the same sets of behavioural tasks from 
baseline (prior to the mood challenge). The first task was the Means-Ends Problem Solving 
task (MEPS; Platt & Spivack, 1975). The MEPS task is a verbal task, which was devised to 
measure interpersonal problem solving ability. Previous studies have shown that an impaired 
problem solving ability is a behavioural feature of hopelessness (Pollock & Williams, 2001; 
Sadowsky & Kelly, 1993; Schotte & Clum, 1982). The purpose of the mood challenge was to 
test if the change in mood will alter the interpersonal problem ability as suggested by the 
DAH framework. The results of the study were consistent with this hypothesis as the suicidal 
history group exhibited a more impaired problem solving performance following the mood 
challenge. Further, compared to the non-suicidal group, the suicidal history group also 
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exhibited higher levels of despondence and lower levels of happiness as measured by the 
Visual Analogue Scale (McCormick, Horne, & Sheather, 1988) following the sad mood 
induction. However, contrary to the hypothesis, individuals’ CR to hopelessness as measured 
by the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale was not correlated with the pre- to post-induction 
change in problem solving ability. Overall, the pattern of data from this problem solving study 
replicated the results of the ESM, which indicated that negative affectivity reactivates 
hopeless thoughts. Intriguingly however, the lack of association between vulnerability to 
hopelessness (or the pre- to post-induction change in problem solving ability) and CR to 
hopelessness (as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale) is in conflict with the 
apparent link between the LEIDS and momentary hopelessness when affectivity is negative. 
 Following the MEPS task, the Future Thinking (FT; MacLeod et al., 1993) task was 
conducted. The FT task is also a verbal task, which was devised to measure fluency for future 
expectations (also referred to as future events). Previous studies have illustrated that the lack 
of fluency for positive events is also a behavioural feature of hopelessness (MacLeod et al., 
1993). As predicted, the suicidal history group had significantly fewer numbers of positive 
events to look forward to than the non-suicidal group, which is in agreement with the findings 
of previous studies. More importantly, the data from the present study also indicated that the 
subtle downward shift in mood significantly reduced the positive future fluency in the suicidal 
history group, which confirms the assumption of the DAH of suicidal relapse.  As expected, 
the downward shift in mood did not alter the negative future fluency in both groups, which 
was also illustrated in the findings of a similar mood priming study (Hepburn et al., 2006). 
Whereas the suicidal history group failed to exhibit less positive valence ratings for good 
events, the suicidal history group exhibited greater negative valence ratings for negative 
events as predicted. On the other hand, the data on the likelihood ratings showed a more 
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consistent pattern of results with previous studies as the suicidal history group illustrated 
lower likelihood ratings for positive events and higher likelihood ratings for negative events 
(Andersen et al., 1992; MacLeod et al., 1997; MacLeod & Cropley, 1995).  Overall, the 
pattern of data from this future thinking study was in keeping with the results of the problem 
solving and ESM study, which indicated that the mechanism of suicidal/hopeless thoughts is 
mood-dependent.  
 In summary, the results from the mood priming and ESM studies have both confirmed 
that previously suicidal individuals are more “differentially active” to suicidal or hopeless 
thoughts when in a low or negative mood, compared to the non-suicidal individuals. 
However, whereas the CR to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS’ hopelessness subscale 
predicted vulnerability to momentary hopelessness when affectivity is negative in everyday 
life, the vulnerability to hopelessness as measured by the MEPS and FT tasks did not correlate 
with the CR to hopelessness as measured by the LEIDS. The reason for this remains unclear 
and only further research will help establish the validity and reliability of the LEIDS’ 
hopelessness subscale as a measure of CR to hopelessness. 
 
6.2. Limitations 
 The studies reported in this thesis are the first to have taken both the experimental and 
ecological approach, to investigate the suicidal thinking process in FEP using the DAH of 
suicidal relapse framework. For this reason, these studies only represent the starting point for 
further investigation of the suicidal thinking mechanism in psychosis. Specifically, there are 
three areas they could extend. First, future research could employ a follow-up study in order 
to examine if the observed vulnerability to hopeless or suicidal thoughts (as measured from 
either the ESM, or behavioural problem solving & future fluency tasks) will be predictive of 
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subsequent suicidal behaviours in real life. The studies conducted in this thesis were a 
combination of cross-sectional (chapter 4 & 5) and longitudinal (chapter 3) methods, and the 
inclusion of a follow-up was simply not feasible due to time constraints.  
 Second, future research could investigate the suicidal thinking process in other 
psychosis populations. The studies in this thesis were restricted to FEP individuals only. Due 
to the particularly high incidence of suicidal behaviour during this early stage of the illness, 
the results may not be transferrable to individuals who are at a much later stage of the 
psychotic illness.  
 Third, future research could explicitly investigate suicidal relapse via the ESM by 
adding items that are specifically formulated to measure the severity of suicidal ideation and 
intent. The questionnaire employed in the ESM study in this thesis was only limited to 
assessing hopeless thoughts and feelings. The addition of items that specifically measures the 
severity of suicidal thinking and intent could help uncover the extent of the relationship 
between mood and hopelessness, and the contextual factors that can potentially trigger 
suicidal relapse in everyday life.   
 
6.3. Observations from the Research: Recommendations for future studies  
 on suicidality in psychosis 
 In this thesis it has been suggested that the interaction between the individual and 
his/her natural context is crucial in understanding the underlying mechanism of suicidal 
thinking. One of the important issues that arose from employing the ESM was that a number 
of participants found the diary keeping task inconvenient and slightly irritating. The 6-day 
duration of the ESM study and the daily frequency of sampling (total = 10) were perceived to 
be quite intrusive and challenging. In the debriefing, when participants were asked if they 
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would take part again in a similar study, only a few were keen to do it. As noted in chapter 3, 
the monetary incentive seemed to be the main motivation for taking part in the study. As 
much as monetary incentives helped in the recruitment, there was no guarantee whether the 
task was completed to the best standard possible, or simply to a standard that was acceptable 
enough to earn the incentive. This speculation was mainly based on the fact the average 
number of valid ESM reports per participant (59%) was slightly lower than the reported 
compliance rate in other ESM studies of psychosis (66%; Oorschot et al., 2009). However, 
there was also a possibility that due to the distressing and traumatic experiences following the 
initial episode of psychosis (Harrison & Fowler, 2004; Jackson & Iqbal, 2000; Jackson et al. 
2009; Riedesser, 2004; Tan et al., 2012; Tarrier et al., 2007), the participants were less able to 
cope with a demanding task such as the ESM.  
 Having taken all of the methodological issues of the ESM into consideration, it is 
possible that these issues will present potential ethical and practical difficulties for future 
research. However, there are ways to minimise the difficulty of the ESM in this particular 
group. First, the number of questions in the ESM diary could be simplified by focusing solely 
on the mood, hopelessness, and contexts (i.e. people, places, & activities/events). A 
questionnaire that is more straightforward and quicker to complete might reduce the “burden” 
of doing it more frequently.  Second, the use of electronic devices (i.e. PDA’s or smart 
phones) could offer a more efficient way of filling in the ESM questionnaires. The option to 
customise the sampling signals or prompts, from the irritating beeping sound of a digital 
wristwatch to a more discrete mode in PDA’s, might present a more attractive diary keeping 
method to the participant. Although previous electronic ESM studies have indicated that some 
of the participants found the use of handheld devices slightly difficult (Kimhy et al., 2006), 
the compliance rate was increased and overall feedback was positive (Graholm et al., 2008). 
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Finally, the irritation from frequent sampling could also be minimised by decreasing the 
sampling frequency per day (e.g. 6 samplings per day instead of 10) and increasing the 
duration of the ESM study (e.g. 10 days instead of 6). By doing this, equal number of ESM 
reports (60) are generated at a less intense sampling rate, albeit over a longer period of time.   
 On the other hand, the only issue that arose from the mood priming studies was the 
risk of residual feelings of unhappiness at the end of the testing session. Although it was 
noted that only 3 of the 99 individuals who undertook the sad mood induction procedure 
(chapter 4) reported some residual feelings of sadness at the end of the testing session, it is 
possible that this could present a more serious issue in future research. This issue is 
particularly crucial if the study involves individuals who are at higher suicidal risk (i.e. 
previous attempters or self-harmers). Whereas it is difficult to predict the impact of the mood 
challenge on an individual level, there are ways to minimise the risks of residual effects from 
escalating into feelings of hopelessness. First, a happy mood induction could be offered to 
counteract the effects of the sad mood induction procedure. Teasdale, Taylor, and Fogarty 
(1980) have demonstrated the effectiveness of such procedure in inducing feelings of elation 
to facilitate retrieval of happy memories. Second, frequent monitoring could be coordinated 
with the participant’s care team. Third, as a responsible researcher, a leaflet with information 
about agencies/organisations that could be contacted during out of working hours should be 
given to the participants at the end of the session.  
 
6.4. Clinical Implications 
 Results of the mood priming studies suggesting a link between an induced sad mood 
and hopelessness is consistent with the pattern of data from the ESM study. The confirmation 
of such link between the natural fluctuation of mood in everyday life and hopeless thoughts 
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conveys implications that are crucial to understanding the suicidal thinking process in FEP. 
More specifically, it supports the assumptions of the DAH of suicidal relapse, which suggests 
that the mechanism of hopeless/suicidal thinking is mood-dependent. From a clinical point of 
view, the results of this study present potentially valuable inputs that will help manage and 
prevent suicidal relapse in FEP more effectively. First, the application of the DAH for suicidal 
relapse as a framework of suicidality in psychosis could provide clinicians a better 
understanding of the suicidal thinking process, and a better insight for a more effective risk 
assessment. Unlike the traditional suicidal risk assessment which mainly relies on historical 
information (distal) and/or the immediate (proximal) risk factors, recognition of the 
interaction between the distal and proximal risk factors as suggested by the DAH framework 
could help establish a more effective way to assess suicidal vulnerability.  Second, the 
appraised “reactivity” to momentary hopelessness linked to changes in negative affectivity in 
everyday life suggests that low-level hopelessness remains even though the individuals with a 
history of suicidal behaviour were not “currently” suicidal. The absence of suicidal attempts 
despite the activation of suicidal ideation supports the idea that attenuated hopelessness 
persists on a day to day basis for those with histories of suicidal behaviour and this may be 
speculated that if this was a target for intervention, this might act to interrupt the mood-
hopeless-suicidal attempt cycle. In view of this, the use of the ESM as a tool for assessing the 
individual’s vulnerability to hopeless thoughts in everyday life could potentially offer a more 
effective form of risk assessment. As the ESM was devised to sample data from the 
individual’s natural environment, the data from the ESM could present a better understanding 
of how hopelessness reacts to the natural fluctuations of mood in real life. For this reason, the 
ESM could also function as an alternative measure of cognitive reactivity to hopelessness in 
everyday life. Third, the ability of the ESM data to provide real life contexts (e.g. people, 
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places, activities, & events) to the interaction between mood and hopelessness could also 
provide a better insight on the role of contextual factors in suicidal thinking. Further, 
identification of good and problematic contexts could be a useful input in the development of 
new interventions for suicidality. More importantly, the ESM could also be a valuable tool for 
both the clinician and the individual by: (1) providing clinicians a way to assess the efficacy 
of the interventions for suicidality, and (2) educating the individual to be more mindful of 
his/her mood along with the context that he/she is in. Fourth, the impairment of problem 
solving following a downward shift in mood suggests that the development of problem 
solving abilities could be an important focus of interventions for suicidality. The development 
of problem solving ability could facilitate a better coping mechanism and enhance the self-
esteem/confidence of the individual. A study on resilience to suicidality has indicated that 
positive attributional style was one of the psychological factors that act as a “buffer” to 
suicidality (Johnson, Wood, Gooding, & Tarrier, 2011). Finally, the decrease in fluency for 
positive events following the sad mood induction suggests that the development of goal 
specificity could be another important focus on interventions for suicidality. A study on the 
effect of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy on the specificity of goals in a sample of 
previously suicidal individuals with chronic depression has indicated that being mindful 
facilitated identification of more specific goals (Crane, Winder, Hargus, Amarasinghe, & 
Barnhofer, 2012). There is every reason to suppose that this may be successful in the early 
phase of psychosis where suicide is at its highest and is a very positive avenue for further 
research.  
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6.5. Conclusion  
 In conclusion, the results of the studies in this thesis illustrated that low mood triggers 
the “differential activation” of hopeless/suicidal thoughts as proposed by the DAH of suicidal 
relapse. Importantly, mood-linked impairments in problem solving and positive future 
fluency, along with reactivity to momentary hopelessness in everyday life were all 
demonstrated to be significantly more evident in the suicidal history group than the non-
suicidal group. Thus, it is indicated that mood-dependent problem solving deficit and 
dysfluency for positive events, along with increased reactivity to momentary hopelessness 
linked to negative affectivity are significant characteristics of a greater suicidal vulnerability 
in FEP individuals with a history of suicidal behaviour. Therefore, the application of the DAH 
as a framework for understanding the suicidal thinking in FEP warrants further studies, in 
order to improve existing interventions for suicidality and reduce the likelihood of subsequent 
suicidal relapse. Specifically, the use of the ESM as a potential tool for assessing suicidal 
vulnerability also requires further research in order to improve existing risk assessment 
procedures. Further, the mindfulness-based interventions used to prevent depression relapse in 
MDD may well have utility in preventing escalation from momentary changes in hopelessness 
linked to daily life experiences, in this most difficult and clinically challenging area of 
psychosis. 
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APPENDIX 1. PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
 
 
 
Study Title  
 
The association between daily hassles, low mood, and hopelessness in patients with psychosis: A move 
towards validating the Differential Activation Hypothesis of suicidal relapse and recurrence using the 
Experience Sampling Method 
 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it 
is important to understand why this research study is being carried out and also what it involves. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. You 
are welcome to ask us any questions and our contact details are available at the end of this information 
sheet. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
There are two main aims to this study. First, is to examine the effect of mood on the way we look into 
our future and how we solve common day to day problems. Second, is to look at the effect of daily life 
hassles on your day to day mood and thoughts.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary. You are free to – (a) decline to participate, (b) 
refuse to answer any individual question, or (c) withdraw your participation at any time without giving 
a reason, and without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
What will I have to do, if I take part? 
 
This research involves two separate studies. You may choose to take part only in study 1, study 2, or 
both. If you do not wish to take part at all then there is no need to return the reply form from your 
letter of invitation. 
 
Study 1 – Future Thinking (FT) task and Means Ends Problem Solving (MEPS) tasks 
 
Assessments: Before the main part of the experiment starts you will undergo a series of assessments. 
These will measure your current level of depression, suicidal thinking, hopelessness and future 
thinking. The assessments are conducted in the form of questionnaires and interview. Each test will 
take between 10-15 minutes to complete. 
 
Future Thinking Task: You will be asked to think of possible future experiences that will occur over 3 
different time periods (next week including today, next year, & next 5 to 10 years). You will then be 
asked to think of future experiences under two different conditions (negative and positive). You will 
be given 1 minute to generate as many responses as you can for each of the time period and 
conditions. (Total duration: 15 minutes) 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
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Means-Ends Problem Solving Task: You will be presented with problem scenarios on cards which will 
be simultaneously read aloud by the experimenter. Each scenario will outline an initial situation in 
which there is a problem to be solved and a desired endpoint. You will be given 2 minutes to describe 
the most effective strategy for solving the problem. (Total duration: 20 minutes) 
 
Note: There are no right and wrong answers for the FT & MEPS tasks, they are both relatively easy to 
complete. 
 
Musical Mood Induction Procedure: After completing the FT and MEPS tasks, a musical mood 
induction procedure will then be performed. This will consist of listening to a sad music and reading 
cards containing sad statements. The purpose of the procedure is to induce a sad mood. (Total 
duration: 8-10 minutes) 
 
Following this procedure, you will be asked to complete the same tasks that you did prior to the mood 
induction procedure.  
 
Study 2 - Experience Sampling Method (ESM) 
 
Assessments: Before the main part of the experiment starts you will undergo a series of assessments. 
These will measure your current level of depression, suicidal thinking, hopelessness and future 
thinking, mood, rumination, response style, and life events. The assessments are conducted in the form 
of questionnaires and interview. Each test will take between 10-15 minutes to complete. (Note: Some 
of the assessments completed on study 1 will not be repeated.) 
 
ESM procedure: You will be asked to assess your mood, thoughts, and activities in your day to day 
environment (e.g. at home, at work). You will be given a digital wrist watch and 6 ESM questionnaire 
diaries; one diary for each day of the study. Over the 6 days of study, the digital watch will emit 10 
randomised beeps between the hours of 07.30am – 10.30pm, to inform you to fill out the 
corresponding page in the ESM questionnaire diary. It takes about 2 minutes to complete each 
questionnaire. The questionnaire assesses your current thought, mood, self-worth, future thinking, 
psychotic experience, location, activity, physical needs and substance use. (Total duration: Each diary 
questionnaires = 2 minutes; 10 questionnaire per day (10 x 2min) = 20 minutes; 6 days of diary 
assessments (6 X 20min) = 120 minutes).  
 
Note: You will only be expected to complete the diary assessments whenever it is possible & safe to 
do so. For instance, if you usually get up at around 10am and do not want to be disturbed when the 
watch emits a beep sound, you could put the watch in another room, or hide it in a drawer. The same 
thing applies should you wish to go to bed earlier than 10.30pm. Also, you will not be expected to 
pause from your day to day activity to fill in your diary unless it is safe and possible to do so (e.g. 
cycling & driving). 
 
What about my expenses?  
 
If you take part in the experiment your transportation costs to and from the pre-assessment venue will 
be met. Unfortunately, we cannot refund petrol costs for your own personal vehicle, but can reimburse 
you for public transport cost (on provision of a receipt/bus or train tickets).  
 
This sounds really complicated, will I get any help? 
 
Yes, when you have expressed an interest in taking part in the study, we will contact you, allowing 
you to ask any questions and address any concerns or worries you have about the study. You will be 
given a brief session on how you take part in the Experience Sampling Method study. A researcher 
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will guide you through a sample questionnaire, briefing you in how to use the watch, and provide all 
the guidance you will require. In the case of an emergency during the experiment, the researcher will 
be contactable by phone (e.g. problems with watch, diary loss)  
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
You will be paid £20 upon completion of Study 1 (MEPS & FT study) and £30 upon completion of 
Study 2 (ESM study) in appreciation of your time and effort.  
 
When your participation is complete, you will be given an opportunity to learn about this research, 
which may be useful in understanding yourself and others. By keeping a diary for 6 days (study 2), 
you may gain some insight on how your thoughts, activities, and events could make you feel a certain 
way (e.g. sad, cheerful, etc.). We do not, however, guarantee that everyone would benefit from the 
study as the daily life experiences of each individual will vary from person to person.  
 
All in all, whilst we cannot promise that this study will help you, we hope that our results will add to 
the knowledge about daily life hassles, hopelessness, and low mood. 
 
 
What are the possible risks of taking part? 
 
When filling out questionnaires (for study 1 & 2), you may come across a question(s) that you find 
unpleasant. For instance, for study 1 you will be asked to think about possible negative events in your 
future. A couple of our questionnaires have questions about past events or occasions when you were 
feeling quite low, which you might also find uncomfortable.  
 
Some of you may find study 2 slightly challenging or demanding as you will be need  to complete 
your diary assessments at random times of the day. The diary assessments are especially challenging 
during the first day but once you get used to doing it, each questionnaire should only take no more 
than 2 minutes to complete.  
 
If you want to seek help or wish to discuss your concerns further, support and assistance will be 
available via your Early Intervention Service (EIS) key worker. Counselling from an appropriate 
professional will also be offered if required. 
 
What will happen once I have finished taking part in the study? 
 
You will firstly be given an in depth debrief of the aims of the study, and when the data analysis is 
completed, a copy of the report will be issued to you. 
  
 
Will my taking part keep confidential? 
 
We recommend that your GP should know that you are taking part in this research. If you are happy 
for us to tell them, we will write them a letter. Nobody else will know about your participation in the 
study, and all results will be made anonymous (that is, your name will not be on them). 
 
You will be assigned a code number which will protect your identity. All data will be kept in secured 
files, in accord with the standards of the NHS Research Ethics. Only the researchers involved in this 
study and those responsible for research oversight will have access to the information you provide. 
There will no identifying information (e.g. name, address, & telephone number) in your questionnaires 
so no one will be able to know how you did in your assessments. Your signed consent form will be 
kept completely separate from your paper-based assessments.  
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Finally, it is no individual person's responses that interest us; we are studying the association between 
low mood, hopelessness, and daily life hassles between clinical groups in general, so your name and 
any other identifying information will not appear on the final report.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The results of the study will be published as an internal and external report, being made available to 
the educational supervisors of the student conducting this research at the University of Birmingham. 
The study may also be external published through publication to a scientific journal. However, your 
anonymity will be preserved at all stages of this process.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This research is organised jointly by the University of Birmingham and Birmingham and Solihull 
Mental Health Trust: Early Intervention Service. The study has been reviewed by Birmingham South 
Research Ethics Committee and has been ethically approved (Insert Ethics Approval/Ref Number). 
 
What happens now? 
 
Think about all the information on this sheet and tell your Early Intervention Service (EIS) key worker 
or the person who sent you the sheet (please see reply form on the letter of invitation) whether you 
want to learn more about the research. If you do, we will telephone you at home and offer you an 
appointment for an assessment visit. If you are not sure about anything, you can ask questions at that 
first visit. At the first visit, we will go through all the information on this sheet to make sure that you 
understand it. We will then ask you to sign a consent form to agree to the research. 
 
Where can I get more information? 
 
If you have any further questions about this study, please feel free to contact any members of the 
researcher team below: 
 
 Donna Back 
PhD Psychology Student 
School of Psychology 
University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, B15 2TT 
0121 414 7209  
 07985 882 878 
 dbb759@bham.ac.uk 
 
 Dr Chris Jackson 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
Early Intervention Services 
1 Miller Street, Aston Birmingham, B6 4NF  
 0121 301 1850 Fax:  0121 301 1851 
 Chris.Jackson@bsmht.nhs.uk 
 
 Prof Max Birchwood 
Director of Early Intervention Services 
1 Miller Street, Aston Birmingham, B6 4NF,  
 0121 301 1850, Fax: 0121 301 1851 
 M.j.birchwood.20@bham.ac.uk 
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Important contact points DURING the study: 
If you have any concerns about the conduct of this study please contact: 
 Dr Paul McDonald 
Manager of Research and Development Unit  
Birmingham & Solihull Mental Health NHS Trust 
Suite P, Radclyffe House, 66/68 Hagley Road 
Birmingham, B16 8PF 
 0121 678 4326 
 paul.mcdonald@bsmht.nhs.uk 
 
For ESM diary study-related enquiries/concerns (e.g. faulty watch, missing diaries, etc.), please 
contact: 
 
 Donna Back (between 9am – 5pm only) 
 0121 414 7209 
 (Work mobile – tbc) 
 dbb759@bham.ac.uk 
 
 
For support and assistance (should you feel upset, unhappy, or have any concerns about your mental 
health during and after the study), please contact your Early Intervention Service (EIS) key worker on: 
 
 Early Intervention Services (between 9am – 5pm only) 
 0121 301 1850 
 
 
For out of hours or 24 hours advice and support, please contact: 
 
 24 hours - Mental Health Services Switchboards 
 
North or Heart of Birmingham 
 0121 685 7300 or 0121 623 5500 
 
QEPH and South Birmingham 
  0121 678 2000 
 
 Solihull Patients 
  0121 424 2000 
 
 PALS (Patient Advice & Liaison Service) 
 0800 953 0045 
 
 Birmingham Focus Line  
 0800 027 2127 
 
 
THANK YOU for taking time to read this. 
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APPENDIX 2. PARTICIPANT’S LETTER OF INVITATION 
 
 
 
 
School of Psychology 
513 Frankland Bldg 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 
B15 2TT 
 
Tel No. 0121 414 7209 
 dbb759@bham.ac.uk 
 
 
>Patient’s Name< 
>Patient’s Address< 
 
>Date< 
 
 
Dear __________________, 
 
My name is Donna Back. I am a postgraduate student at the University of Birmingham. I am conducting a 
research study on “The association between daily hassles, low mood, and hopelessness” as part of the 
requirements of my PhD in Psychology, and I would like to invite you to participate. This study is jointly 
sponsored by the University of Birmingham and Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust. The main aim of 
the study is to explore the relationship between daily life hassles and mood. If you do decide to participate, you 
will be asked to complete several questionnaires and participate in the experiments explained in the attached 
information sheet.  
 
Your participation is confidential. The data collected from this study will be kept in a secure location at the 
University of Birmingham, which only the research team has access to. The results of the study may be 
published or presented at professional meetings, but your identity will not be revealed. Your participation is also 
anonymous, which means that no one (not even the research team) will know what your answers are. So, please 
do not write your name or any other identifying information on any of the questionnaires. 
 
You will receive a total of £50.00 as an appreciation for your time and participation (Study 1 = £20.00 & Study 2 
= £30.00). Your travel expenses will also be reimbursed upon proof of travel receipts or tickets (bus or train). If 
you withdraw from the study prior to the conclusion, your reimbursement will be pro-rata (total amount due will 
be divided by the number of hours spent). 
 
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You are free to withdraw at anytime during the study without giving any 
reason. 
 
If you would like to participate, please read the attached information sheet for full details of the study. If you 
have any questions about it or would like to discuss participating, please contact me using the details listed 
below. Alternatively, you may complete and sign the attached reply form and hand it back to your key worker or 
send it to the address given below. You do not need to reply if you do not want to participate in the study. 
 
Thank you for your consideration. 
 
With kind regards, 
 
 
Donna Back 
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APPENDIX 3. LETTER TO THE PARTICIPANT’S GP 
         
 
 
 
 
 
School of Psychology 
513 Frankland Bldg 
Edgbaston 
Birmingham 
B15 2TT 
 
Tel No. 0121 414 7209 
 
 
>GP’s Name< 
>GP’s Address< 
 
 
 
Dear Dr …………………., 
 
Re:  Patient’s Name ______________________ 
Date of Birth  ______________________ 
NHS No  ______________________ 
 
Study Title: “The association between daily life hassles, low mood, and hopelessness in 
patients with psychosis” 
 
 
Your patient is participating in the above study on daily life hassles, low mood, and hopelessness. The 
study will involve completion of a number of questionnaires, simple problem-solving and future 
directed thinking tasks, but will not involve any changes in their treatment. A copy of the participant 
information sheet is enclosed for your reference. 
 
If you require any further information, please contact me on the numbers above, or the Principal 
Investigator, Prof Max Birchwood on 0121 301 1850. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Donna Back 
Chief Investigator/PhD Student 
 
(On behalf of the study investigators) 
 
 
Cc: >Patient’s name< 
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APPENDIX 4. PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM (MEPS & FT STUDY) 
 
Study title: The association between daily hassles, low mood, and hopelessness in patients with psychosis: 
A move towards validating the Differential Activation Hypothesis of suicidal relapse and recurrence using 
the Experience Sampling Method 
 
By signing this informed consent form you are indicating that you understand the nature of the research study 
and that you agree to participate in the research.   
 
                       
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 25
th
 March 2009 
(version 2) for the above study and have had the opportunity to discuss the details with 
………………………. and ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason, and without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that my participation will be anonymous (that is, my name will not be linked 
with any data I give) and that all information I provide will remain confidential. 
 
4. I also understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected during the 
study may be looked at by members of the research team, from regulatory authorities or 
from the NHS Trust where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission 
for these individuals to have access to my records. 
 
5. I agree to communication with my GP about my participation in the research.  
 
 5.a. I would like to be copied in to all such correspondence 
 
6. I hereby fully and freely consent to participate in the above Study 1- Future Thinking 
Task and Means Ends Problem Solving task, which has been fully explained to me. 
 
I have read and understood the statements above, and voluntarily sign this form. I further acknowledge 
that I have received an offer of a copy of this consent form. 
 
Volunteer _____________________________  
Signature _____________________________ Date ___________________________ 
*If you wish to be told the results of this research, please tick here             and provide your contact details at the 
back of this form.  
 
Investigator Donna Back___________________ 
Signature _____________________________ Date ___________________________ 
 
Person taking consent _______________________  
Signature _____________________________ Date ___________________________ 
Participant Consent Form 
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APPENDIX 5. PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM (ESM STUDY) 
 
 
Study title: The association between daily hassles, low mood, and hopelessness in patients with psychosis: 
A move towards validating the Differential Activation Hypothesis of suicidal relapse and recurrence using 
the Experience Sampling Method 
 
By signing this informed consent form you are indicating that you understand the nature of the research study 
and that you agree to participate in the research.   
            
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 25
th
 March 2009 
 (version 2) for the above study and have had the opportunity to discuss the details with  
………………………. and ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time,  
without giving any reason, and without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I understand that my participation will be anonymous (that is, my name will not be linked  
with any data I give) and that all information I provide will remain confidential. 
 
4. I also understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected during the  
study may be looked at by members of the research team, from regulatory authorities or from  
the NHS Trust where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give permission for these  
individuals to have access to my records. 
 
5. I agree to communication with my GP about my participation in the research.  
 
 5.a. I would like to be copied in to all such correspondence 
 
6. I hereby fully and freely consent to participate in the above Study 2- The Experience Sampling 
 Method, which has been fully explained to me. 
 
 
I have read and understood the statements above, and voluntarily sign this form. I further acknowledge 
that I have received an offer of a copy of this consent form. 
 
Volunteer _____________________________  
Signature _____________________________ Date ___________________________ 
 
*If you wish to be told the results of this research, please tick here             and provide your contact details at the 
back of this form.  
 
Investigator Donna Back___________________ 
Signature _____________________________ Date ___________________________ 
 
Person taking consent _______________________  
Signature _____________________________ Date ___________________________ 
 
 
Participant Consent Form 
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APPENDIX 6. COLUMBIA SUICIDE HISTORY FORM 
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APPENDIX 7. LEIDEN INDEX OF DEPRESSION SCALE – REVISED 
    
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Instructions 
Below are a number of statement that may apply to you to a lesser or greater extent. 
Almost every statement concerns your thoughts about a certain matter at time when you feel down or 
when you are in a low mood. This does not mean a seriously depressed mood or true depression. Your 
task is to indicate the extent to which the statements apply to you when you feel somewhat sad. 
 
Try to imagine the following situation when filling out this questionnaire. 
 It is certainly not a good day, but you don’t truly feel down or depressed. 
 Perhaps your mood is an early sign of something worse, but things might improve in the next 
 day or two. 
 On a scale of 0 to 10 (0 = not at all; 10 = extremely sad; 6 and above = a truly depressed 
 mood), you would choose 3 or 4 to describe your mood. 
 This scale looks like this: 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
not at all sad  somewhat sad  depressed   extremely sad 
 
Please try to imagine yourself in the above situation, for instance by thinking back to the last time you 
felt somewhat sad (score 3 or 4). 
    
   {Now take some time to imagine such a situation} 
 
To what extent are you able to imagine such a situation?  O well 
        O somewhat 
        O not at all 
 
Now proceed to the next question (even if you find it difficult to imagine yourself in such a situation). 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Behaviour Research & Therapy 40; 105-120 (2002) 
Revised version © 2003, Willem Van der Does & Mark Williams 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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This applies to me....... (please circle) 
  not 
at all 
a bit mode- 
rately 
strongly very 
strongly 
1 I can only think positive when I am in a good 
mood. 
0 1 2 3 4 
2 When in a low mood, I take fewer risks. 0 1 2 3 4 
3 When I feel sad, I spend more time thinking about 
what my moods reveal about me as a person. 
0 1 2 3 4 
4 When in a sad mood, I am more creative than 
usual. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5 When I feel down, I more often feel hopeless about 
everything. 
0 1 2 3 4 
6 When I feel down, I am more busy trying to keep 
images and thoughts at bay. 
0 1 2 3 4 
7 In a sad mood, I do more things that I will later 
regret. 
0 1 2 3 4 
8 When I feel sad, I go out and do more pleasurable 
things. 
0 1 2 3 4 
9 When I feel sad, I feel as if I care less if I lived or 
died. 
0 1 2 3 4 
10 When I feel sad, I am more helpful. 0 1 2 3 4 
11 When I feel sad, I am less inclined to express 
disagreement with someone else. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12 When I feel somewhat depressed, I think I can 
permit myself fewer mistakes. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13 When I feel down, I more often feel overwhelmed 
about things. 
0 1 2 3 4 
14 When in a low mood, I am more inclined to avoid 
difficulties or conflicts. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15 When I feel down, I have a better intuitive feeling 
for what people really mean. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16 When in a sad mood, I become more bothered by 
perfectionism. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17 When I feel sad, I more often think that I can make 
no one happy. 
0 1 2 3 4 
  not 
at all 
a bit Mode- 
rately 
strongly very 
strongly 
 
Please continue to the next page. 
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This applies to me....... (please circle) 
  not 
at all 
a bit mode- 
rately 
strongly very 
strongly 
18 When I feel bad, I feel more like breaking things. 0 1 2 3 4 
19 I work harder when I feel down. 0 1 2 3 4 
20 When I feel sad, I feel less able to cope with 
everyday tasks and interests. 
0 1 2 3 4 
21 In a sad mood, I am bothered more by aggressive 
thoughts. 
0 1 2 3 4 
22 When I feel down, I more easily become cynical 
(blunt) or sarcastic. 
0 1 2 3 4 
23 When I feel down, I feel more like escaping 
everything. 
0 1 2 3 4 
24 When I feel sad, I feel more like myself. 0 1 2 3 4 
25 When I feel down, I more often neglect things. 0 1 2 3 4 
26 When I feel sad, I do more risky things. 0 1 2 3 4 
27 When I am sad, I have more problems 
concentrating. 
0 1 2 3 4 
28 When in a low mood, I am nicer than usual. 0 1 2 3 4 
29 When I feel down, I lose my temper more easily. 0 1 2 3 4 
30 When I feel sad, I feel more that people would be 
better off if I were dead. 
0 1 2 3 4 
31 When I feel down, I am more inclined to want to 
keep everything under control. 
0 1 2 3 4 
32 When I feel sad, I spend more time thinking about 
the possible causes of my mood. 
0 1 2 3 4 
33 When in a sad mood, I more often think about how 
my life could have been different. 
0 1 2 3 4 
34 When I feel sad, more thoughts of dying or 
harming myself go through my mind. 
0 1 2 3 4 
  not 
at all 
a bit Mode- 
rately 
strongly very 
strongly 
 
 
Please check whether all items are answered. Thank you.  
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APPENDIX 8. CALGARY DEPRESSION SCALE FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA 
 
 
 
CALGARY DEPRESSION SCALE 
 
1. DEPRESSION. 
How would you describe your mood over the last two weeks? 
Do you keep reasonably cheerful or have you been very depressed or low spirited recently? 
In the last two weeks how often have you (own words) every day? all day? 
0 Absent  
1 Mild Expressed some sadness or discouragement on questioning. 
2 Moderate Distinct depressed mood persisting up to half the time over last two weeks, present 
daily. 
3 Severe Markedly depressed mood persisting daily over half the time, interfering with 
normal motor and social functioning. 
 
2. HOPELESSNESS. 
How do you see the future for yourself? 
Can you see any future or has life seemed quite hopeless? 
Have you given up or does there still seem some reason for trying? 
0 Absent  
1 Mild Has at times felt hopeless over the last week but still has some degree of hope for the 
future. 
2 Moderate Persistent, moderate sense of hopelessness over last week. Can be persuaded to 
acknowledge possibility of things being better. 
3 Severe Persisting and distressing sense of hopelessness. 
 
3. SELF-DEPRECIATION. 
What is your opinion of yourself compared to other people? 
Do you feel better or not as good or about the same as most? 
Do you feel inferior or even worthless? 
0 Absent  
1 Mild Some inferiority; not amounting to feelings of worthlessness. 
2 Moderate Subject feels worthless, but less than 50% of the time. 
3 Severe Subject feel worthless more than 50% of the time. May be challenged to 
acknowledge otherwise. 
 
4. GUILTY IDEAS OF REFERENCE. 
Do you have the feeling that you are being blamed for something or even wrongly accused? 
What about ? (Do not include justifiable blame or accusations; exclude delusions of guilt). 
0 Absent  
1 Mild Subject feels blamed but not accused less than 50% of the time. 
2 Moderate Persisting sense of being blamed, and/or occasional sense of being accused. 
3 Severe Persistent sense of being accused. When challenged acknowledges that it is not so. 
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5. PATHOLOGICAL GUILT. 
Do you tend to blame yourself for little things you may have done in the past? 
Do you think you deserve to be so concerned about this? 
0 Absent  
1 Mild Subject sometimes feels over guilty about some minor peccadillo, but less than 50% 
of the time. 
2 Moderate Subject usually, (over 50% of time) feels guilty about past, actions, the significance 
of which he/she exaggerates. 
3 Severe Subject usually feels he/she is to blame for everything that has gone wrong, even 
when not his/her fault. 
 
6. MORNING DEPRESSION. 
When you have felt depressed over the last two weeks, have you noticed the depression being worse at 
any particular time of day? 
0 Absent No depression. 
1 Mild Depression present but no diurnal variation. 
2 Moderate Depression spontaneously mentioned to be worse in the morning. 
3 Severe Depression markedly worse in morning, with impaired functioning which improved 
in afternoon. 
 
7. EARLY WAKENING. 
Do you wake earlier in the morning than is normal for you? 
How many times a week does this happen? 
0 Absent No early wakening. 
1 Mild Occasionally wakes (up to twice weekly) one hour or more before normal time to 
wake or alarm time. 
2 Moderate Often wakes early (up to five times weekly) one hour or more before normal time to 
wake or alarm 
3 Severe Daily wakes one hour or more before normal time. 
 
8. SUICIDE. 
Have you felt that life wasn’t worth living? 
Did you ever feel like ending it all? 
What did you think you might do? 
Did you actually try? 
0 Absent  
1 Mild Frequently thought of being better of dead, or occasional thoughts of suicide. 
2 Moderate Deliberately considered suicide with a plan, but made no attempt. 
3 Severe Suicidal attempt apparently designed to end in death (i.e. accidental discovery or 
inefficient means). 
 
9. OBSERVED DEPRESSION. 
Based on interviewer’s observations during the entire interview. 
The question “do you feel like crying?” used at an appropriate point in the interview, may elicit 
information useful to this observation. 
0 Absent  
1 Mild Subject appears sad and mournful even during parts of the interview involving 
effectively neutral discussion. 
2 Moderate Subject appears sad and mournful throughout the interview, with gloomy 
monotonous voice and is tearful or close to tears at times. 
3 Severe Subject chokes on distressing topics, frequently sighs deeply and cries openly, or is 
persistently in a state of frozen misery. 
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APPENDIX 9. BECK HOPELESSNESS SCALE 
  
 This questionnaire consists of 20 statements. Please read the statements carefully one by 
one. If the statement described your attitude for the past week including today, mark the “T” 
indicating TRUE in the column next to the statement. If the statement does not describe your attitude, 
mark the “F” indicating FALSE in the column next to this statement. Please be sure to read each 
statement carefully. 
 
 
Please be sure to read each statement carefully. 
 
 True False 
1. I look forward to the future with hope and enthusiasm. T F 
2. I might as well give up because there is nothing I can do about making 
things better for myself. 
T F 
3. When things are going badly, I am helped by knowing that they can’t stay   
that way forever. 
T F 
4. I can’t imagine what my life would be like in ten years. T F 
5. I have enough time to accomplish the thing I most want to do. T F 
6. In the future, I expect to succeed in what concerns me most. T F 
7. My future seems dark to me. T F 
8. I happen to be particularly lucky and I expect to get more of the good 
things in life than an average person. 
T F 
9. I just don’t get the breaks, and there’s no reason to believe that I will in the 
future. 
T F 
10. My past experiences have prepared me well for my future. T F 
11. All I can see ahead is unpleasantness rather than pleasantness. T F 
12. I don’t expect to get what I really want. T F 
13. When I look ahead to the future, I expect to be happier than I am now. T F 
14. Things just won’t work out the way I want them to. T F 
15. I have great faith in the future. T F 
16. I never get what I want, so it’s foolish to want anything. T F 
17. It is very unlikely that I will get any real satisfaction in the future. T F 
18. The future seems vague and uncertain to me. T F 
19. I can look forward to more good times than bad times. T F 
20. There’s no use in really trying to get something I want because I probably 
won’t get it. 
T F 
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APPENDIX 10. INTERSEPT SCALE FOR SUICIDAL THINKING 
 
  
0 
 
1 
 
2 
Score  
(1 to 2) 
1. Wish to die None Weak Moderate to strong  
2. Reasons for living vs. dying For living outweigh for 
dying 
About equal For dying outweigh for 
living 
 
3. Desire to make active suicide attempt None Weak Moderate to strong  
4. Passive suicidal desire Would take precautions to 
save lives 
Would leave life/death to 
chance 
Would avoid steps 
necessary to save or 
maintain life 
 
5. Frequency of suicidal ideation Rare or occasional Intemittent Accepting  
6. Attitude towards ideation/wish Rejecting Ambivalent or indifferent Has no ability to control 
impulses 
 
7. Control over suicidal/acting out or delusions/ 
hallucinations of self-harm 
Has complete ability to 
control impulses 
Unsure of ability to control 
impulses 
Has no ability to control 
impulses 
 
8. Deterrents to active attempt (e.g. religious values, 
family) 
Would not attempt 
because of deterrents 
Some concerns about 
deterrents 
Minimal or no deterrents  
9. Reason for contemplating attempt To maintain the 
environment, revenge; get 
attention 
Combination of 0 and 2 Escape, solve problems  
10. Method: Specificity/planning of contemplated 
attempt 
Not considered or not 
applicable 
Considered but details not 
worked out 
Details worked out; well 
formulated plan 
 
11. Expectancy/anticipation by patient of actual 
attempt 
None Uncertain Yes  
12. Delusions/Hallucinations of self-harm (including 
command hallucinations) 
None Occasional Frequent  
TOTAL SCORE     
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Semi-Structured Interview 
InterSePT Scale for Suicical Thinking 
1. The items assess the extent of suicidal thoughts and their characteristics as well as the patient’s attitude towards them. 
2. The scale should be rated on the basis of all information available to the rater. 
3. Depending on the psychiatric status of the patients as well as the degree to which he/she is articulate, the rater has the option to follow different lines f 
 inquiry than those suggested by the questions provided below. 
4. The general time frame for rating each of the items is the last 7 days. 
5. If there is ambiguity, rate the highest rating for the week. 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Possible Questions: 
1. How are you feeling this week? 
2. In the past week, have you ever thought about taking your life? 
3. If so, how strong have these thoughts been? 
4. How frequently have you had this thoughts this past week?  
5. How strong would you say your wish to die is? 
6. This past week, have you looked forward to taking your life? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Which has been stronger this past week – your reasons for living or your reasons for dying? 
8. If you had been in a dangerous or life-threatening situation this past week, what actions would you  have taken to save your life? 
9. In this past week, have you been able to control your suicidal thinking or might you have made an attempt at any time? 
10. Is there anything in your life that would have made taking your life this past week seem like a bad idea, for example, your religion, family, 
 etc.? 
11. (IF PATIENT WAS SUICIDAL IN PAST WEEK) What have reasons been for thinking about taking your life during this past week? Do you 
 think there reasons are good ones? 
12. If you have committed sucide this past week, how would you have done it? 
13. In the past week, have you heard voices, commands or others telling you to take your life? 
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APPENDIX 11. THE ESM TIME SAMPLING SCHEDULE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAY No. TS1 TS2 TS3 DAY No. TS1 TS2 TS3
DAY 1 08:46:00 08:13:00 08:39:00 DAY 4 08:24:00 08:51:00 07:57:00
09:45:00 10:20:00 09:56:00 09:31:00 09:58:00 10:30:00
11:21:00 10:56:00 11:49:00 11:52:00 10:56:00 11:58:00
13:25:00 13:09:00 12:20:00 12:19:00 13:04:00 12:36:00
14:55:00 14:54:00 14:54:00 14:27:00 14:02:00 14:34:00
15:23:00 16:29:00 15:26:00 15:42:00 15:18:00 16:22:00
16:49:00 17:02:00 17:39:00 16:55:00 17:28:00 17:59:00
19:14:00 18:58:00 18:27:00 18:25:00 18:58:00 18:53:00
20:04:00 19:56:00 20:30:00 20:46:00 20:48:00 20:15:00
21:40:00 21:20:00 21:49:00 21:49:00 21:40:00 21:41:00
DAY 2 08:43:00 07:59:00 08:53:00 DAY 5 08:16:00 08:33:00 08:07:00
10:06:00 09:50:00 09:17:00 10:13:00 09:18:00 09:17:00
11:41:00 11:38:00 11:55:00 11:38:00 11:36:00 11:03:00
13:23:00 13:15:00 13:14:00 13:26:00 12:57:00 13:20:00
14:14:00 14:57:00 14:35:00 14:40:00 14:13:00 14:14:00
16:26:00 16:28:00 15:50:00 16:14:00 15:55:00 15:24:00
17:53:00 17:13:00 17:45:00 16:47:00 16:52:00 17:43:00
18:46:00 19:22:00 19:15:00 18:30:00 19:23:00 18:42:00
20:20:00 19:46:00 20:32:00 19:50:00 20:13:00 20:17:00
21:41:00 22:01:00 21:54:00 21:56:00 21:40:00 21:24:00
DAY 3 08:09:00 08:39:00 08:37:00 DAY 6 08:03:00 08:48:00 08:06:00
10:24:00 09:18:00 09:18:00 10:00:00 09:45:00 09:27:00
11:08:00 11:57:00 11:52:00 11:18:00 11:31:00 11:58:00
12:38:00 13:22:00 13:06:00 12:34:00 12:59:00 12:19:00
13:45:00 14:27:00 14:48:00 14:16:00 14:56:00 14:06:00
16:16:00 15:59:00 15:17:00 16:15:00 15:51:00 15:32:00
17:19:00 17:36:00 17:00:00 16:47:00 17:26:00 17:11:00
18:22:00 19:22:00 18:18:00 19:01:00 19:28:00 18:48:00
20:02:00 20:05:00 20:27:00 20:16:00 20:56:00 20:16:00
21:37:00 21:49:00 21:56:00 21:22:00 22:06:00 21:47:00
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APPENDIX 12. THE ESM DEBRIEFING FORM 
 
 
 
 
 
Date:  _____________________________ 
Interviewer: _____________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Did the Experience Sampling influence… 
Your mood          Yes/No 
If so, how? 
 
 
Your activities         Yes/No 
If so, how? 
 
 
Your thoughts         Yes/No 
If so, how? 
 
 
Your contact with other people       Yes/No 
If so, how? 
 
 
2. Did the Experience Sampling disturb you     Yes/No 
If so, how? 
 
 
 
3. Was this an ordinary week (with respect to the complaints)  Yes/No 
If not, what was different? 
 
 
 
4. Were there special events or problems during this week?   Yes/No 
If so, what? 
 
Participant Number 
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5. Were there difficult items in the booklets?     Yes/No 
    If so, which item/s? 
 
 
 
 
6. Could you give a good reflection of your experiences?   
 Yes/No 
If not, why not? 
 
 
 
 
7. Is there anything you missed in the booklets?    Yes/No 
If so, what? 
 
 
 
8. Did you take your medication during this period?    
 Yes/No 
    If not, what medication and why not?  
 
 
Remarks: 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX 13. VISUAL ANALOGUE SCALE 
 
VAS Mood Rating 
 
   Participant Number  
     Date 
 
 
 
Place a vertical mark on the line below to indicate how you feel right now. 
 
 
At this moment, I feel... 
 
 
 not at all                                                           extremely 
Happy 
 
 
 
 not at all                                                           extremely 
Despondent 
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APPENDIX 14. THE MEPS TASK – PROBLEM SCENARIOS 
 
Item no. Problem scenario 
2 Heather loved her boyfriend very much, but they had many arguments. One day, 
he (the boyfriend) left her. Heather wanted things to be better. The story ends 
with everything fine between her and her boyfriend. Please begin your story 
when her boyfriend left after an argument. 
 
3 Mrs Philips came home after shopping and found that she had lost her watch. 
She was very upset about it. The story ends with Mrs Philips finding her watch 
and feeling good about it. Please begin your story when Mrs Philips realised that 
she had lost her watch. 
 
4 Caroline had just moved in that day to a new neighbourhood and didn’t know 
anyone. Caroline wanted to have friends in this new neighbourhood. The story 
ends with Caroline having many good friends and feeling at home in the 
neighbourhood. Please begin your story with Caroline in her room, unpacking 
boxes. 
 
6 One day, Alice saw a beautiful man she had never seen before while eating in a 
restaurant. She was immediately attracted to him. The story ends when they get 
married. Please begin your story when Alice first sees the man in the restaurant. 
 
8 Jane noticed that her friends seemed to be avoiding her. Jane wanted to have 
friends and be liked. The story ends when Jane’s friends like her again. Please 
begin your story when Jane first notices her friends avoiding her. 
 
10 Jenny is having trouble getting along with her supervisor at work. Jenny is very 
unhappy about this. The story ends with Jenny’s supervisor liking her. Please 
begin your story when Jenny wasn’t getting along well with her supervisor at 
work. 
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APPENDIX 15. VELTEN NEGATIVE STATEMENTS 
 
1. It seems such an effort to do anything. 
2. I feel pessimistic about the future. 
3. I have too many bad things in my life. 
4. I have very little to look forward to. 
5. I’m drained of energy, worn out. 
6. I’m not as successful as other people. 
7. Everything seems futile, pointless. 
8. I just want to curl up and go to sleep. 
9. There are things about me that I don’t like. 
10. It’s too much of an effort even to move. 
11. I’m absolutely exhausted. 
12. The future seems just one string of problems. 
13. My thoughts keep drifting away. 
14. I get no satisfaction from the things I do. 
15. I’ve made so many mistakes in the past. 
16. I’ve got to really concentrate just to keep my eyes open. 
17. Everything I do turns out badly. 
18. My whole body has slowed down. 
19. I regret some of the things I’ve done. 
20. I can’t make the effort to liven myself up. 
21. I feel depressed with the way things are going. 
22. I haven’t any real friends anymore. 
23. I do have a number of problems. 
24. There’s no one I can really feel close to. 
25. I wish I were somebody else. 
26. I’m annoyed at myself for being so bad at making decisions. 
27. I don’t make a good impression on other people. 
28. The future looks hopeless. 
29. I don’t get the same satisfaction out of things these days. 
30. I wish something would happen to make me feel better. 
 
 
